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Disrupting Frivolous Defenses
Thomas D. Russell*
Judge Milton I. Shadur was a disrupter of frivolous defenses. In 2018,
Judge Shadur died at the age of ninety-three after thirty-seven years as a
judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
Sua sponte, Judge Shadur reviewed civil answers and disrupted the pleading
of frivolous defenses. Sua Sponte Shadur—as some lawyers called him—
rejected answers that departed from or ignored Rule 8 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
In 2001, Judge Shadur issued an Appendix to an order in State Farm v.
Riley, 199 F.R.D. 276 (N.D. Ill. 2001). The Appendix presented his
expectations regarding how defense lawyers should answer according to
Rule 8. As the Appendix makes clear, Judge Shadur disallowed pleaders to
dodge Rule 8 by (1) claiming that an allegation called for a legal conclusion,
(2) claiming that documents speak for themselves, and (3) demanding strict
proof. Judge Shadur also expected that affirmative defenses would be true
affirmative defenses, and that defense attorneys would support affirmative
defenses with foundational or predicate facts.
After presenting a minibiography of Judge Shadur, the backstory of State
Farm v. Riley, and a gloss on the Appendix, this Article tracks the use of the
Appendix by judges—mostly federal judges but some state judges—
throughout the United States. The Article covers the citation of the Appendix
by Judge Shadur himself, next by Northern District of Illinois colleagues,
then within the broader Seventh Circuit, and next among the other federal
circuits. There are a few citations in state courts. The Article concludes with
the epitome of Shadur’s Appendix, which was a rule change by the Arizona
Supreme Court in 2018, the year of Shadur’s death. Arizona’s Rule 8 now
aligns with Shadur’s Appendix.
* Professor of Law, University of Denver. Member, Colorado and California Bar. B.A., 1983,
Northwestern University; M.A., 1986, J.D., 1989, Ph.D., 1993, Stanford University.
trussell@law.du.edu. Michelle Penn, Ph.D., Kevin Whitfield, and Kris Abernathy of the
Westminster Law Library at the University of Denver have provided invaluable assistance with
research and sources. I am very grateful to Mackenzie Russell, Maria Spiridonova, and Erin
Kennedy for their expert research assistance. Professor Robert Hardaway, Andrew Jacobs, Esq.,
Scott Schutte, Esq., Patrick DeMoon, Esq., John Adams, Esq., Emily Rees Brown, Esq., Craig
Sonnenschein, Esq., Brian Sieve, Esq., Jonah Orlovsky, Esq., Dave Webster, Esq., Michael J.
Rosenberg, Esq., Lee Sternal, Esq., Zachary R. Morgan, Esq., John R. Fuller, Esq., and Lance
Taylor, Esq., generously lent their expertise to me.
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Specifically, the Article focuses on speaking documents, legal
conclusions, and affirmative defenses. The organization by federal circuit
should be interesting to academics and useful to attorneys preparing FRCP
12 motions to deem allegations admitted, motions for a more definite
statement, or motions to strike affirmative defenses.
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I. JUDGE MILTON SHADUR: DISRUPTER OF FRIVOLOUS DEFENSES
Judge Milton Shadur was a disrupter of frivolous defenses. Judge
Shadur, who died at the age of ninety-three in 2018,1 schooled lawyers
who answered civil cases during his thirty-seven years as a judge of the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.2 Sua
1. Tony Briscoe, Judge Oversaw Cases Involving CPS and Jail, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 17, 2018, at 5;
Shadur, Milton Irving, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/shadur-milton-irving
[https://perma.cc/SYS8-UHGK] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
2. Julianne M. Hartzell & David N. Patariu, More Than a Judge, Shadur Became a Teacher on
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sponte, Judge Shadur reviewed civil complaints and answers.3 Indeed,
one former clerk told me the judge’s nickname was Sua Sponte Shadur;
if this lore be untrue, then I bestow the nickname posthumously.4
From his first years on the bench in the early 1980s until he retired near
the end of his life,5 Sua Sponte Shadur disrupted the pleading of frivolous
defenses. Judge Shadur rejected answers that departed from or ignored
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 8, which governs the pleading of
allegations in complaints, permissible responses to allegations, and the
pleading of affirmative defenses.6 In Shadur’s court, when defense
lawyers’ responses had no basis in law, Judge Shadur rejected them.
When answering attorneys listed affirmative defenses without legal or
factual support, he rejected the frivolous defenses without waiting for the
plaintiffs’ lawyers to file motions. I endorse Judge Shadur’s approach and
urge federal judges, state court judges, and defense attorneys—especially
insurance defense attorneys—to emulate Judge Shadur. For plaintiffs’
lawyers who may need to convince a judge or opposing counsel of the
wisdom of this Illinois federal judge’s approach, I have organized this
article by jurisdiction with an eye toward providing authority to support
motions to overcome frivolous defenses.
This article meshes with empirical analysis I present in my article
Frivolous Defenses.7 In that piece, I examine car crash answers and
complaints in the state courts of Colorado, where I live, teach, and have
practiced law. For 298 lawsuits, I retrieved and read the complaints and
corresponding 356 answers, which number more than 298 because a
number of suits had multiple defendants.8 Consistent with Judge Shadur’s
understanding of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which Colorado’s
Rules of Civil Procedure largely adopt, I coded the pleading of insurance
Civil Procedure, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Mar. 21, 2018; Julianne M. Hartzell & David N. Patariu,
Shadur’s Crusade Against Misdirected Affirmative Defenses Still Has Merit, CHI. DAILY L. BULL.,
Apr. 26, 2018.
3. In Murphy v. Schering Corp., 878 F. Supp. 124, 125 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1995), Judge Shadur
explained in a footnote that “[t]his Court always undertakes an immediate review of newly-filed
complaints,” citing Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1282 (7th
Cir. 1986) (quoting Judge Posner who explained that “[t]he first thing a federal judge should do
when a complaint is filed is check to see that federal jurisdiction is properly alleged”). Judge Shadur
included this footnote in nearly 500 cases. See, e.g., Bryant v. Yellow Freight Sys., 989 F. Supp.
966, 967 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Durr v. Intercounty Title Co. of Ill., 826 F. Supp. 259, 263 n.2 (N.D.
Ill. 1993), aff’d, 14 F.3d 1183 (7th Cir. 1994); Salzstein v. Bekins Van Lines, Inc., 747 F. Supp.
1281, 1282 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
4. Attorneys in the office of the Illinois Attorney General may have had a different nickname
for Judge Shadur. See infra p. 920.
5. Shadur, Milton Irving, supra note 1; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley (State Farm v.
Riley), 199 F.R.D. 276, 278 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
6. FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
7. Thomas D. Russell, Frivolous Defenses, 69 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 785 (2021).
8. Russell, supra note 7, at Part III.
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defense lawyers on behalf of insured defendants in car crash cases. As
60% of all tort filings, car crashes dominate personal injury litigation in
Colorado.9 At bottom, personal injury and the subject of torts are about
car crashes.10 Liability insurance—car insurance—fuels the system.11
Adopting jargon that Stanford Law Professor Nora Freeman Engstrom
used for plaintiffs’ lawyers,12 I refer to most lawyers who filed answers
in car crash cases as insurance defense mill lawyers.13 My empirical
analysis reveals that insurance defense mill lawyers routinely depart from
Colorado’s Rule 8 by adopting evasive, formulaic methods to avoid
answering allegations. I will touch upon some of these findings as I
explain Judge Shadur’s approach.
My empirical research also confirms what Judge Shadur abhorred
regarding affirmative defenses. Insurance defense mill lawyers often
improperly label claims as affirmative defenses, a technical point that
concerned Judge Shadur but that may be a bit pedantic even for this law
professor. More important, in my view, insurance defense mill lawyers
cut and paste long laundry lists of fact-free defenses into their pleadings.
Colorado’s insurance defense mill lawyers, though they have access to
claim files that include insurers’ investigations that started the day of or
soon after the crash, nonetheless plead no facts whatsoever in 90% of all
answers and included an average of 0.14 facts to support each list of
defenses.14 The median number of facts supporting each list of
defenses—again not each defense—is zero; the greatest number of facts
any insurance defense lawyer includes in support of a list of affirmative
defenses is four.15
Fact-free affirmative defenses are literally groundless and therefore
frivolous. Judge Shadur used the adjective frivolous and, possessing a
rich vocabulary, used other terms as well. In 1982, a defendant’s counsel
raised as an affirmative defense that the plaintiff’s “purpose in bringing
9. Id. at Section II.D.
10. Id. at Part I.
11. See Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1114–15 (1990) (“I believe
liability insurance and tort litigation evolve together, with each institution acting upon, reacting to,
and supporting the other.”).
12. Nora Freeman Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1485, 1538–
39 (2009) [hereinafter Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice]; Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and
Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805, 841 (2011) [hereinafter Engstrom, Sunlight]; Nora
Freeman Engstrom, Legal Access and Attorney Advertising, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y &
L. 1083 (2011) [hereinafter Engstrom, Legal Access]; Nora Freeman Engstrom, Shining a Light on
Shady Personal Injury Claims, 2 J. INS. FRAUD AM. 13 (2011) [hereinafter Engstrom, Shining A
Light] (describing a settlement mill as acting in a cookie-cutter or routine manner to process its
large caseload).
13. Russell, supra note 7, at Part I.
14. Id. at Part IV.
15. Id.
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this action is to enable him to receive more favorable terms for the sale
of his stock . . . .”16 “As a ‘defense,’” thundered Judge Shadur, “that
allegation is entirely frivolous. . . . Improving settlement prospects is a
normal and legitimate concomitant of filing a lawsuit,” he commented
before striking the affirmative defense.17 By 2017, near the end of his
career on the bench, he had become even more efficient. With just 151
words within an order, he struck three different affirmative defenses,
describing them as “unnecessary,” not “an A[ffirmative] D[efense]
within the purview of Rule 8(c),” “not only frivolous . . . but . . . also
flawed as a conceptual matter,” a “partial laundry list selected from the
grab bag of defenses listed in Rule 8(c),” “subject to the same criticism
and, . . . totally uninformative as to the predicate for each of the listed
grounds.”18 For simplicity’s sake, I just use the phrase frivolous defenses.
Argument and writing about frivolous litigation or frivolous lawsuits is
familiar to Americans—really to the entire world. But the phrase
frivolous defenses is rarely found on Google or heard anywhere. I am
trying to right this imbalance.
II. MINIBIOGRAPHY OF JUDGE SHADUR
Born in Minnesota in 1924, Milton Shadur grew up in Milwaukee. He
graduated first in his high school class at age 15.19 He left Wisconsin for
the University of Chicago, where he had a full scholarship of $300 per
year and studied math and physics.20 After the University of Chicago
graduated him in 1943, Shadur joined the United States Navy.21 After
World War II ended, he attended the University of Chicago School of
Law,22 where, according to his law partner Ronald S. Miller, Esq., Shadur
again finished first in his class.23 He was editor in chief of the University
of Chicago Law Review in 1948–49.24

16. Bobbitt v. Victorian House, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 734, 738 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
17. Id.
18. Webb v. Medicredit, Inc., No. 16-C-11125, 2017 WL 74854, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 9, 2017).
19. Social and Personal, WIS. JEWISH CHRON., May 10, 1940, at 2.
20. Id.
21. Gregory Pratt, Shadur to Step Down After 37 Years on Federal Bench, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 2,
2017, at 4.
22. Id.
23. Ronald S. Miller, Magnificent Reasons for Keeping Involved, ABA (Sept. 1, 2011),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/senior_lawyers/publications/voice_of_experience/2011/fall/
magnificent-reasons-for-keeping-involved/ [https://perma.cc/UBN5-4L5H]; see also High Law
Grades, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 10, 1949, at 225 (“Milton Irving Shadur . . . established a record of having
the highest grade average in the university’s law school in the last eight years.”).
24. 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 909 (1947–48).
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In 1948, Shadur agreed to join the law firm Goldberg, Devoe &
Brussell,25 which Arthur Goldberg,26 later Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States, had founded in 1946.27 Judge Shadur
recounted that when he joined the firm “the three lawyers were then
occupying unprepossessing offices as subtenants of another firm at 231
South LaSalle Street,” the Central Standard Building.28 Shadur became a
partner in 1952, by which time Goldberg was practicing law in
Washington, DC.29
Later, Abner Mikva was one of Shadur’s partners. They grew up on
the same block in Milwaukee though in different years. In a well-known
story, Mr. Mikva sua sponte stopped at the 8th Ward Regular Democratic
Organization in 1948 when he was a law student. The committeeman
asked who sent him; Mr. Mikva answered, “nobody.” The ward heeler
told the law student, “we don’t want nobody nobody sent.”30 Too liberal
and reform-oriented for the Daley Machine, Chicago’s Democrats left
Mr. Mikva to pursue his political interests downstate in the state house
and later in Congress.31 And, as with Shadur, President Carter appointed
him to the federal bench where he served as Judge of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.32 Later, Judge
Mikva was counsel to President Clinton.33 The firm that spawned Justice
Goldberg, Judge Mikva, and Judge Shadur—also Judge Elaine
Bucklo34—is now Miller Shakman Levine & Feldman, which rightly
touts its impressive history.35
I am not presenting Judge Shadur’s biography, although someone
25. Gerald Berendt et al., Arthur J. Goldberg’s Legacies to American Labor Relations, 32 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 667, 671–72 (1999).
26. Goldberg, Arthur Joseph, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/goldbergarthur-joseph [https://perma.cc/5A7J-4QU8] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
27. Goldberg founded the firm as Goldberg & Devoe. Berendt et al., supra note 25, at 669. The
firm was Goldberg, Devoe & Brussell by the time Shadur joined.
28. Berendt et al., supra note 25, at 672; Central Standard Building, BEACON CAP. PARTNERS,
https://231southlasalle.com [https://perma.cc/5UE3-E5PT] (last visited May 7, 2021).
29. See Neighborhood Section, CHI. SUNDAY TRIB., Feb. 17, 1952 at Part 3, p. 1 (advertising
Shadur’s new position as partner at Goldberg, Devoe, Brussell & Shadur).
30. MILTON L. RAKOVE, WE DON’T WANT NOBODY NOBODY SENT: AN ORAL HISTORY OF
THE DALEY YEARS 318 (1979).
31. MILTON L. RAKOVE, DON’T MAKE NO WAVES, DON’T BACK NO LOSERS: AN INSIDER’S
ANALYSIS OF THE DALEY MACHINE 104–05, 160, 197 (1975).
32. Mikva, Abner Joseph, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/mikva-abnerjoseph [https://perma.cc/2PU9-4CLN] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
33. Ronald S. Miller, Magnificent Reasons for Keeping Involved, ABA (Sept. 1, 2011)
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/senior_lawyers/publications/voice_of_experience/2011/fall/
magnificent-reasons-for-keeping-involved/ [https://perma.cc/WJA4-Y33F].
34. Bucklo, Elaine E., FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/bucklo-elaine-e
[https://perma.cc/WLB7-SBZV] (last visited Apr. 6, 2021).
35. History, MILLER SHAKMAN LEVINE & FELDMAN, http://www.millershakman.com/history/
[https://perma.cc/2795-T52R] (last visited Apr. 6, 2021).
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should write his story. I am also not attempting to identify influences that
may have shaped him as a judge. He was a Democrat, of course. He and
his partners became powerful Jewish lawyers at a time when the most
powerful law firms in the United States did not hire Jews. 36 Whether
Judge Shadur’s Democratic politics, religion, family life, early years in
Milwaukee, or maybe his time at the University of Chicago shaped his
judicial practice or philosophy, I leave to a biographer.37 His personal
history is fascinating, but my focus is Judge Shadur’s insistence regarding
FRCP 8.
First, I describe the backstory of State Farm v. Riley, the case onto
which Judge Shadur engrafted the Appendix. Then, I review Judge
Shadur’s Appendix in detail. Judge Shadur sent his order and Appendix
to West Publishing for inclusion in the Federal Rules Decisions reporter,
and I briefly explain the FRD, as it’s known. Subsequent parts track
citation of the Appendix, which has been quite extensive. Not
surprisingly, Judge Shadur cited the Appendix frequently. In another part,
I look at his Northern District colleagues’ citation of the Appendix by the
three most important topics: speaking documents, legal conclusions, and
affirmative defenses. In subsequent sections, I follow the same
36. See Temple Beth El, WIS. JEWISH CHRON., June 11, 1937, at 5 (“Rabbi Philip Kleinman will
deliver a sermon in honor of the Bar Mitzvah of Milton Shadur.”). Gil Cornfield, Esq., an Illinois
labor lawyer, commented on Shadur’s first job with Goldberg, Devoe, and Brussell:
Can you imag[in]e today the Editor-in-Chief of the University of Chicago Law Review
going to work for a three-person law firm in Chicago? But, Goldberg’s and Shadur’s
starts in the profession were not uncharacteristic of a new Jewish attorney in the years
preceding and after World War II, whether or not they were outstanding graduates from
prestigious law schools. I remember some years ago, on behalf of the Illinois Humanities
Counsel, I participated and assisted in a program on the relationship of the Jewish labor
lawyer to the labor movement. I interviewed Les Asher, Joe Jacobs and others who were
from an older generation and in many cases these people became involved in labor
movement partially because they had become professionals and there weren’t other
positions available to them. They did not even consider the possibility of working for
the large LaSalle Street law firms.
Berendt et al., supra note 25, at 696; see also Eli Wald, The Rise and Fall of the WASP and Jewish
Law Firms, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1803 (2008) (discussing the segregation in law firms along religious
and cultural lines); Eli Wald, The Rise of the Jewish Law Firm or Is the Jewish Law Firm Generic?,
76 UMKC L. REV. 885 (2008); Eli Wald, The Jewish Law Firm: Past and Present (Univ. of Denver
Sturm Coll. of L. Legal Rsch. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 15-32, 2015),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2631782# [https://perma.cc/7HM3-HXR];
MALCOLM GLADWELL, OUTLIERS 116–58 (2008) (discussing Joseph “Joe” Flom, a successful
attorney whose perceived disadvantages in life—growing up during the Depression, being a poor
child of garment workers, and Jewish—contributed to his successful career).
37. Cf. Joanna Shepherd, Jobs, Judges, and Justice: The Relationship Between Professional
Diversity and Judicial Decisions, DEMAND JUSTICE 1, 2–3, http://demandjustice.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/02/Jobs-Judges-and-Justices_Demand-Justice_Joanna-ShepherdReport_2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/TFZ6-LE47] (addressing the relationship between judges’
qualifications and backgrounds to their judicial decisions). See also RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW
JUDGES THINK 19–29 (2008) (describing the “attitudinal theory” of judging).
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organization except that I do not include the reference to strict proof,
which does not seem to be prevalent outside the Northern District. I
canvass citations of the case in the Seventh Circuit and then track it
through the remaining circuits in numerical order.38 Finally, after looking
at all state courts, I found three cases citing the Appendix in Maryland,
Connecticut, and Illinois. I conclude with Arizona, which through a rule
change by its highest court, perfects the Shadur scheme with an
amendment of Rule 8 that disallows the offenses that Judge Shadur
perceived as the worst. Along the way, I do not shy from expressing my
admiration for Judge Shadur’s approach.
III. BACKSTORY OF STATE FARM V. RILEY
In 2001, Judge Shadur made his expectations clear regarding Rule 8
and answers in an appendix that he attached to an order in State Farm v.
Riley.39 A fellow judge estimates that Judge Shadur issued more than
11,000 orders over the course of his thirty-seven-year career on the
bench.40 Westlaw includes 7,544 of these “Opinions and Orders,” their
most common title, and Judge Shadur’s Opinion and Appendix in State
Farm v. Riley is his twentieth-most-cited document on Westlaw, with 774
citations. Starting as early as 1997, Judge Shadur sat by designation on
various panels of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals including
the First, Second, Third, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and District of Columbia
Circuits,41 and seventeen of his twenty most cited opinions result from
these temporary stints on the Circuit Courts of Appeal.42 Shadur’s
38. I found no citations of Judge Shadur’s Appendix in either the Federal or DC Circuits.
39. See 199 F.R.D. 276, 278 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (publishing the appendix due to “years of
unsuccessful efforts to correct a gaggle of fundamental pleading errors that continue to crop up in
responsive pleadings”).
40. Briscoe, supra note 1, at 5.
41. The Chief Justice designates district court judges for service on circuit courts of appeal in
circuits other than their home circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 292(d). Judge Shadur discussed his Circuit Court
of Appeals stints in an interview with Above the Law. Howard J. Bashman, How Appealing’s 20
Questions,
ABOVE
THE
LAW
(April
19,
2004,
12:00
AM)
https://howappealing.abovethelaw.com/20q/2004_04_01_20q-appellateblog_archive/
[https://perma.cc/3AEQ-CG5F].
42. See e.g., Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1999); Rutherford v. Barnhart,
399 F.3d 546 (3d Cir. 2005); Avetova-Elisseva v. INS, 213 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2000), as amended
(June 26, 2000); Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587 (3d Cir. 2003); Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d
1150 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2005); United States
v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537 (10th Cir. 1994); Diaz v. United Agric. Emp. Welfare Benefit Plan & Tr.,
50 F.3d 1478 (9th Cir. 1995); Thompson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 34 F.3d 932 (10th Cir.
1994); Hendricks v. Coughlin, 114 F.3d 390 (2d Cir. 1997); Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432
F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 2005); Morningside Grp. v. Morningside Cap. Grp., 182 F.3d 133 (2d Cir.
1999); Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2003); Bobbitt v. Victorian House, Inc., 532 F.
Supp. 734 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Walker v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 240 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 2001);
Spaulding v. United Transp. Union, 279 F.3d 901 (10th Cir. 2002); Jordan v. City of Cleveland,
464 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2006).
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opinions for various Circuit Courts of Appeal have precedential force,
which accounts for their placement atop his citation ranking. His opinions
as a trial court judge for the Northern District of Illinois lacked the
precedential force of the circuit opinions, and one would expect little
citation of the trial court orders of federal district judges. Even so, four of
his trial court opinions—including State Farm v. Riley—climbed into his
top twenty list of cited cases.43 The mean number of citations of his orders
is 18.9 with the median at 1. Just about half of his orders—3,594—have
never been cited.44
There was nothing auspicious about the parties, issues, or lawyers in
State Farm v. Riley that suggested the case would be among the most
cited in Judge Shadur’s long career. Judge Shadur’s sua sponte
memorandum order offers no detail whatsoever about the lawsuit, save
for describing it as an “interpleader action brought by State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company.”45 Attorneys for State Farm filed the
complaint on January 17, 2001.46 With the complaint, State Farm’s
attorneys sought to discharge the insurer’s obligation by interpleading the
policy limits—that is, paying the money into the court so that Judge
Shadur could sort out how the five different defendants should divide the
insurance proceeds.47
The underlying story of State Farm v. Riley was tragic. William G.
Riley, the first named defendant, drove a 2000 Chevrolet Cavalier to
Hemingway’s Restaurant in Westmont, Illinois, on June 25, 2000.48 In
the restaurant’s parking lot, State Farm alleged, Mr. Riley stopped the
car, and his wife Leona Riley and a woman named Rose Linger got out
of the Chevy’s rear doors.49 Mr. Riley, born in 1916, was then eighty-

43. Quaker Alloy Casting Co. v. Gulfco Indus., Inc., 123 F.R.D. 282 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (6th most
cited); Keene Corp. v. Int’l Fid. Ins. Co., 561 F. Supp. 656 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff’d, 735 F.2d 1367
(7th Cir. 1984), and aff’d, 736 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1984) (7th most cited); Bobbitt, 532 F. Supp. at
734 (16th most cited); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley (State Farm v. Riley), 199 F.R.D.
276 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (20th most cited).
44. See Westlaw Edge, https://1.next.westlaw.com/Search/Home.html (last visited Apr. 19,
2021) (search “JU(shadur)”; sort the 7,544 resulting cases by date; download results into .csv files
(accommodating for the fact that Westlaw caps downloads to the first 1,000 results, repeating the
downloading process the eight necessary times and ensuring no duplicate cases in the resulting
spreadsheet); review the “citing references count” column to calculate the mean and median).
45. State Farm v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. at 277.
46. Complaint of Interpleader, State Farm v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. 276 (No. 01-C-0318)
[hereinafter State Farm v. Riley Complaint].
47. Id.
48. Id. ¶ 5.
49. Id.
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four years old.50 Mrs. Riley, born in 1919, was eighty-one years old.51
They had been married for fifty-nine years.52 State Farm, which insured
the Cavalier, then noted that “Mr. Riley, unaware that his passengers had
gotten out of the car, put the car into reverse to back into a parking
space.”53 The rear doors were open, and the octogenarian Mr. Riley
struck the two women and knocked them both to the pavement.54 Mrs.
Riley broke her hip, suffered other injuries, and, presumably via
ambulance, went to Hinsdale Hospital, where she received treatment,
developed complications, and died more than a month later on July 31,
2000.55 Mrs. Riley’s hospital and other medical bills exceeded
$200,000.56 Mr. and Mrs. Riley had one child, William G. Riley, Jr.,
whom the interpleader complaint describes as “a developmentally
disabled adult due to mental retardation” and “a ward of the Illinois State
Guardian.”57
Without the involvement of a personal injury attorney representing
Mrs. Riley’s estate or her son, State Farm concluded that its insured, Mr.
Riley, was at fault for his wife’s death.58 The liability policy’s limits were
$150,000, but State Farm interpreted its policy—correctly, in my view—
to exclude coverage for Mrs. Riley and her estate because she was a
“member of the family of the insured, related by blood, marriage or
adoption, residing in the same household.”59
Exclusion from liability coverage transformed Mr. Riley’s Chevy
Cavalier into an uninsured motor vehicle. However, the policy provided
$50,000 in uninsured motor vehicle coverage, and “State Farm wishe[d]
50. U.S.,
Social
Security
Death
Index,
1935–2014,
ANCESTRY.COM,
https://www.ancestry.com/search/collections/3693/ [https://perma.cc/L4XM-HDPP] (last visited
May 15, 2021) (enter “William Giles” for “First & Middle Name(s)” and “Riley” for “Last Name”
and select “Match all terms exactly” to generate one record result) (original data from the United
States Social Security Administration).
51. U.S., Social Security Applications and Claims Index, 1936–2007, ANCESTRY.COM,
https://www.ancestry.com/search/collections/60901/
[https://perma.cc/X4M4-WAAU]
(last
visited May 15, 2021) (enter “Leona” for “First & Middle Name(s)” and “Pruger” (Ms. Riley’s
maiden name) for “Last Name” and select “Match all terms exactly” to generate one record result)
(original data from the United States Social Security Applications and Claims, 1936–2007).
52. Cook
County,
Illinois
Marriage
Index,
1930–1960,
ANCESTRY.COM,
https://www.ancestry.com/search/collections/1500/ (last visited May 15, 2021) (enter “Leona” for
“First & Middle Name(s),” “Pruger” for “Last Name,” “1941” for “Year,” “William” for “Spouse
First & Middle Name(s),” “Riley” for “Spouse Last Name,” and select “Match all terms exactly”
to generate one record result) (original data from Cook County Clerk Genealogy Records).
53. State Farm v. Riley Complaint, supra note 46, ¶ 5.
54. Id.
55. Id. ¶¶ 6–7.
56. Id. ¶ 8.
57. Id. ¶¶ 17, 21.
58. Id. ¶ 12.
59. Id. ¶ 13.
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to pay the $50,000.00 limits and be discharged from further liability
under the policy.”60 Sad though the details of Mrs. Riley’s injury and
death are, State Farm was simply tendering its uninsured motorist policy
limits.
Four different persons or entities had claims upon the $50,000 that
State Farm tendered. The Rileys’ policy included $100,000 in medical
payment coverage, which State Farm had already paid to Hinsdale
Hospital.61 State Farm noted in the complaint that the hospital might also
have a claim to the $50,000 under Illinois’s Hospital Lien Act.62 Given
Mrs. Riley’s age, Medicare paid for all or most of her treatment (one
hopes), and for that reason, State Farm listed Donna Shalala, then
secretary of health and human services, as a defendant and cited the
relevant federal statute concerning Medicare’s claim for
reimbursement.63 State Farm’s attorney, John Adams, Esq., told me that
he filed the lawsuit simply because getting Medicare to provide a
reimbursement lien figure was so bureaucratically difficult that filing a
federal lawsuit was the best way to get Medicare to respond. Against Mr.
Riley, State Farm noted there might be a wrongful death claim and a
negligence claim under Illinois’s Survival Act.64 Mrs. Riley had died
without a will,65 and her heirs at law and next of kin for purposes of the
Wrongful Death Act were her husband and disabled son.66 Mr. Riley thus
may have been entitled to claim some of the insurance payment for her
wrongful death or perhaps under the Survival Act—a complicated
issue.67 Last, Mrs. Riley’s adult son, as her heir and next of kin, had a
claim to the insurance proceeds. State Farm named the son as a defendant,
but because he was a ward of the state, State Farm also named the Illinois
State Guardian, which was a division of the Illinois Guardianship and
60. Id. ¶¶ 14–15.
61. Id. ¶ 10. Whether State Farm should first have paid Medicare is a question.
62. Id. ¶ 20 (citing 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/0.01 et seq. which, having been repealed, is now
770 ILL. COMP. STAT. 23/35 (2021)).
63. Id. ¶ 2 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395y). Medicare, as a secondary payer, is entitled to be
reimbursed after “payment has been made . . . under an automobile or liability insurance policy or
plan (including a self-insured plan) or under no fault insurance.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii),
(A)(ii). The interplay between hospital liens and Medicare and Medicaid remains complicated
twenty years after Mrs. Riley’s death. See Sarah Kliff & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, How Rich
Hospitals Profit from Patients in Car Crashes, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/01/upshot/rich-hospitals-profit-poor.html
[https://perma.cc/WT9Z-CC8G] (highlighting that filing hospital liens against liability insurance
proceeds “has become routine” in hospitals and results in high reimbursement rate especially when
used against low-income patients with Medicaid).
64. State Farm v. Riley Complaint, supra note 46, ¶ 11 (citing 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1 et
seq. (2021) (Wrongful Death Act) and 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/27-6 (2021) (Survival Act)).
65. Id. ¶ 16.
66. Id. ¶ 18.
67. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/27-6 (2021).
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Advocacy Commission.68 All this sounds complicated, but ultimately the
lawsuit was about dividing $50,000 among Medicare, the hospital, the
negligent husband, and the disabled son by way of his guardian. I am not
bothered by how State Farm’s lawyers handled this matter.
Patrick DeMoon, Esq., from the Office of the Illinois Attorney General
answered on behalf of the state guardian. Assistant Attorney General
DeMoon represented Ms. Nancy Demarco from the Office of State
Guardian. Mr. DeMoon did not typically litigate in federal court; he
mostly handled state court matters.69 Judge Shadur had a feud with the
Illinois Attorney General’s Office or perhaps only with the parts of the
office that dealt with the Department of Corrections. In the second
sentence of his order, Judge Shadur noted that “the Answer is stricken in
its entirety—but with leave granted to DeMarco’s counsel (an Assistant
Attorney General) to replead promptly.” Mr. DeMoon believes the
parenthetical reference to him as “(an Assistant Attorney General)”
points to Judge Shadur’s unhappiness with the Attorney General’s
Office.70 Mr. DeMoon suggests that Judge Shadur may well have
prepared and held the six-page Appendix, lying in wait for a lawyer from
the Attorney General’s Office to receive his wrath.71 Mr. DeMoon
walked into a judicial ambush.
Bad blood already existed between Judge Shadur and the state
Attorney General’s Office. In 1994, Judge Shadur had launched an order
with “[a]ll too often the representatives of the Illinois Attorney General’s
Office appear in the federal court system wearing false—or at least
misleading—colors.”72 Judge Shadur then recounted the notorious
history of the state’s attorney general. “Half a century ago,” he wrote,
“Illinois was a national byword for its relentless promotion of injustice to
prisoners—its then Attorney General encouraged its courts . . . in
erecting a labyrinthine maze of procedural dead ends for prisoners who
claimed violations of their constitutional rights.”73 He explained that
“[h]abeas corpus, common law writ of error, writ of error coram nobis—

68. State Farm v. Riley Complaint, supra note 46, ¶ 21.
69. See, e.g., People ex rel. Dep’t of Pro. Regul. v. Manos, No. CH-1859, 2000 WL 35747903
(Ill. Cir. Ct., July 31, 2000) rev’d in part 761 N.E.2d 208 (Ill. App. 2001); Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, Manos, No. CH-1859, 2000 WL 35747934, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Complaint, Arvia v. Ryan, No. CH-16992, 2000 WL 35727006; Transcript on Hearing
for Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Chi. Journeymen Plumbers Local Union 130, U.A.
v. Ill. Dep’t of Pub. Health, No. CH-4700, 2000 WL 35715320 (Ill. Cir. Ct., Sept. 18, 2000).
70. Conversation with Patrick DeMoon, Former Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of the Ill. Att’y Gen.
(January 29, 2021) (notes on file with author).
71. Id.
72. United States ex rel. Green v. Peters, No. 93-C-5671, 1994 WL 8258, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan.
8, 1994).
73. Green, 1994 WL 8258, at *1.
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whichever remedy a prisoner would invoke was urged by the Attorney
General and was then held by the Illinois courts to be the wrong path,”
with the consequence of the attorney general’s misdirection being that “it
would typically take years before a hearing on the merits could be
obtained by the prisoner (if at all).”74
Judge Shadur then cited what he called a “scathing denunciation of that
procedural merry-go-round” by Justice Wiley Rutledge75 in a 1947
concurrence for the Supreme Court of the United States that Justices
William O. Douglas76 and William Francis Murphy77 joined.78
Unfavorably comparing the Attorney General’s Office in the 1990s to the
1940s, Judge Shadur noted, “[b]ut at least the Attorney General of that
era occasionally acknowledged wrongdoing. . . . By contrast, these
current cases display the Attorney General—presumably carrying out
office policy—engaged in the active pursuit of the same time-dishonored
goal of throwing up roadblocks to criminal defendants’ access to the
justice system.”79
In the remainder of the 1994 order, Judge Shadur refers to a “bogus
argument” that the attorney general had made earlier;80 cracks that “[t]o
its continuing discredit, the Attorney General’s Office stonewalled”;81
and quips that “[i]n his latest submission the Attorney General continues
to be faithless to his role as attorney for the ‘People of the State of
Illinois.’”82 Along his scorching path, Judge Shadur refers to a “Catch22 argument” that the attorney general had made, and in a footnote
suggests “[p]erhaps ‘Kafkaesque’ might be a more elegant and
appropriate characterization than ‘Catch–22,’ given Kafka’s The Trial
74. Id. at *1.
75. Rutledge, Wiley Blount, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/rutledge-wileyblount [https://perma.cc/HDG2-Z2V3] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
76. Douglas, William Orville, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/douglaswilliam-orville [https://perma.cc/MB8C-EYGD] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
77. Murphy, Frank, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/murphy-frank
[https://perma.cc/6WQ6-NSPP\ (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
78. Green, 1994 WL 8258, at *1 (citing Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 563 (1947)). Judge
Shadur added a footnote to his citation of Justice Rutledge’s concurrence in which Judge Shadur
showed off that “[t]his Court played a chance role in the public identification of Illinois’ shameful
record in that respect. As a second year law school student and member of the law review staff, he
received a last minute assignment, in connection with a study of the Illinois Supreme Court, to
write the criminal law segment of that study (the originally assigned writer having disappointed the
editor). And that quickly-produced section of the study (15 U.Chi.L.Rev. 118–31 (1947)) was
published just before the Marino decision came down—and when it did, a startled law student thus
found that his work had just been cited and quoted in the Supreme Court reports (332 U.S. at 562,
568 n.7, 569 n.11).” Id. at *6 n.4.
79. Green, 1994 WL 8258, at *2.
80. Id. at *3.
81. Id.
82. Id. at *4.
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and the judicial-system context in which the Attorney General has
asserted his outrageous positions.”83
In yet another footnote that stoked ill will between the judge and the
state’s top lawyers, Judge Shadur quoted Shakespeare. He claimed that
the state’s lawyers had misrepresented a Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals decision as supporting the attorney general’s position.84 Judge
Shadur quoted that “[t]he devil can cite Scripture for his purpose” after
listing the act, scene, and line where the attorneys general might find this
aphorism in The Merchant of Venice.85 Unable or unwilling to control his
poison pen, Judge Shadur then specified that “[t]hat obviously applies
only metaphorically and not literally to the current situation—its figure
of speech does not of course suggest that the Attorney General has
literally joined the forces of darkness.”86 Simply put, Judge Shadur and
the Attorney General’s Office hated each other; Judge Shadur clapped
back at the Attorney General’s Office with references to literature, while
in their own offices, the state’s lawyers engaged popular culture and
referred to him, cleverly, as Lord Shadur.
State Farm’s complaint consisted of twenty-one short paragraphs that
laid out the story of how Mr. Riley negligently hit his wife while backing
up their Chevy and sent her to the hospital where she developed
complications and died. In the interpleader action, State Farm was
tendering the uninsured motorist policy limits of $50,000 so that the
insurer could walk away, and the four claimants—Medicare, the hospital,
the disabled son’s guardian, and the widower husband—could divide the
money. Mr. DeMoon denied all but one of the complaint’s paragraphs.
The only paragraph that the assistant attorney general admitted was the
final one before the prayer for relief.87 State Farm alleged that “William
G. Riley, Jr. is a developmentally disabled adult due to mental
retardation, and is a ward of the Illinois State Guardian. The State
Guardian is a division of the Guardinaship [sic] and Advocacy
Commission.”88 Mr. DeMoon admitted only this allegation, the one that
dealt most closely with his client.89
For the state and its ward, Mr. DeMoon might have answered
differently. State Farm took responsibility and was tendering its policy
83. Id. at *3 n.8.
84. Id. at *5.
85. Id. at *5 n.11 (citing WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, act I, sc. 3, l.
99).
86. Id. at *5 n.11.
87. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley (State Farm v. Riley), 199 F.R.D. 276, 278 (N.D.
Ill. 2001) (“[O]nly the final Answer ¶ 21 is in proper form, each of the Answer's other 20 paragraphs
having involved one or both of the repeated infractions.”).
88. State Farm v. Riley Complaint, supra note 46, ¶ 21.
89. State Farm v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. at 278.
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limits. The insurer was turning to the court for assistance dividing the
payout. The assistant attorney general might have admitted every
allegation in the interpleader complaint without, in my view, hindering
his client’s position in the slightest. Instead, the stubbornness of not
answering took over the pleading of the answer. With a look at the policy
and just a bit of legal research, the assistant attorney general could have
confirmed that there was only $50,000 and not $150,000 available. State
Farm’s interpretation of its own policy seems to me correct, which means
the assistant attorney general should have admitted those paragraphs.
Likewise, Mr. DeMoon might have analyzed the legitimacy of
Medicare’s subrogation claim, the hospital’s claim for its bills, and the
claim, if any, that Mr. Riley, the widower, might have after causing his
wife’s death. These claims all appear to have been legitimate ones, even
if the amount was unliquidated.
Mr. DeMoon might have served his client effectively by admitting
each of the complaint’s twenty-one paragraphs, but such was the strength
of the culture of denial by defendants that the assistant attorney general
did the opposite and denied all but one paragraph. Mr. DeMoon’s answer,
like the answers of insurance defense attorneys that I examined in
Colorado car crash cases, reflexively refused to admit allegations even
when admissions would help his client.90
With State Farm v. Riley, the final winners were, predictably, the
hospital and insurers. The hospital took $45,000 of State Farm’s $50,000.
Along the way, Humana Health Care Plans, Inc. entered the matter and
collected $4,000 presumably by way of a subrogation claim. Medicare
got only $535.25. Mr. Riley, the widower, took nothing and seems not to
have participated in the matter. Mr. and Mrs. Riley’s disabled son
received $464.75.91 Mr. DeMoon told me that he suggested to the judge
that the son receive enough money that when his own time came, there
might be money for a suit and burial.92
Fully unaware of what was headed his way, Mr. DeMoon caught Judge
Shadur’s wrath. Mr. DeMoon recalls filing his answer in the case around
eleven in the morning and receiving a call from the judge’s secretary
before one in the afternoon saying that “his order was ready.”93 The
docket sheet shows that Mr. DeMoon entered an appearance and filed an
answer on February 21, 2001, and Judge Shadur dated his order February
22, 2001. What seems like two hours now may have been one day. Either
way, Mr. DeMoon was certainly surprised and reasonably felt ambushed
90. Russell, supra note 7, at Part V (offering a general summary of refusal to admit practice);
Jonathan R. Cohen, The Culture of Legal Denial, 84 NEB. L. REV. 247, 248 (2005).
91. Agreed Order, State Farm v. Riley, No. 01-C-0318 (July 31, 2001).
92. Conversation with Patrick DeMoon, supra note 70.
93. Id.
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that, sua sponte, a federal judge had so quickly issued a four-paragraph,
two-page order with a six-page, separately paginated appendix in
response to his answer on behalf of the state guardian.
IV. SHADUR’S APPENDIX TO STATE FARM V. RILEY
Assistant Attorney General DeMoon’s misfortune was filing the wrong
answer in the wrong courtroom at the wrong time. Judge Shadur’s order
struck Mr. DeMoon’s answer completely—threw it out—and ordered the
assistant attorney general to replead his answer in compliance with the
Appendix.94
“For too many years,” Judge Shadur wrote, “this Court has been
required to treat with a battery of basic pleading errors committed by
defendants’ lawyers who have failed to conform to the clear directives—
or to the basic thrust—of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”95 Judge
Shadur explained that “[b]oth to simplify the process of correcting such
deficiencies in the future and to save unwarranted wear and tear on its
secretary,” he had “decided to issue the attached Appendix as a
compendium of most of those frequently-encountered errors.”96 Hoping
to save time for litigants, his staff, and himself, he wrote that “future flaws
of the same types in later cases can be addressed by a simple reference to
the Appendix rather than by a set of repeated substantive discussions
from case to case.”97
The paragraphs below review Judge Shadur’s 1,344-word Appendix to
his order in State Farm v. Riley. The Appendix consists of several
sections. The first four sections explained Rule 8(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and singled out common deviations from the rule that
particularly irked the judge.98 In the fifth section, Judge Shadur tackled
affirmative defenses and FRCP 8(c).99 The following two sections dealt
with the relationship of a local rule of the Northern District of Illinois to
answers.100 And with the final section, Judge Shadur protected
defendants by penalizing defense lawyers who filed faulty, frivolous
answers.101
Judge Shadur first offered his gloss on Rule 8(b), concerning responses
to the allegations of complaints. In 2001, Rule 8(b) was a five-sentence,

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

State Farm v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. at 278.
Id. at 277.
Id.
Id. at 278.
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b); State Farm v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. at 278–79.
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c); State Farm v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. at 279.
N.D. ILL. R. 10.1; State Farm v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. at 279–80.
State Farm v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. at 280.
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200-word block of text.102 Judge Shadur focused on Rule 8(b)’s second
sentence: “If a party is without knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of an averment, the party shall so state and
this has the effect of a denial.”103 “Even though the second sentence of
Rule 8(b) marks out an unambiguous path for any party that seeks the
benefit of a deemed denial when he, she or it can neither admit outright
nor deny outright a plaintiff’s allegation (or plaintiff’s ‘averment,’ the
word used in Rule 8(b)),”104 Judge Shadur lectured, “too many lawyers
feel a totally unwarranted need to attempt to be creative by straying from
that clear path.”105 Answering lawyers, he complained, failed most often
to mention belief, less often information, notwithstanding that the rule’s
“drafters deliberately chose those terms as elements of the Rule’s
necessary disclaimer in order to set a higher hurdle for the earning of a
deemed denial.”106
Judge Shadur next addressed the answering pleaders’ demands for
“strict proof.” “[A]lthough the concept of ‘strict proof,’ whatever that
may mean, is nowhere to be found in the Rules (or to this Court’s
knowledge in any other set of rules or in any treatise on the subject of
pleading),” Judge Shadur complained that “some members of the same
coterie of careless defense counsel will also often include an
impermissible demand for such proof.”107 He then cited two of his own
previous orders.108
In 1989, Judge Shadur had launched an early salvo in his fight against
frivolous answers. In a footnote in his order in Gilbert v. Johnston, he
102. DEFENSES; FORM OF DENIALS. A party shall state in short and plain terms the
party’s defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments upon which
the adverse party relies. If a party is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth of an averment, the party shall so state and this has the effect of a denial.
Denials shall fairly meet the substance of the averments denied. When a pleader intends in
good faith to deny only a part or a qualification of an averment, the pleader shall specify so
much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader
intends in good faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, the pleader
may make denials as specific denials of designated averments or paragraphs or may
generally deny all the averments except such designated averments or paragraphs as the
pleader expressly admits; but, when the pleader does so intend to controvert all its averments,
including averments of the grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends, the pleader
may do so by general denial subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11.
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b) (2001) (amended 2007).
103. Id.
104. In 2007, the text of Rule 8 changed to no longer include the word averment. See
Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 550 U.S. 1003, 1023–24 (2007).
105. State Farm v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. at 278.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. Judge Shadur cited Gilbert v. Johnston, 127 F.R.D. 145, 146 (N.D. Ill. 1989), and King
Vision Pay Per View, Ltd. v. J.C. Dimitri’s Restaurant, Inc., 180 F.R.D. 332 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
Demands for “strict proof” are infrequent in Colorado cases. See Russell, supra note 7, at Part III.
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wondered just how defense lawyers learned to answer frivolously. “So
many pleadings reflecting the flaws discussed in this opinion have been
coming across this Court’s desk that,” he sarcastically speculated,
“[t]here is room for a growing suspicion that someone somewhere has
produced a pleadings form book (no doubt entitled Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: How Not To Plead) prescribing the kind of response referred
to in this opinion.”109 He noted, too, that his own responses to frivolous
pleading and departures from Rule 8 were becoming standardized so that
“[m]uch of the substantive content of this order has become a
standardized form (subject to any necessary minor adaptations for
particular situations) available on the word processor used by this Court’s
secretary.”110 He finished the footnote by commenting on the difficulty
of educating lawyers about pleading. “This opinion is being published in
the forlorn hope that it may stanch the flow of such pleadings,” he wrote,
“(though it would be overly sanguine to expect any appreciable
diminution—nonreaders of Rule 8(b) are also likely to be nonreaders of
F. Supp. and F.R.D.).”111
Judge Shadur’s Gilbert v. Johnston order had identified the specific
language he targeted with the first section of his 2001 Appendix to State
Farm v. Riley.112 Defense counsel for New South Publications, Inc.
included the following sentence in an answer: “Defendant lacks the
knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of
paragraph—and, therefore, neither admits nor denies such allegations,
but demands strict proof thereof.”113 Judge Shadur counted twelve
different uses of this sentence by New South’s attorney, Donald J. Nolan,
Esq.114 Judge Shadur first dug into the relationship between the pleader’s
belief, knowledge, and information. He then coupled this analysis to the
answer’s references to “strict proof,” which found “no warrant either in
the Rules or, for that matter, in the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure—
both of which can be searched in vain for any such concept.”115
Regarding the concept of “strict proof,” Judge Shadur noted that he would
not “ask counsel for an explanation of (1) exactly what ‘strict proof’
means, (2) what its origins are as a pleading standard or (3) where counsel
got the idea that concept plays any part at all in litigation today.” 116 He
then struck the offending parts of the answer and gave the lawyer ten days
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Gilbert, 127 F.R.D. at 146 n.1.
Id.
Id.
Id.; State Farm v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. at 278.
Gilbert, 127 F.R.D. at 146.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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to replead, or he would deem the allegations admitted.117
The second of his own orders to which Judge Shadur referred in the
first part of the State Farm v. Riley appendix was his 1998 order in King
Vision v. Dimitri’s Restaurant.118 Judge Shadur opened the second
paragraph:
This is it. For too many years and in too many hundreds of cases this
Court has been reading, and has been compelled to order the correction
of, allegedly responsive pleadings that are written by lawyers who are
either unaware of or who choose to depart from Rule 8(b)’s plain
roadmap.119

In a footnote, Judge Shadur wrote that Gilbert v. Johnson “was probably
the first case in which this Court reduced to published form its
identification of the repeatedly manifested problem that is again dealt
with here.”120 But, he emphasized, the problem was longstanding and
pervasive. Gilbert, he explained, “had been preceded by years of like
encounters with pleadings too numerous to waste time in tracing, and the
near decade that has elapsed since Gilbert has exhibited no abatement in
lawyers’ carelessness of the same kind or its equivalent.”121
After denouncing pleaders’ practice of claiming no information,
refusing to admit or deny, and then demanding strict proof, Judge Shadur
turned, in the second part of the State Farm v. Riley Appendix, to “Legal
Conclusions.” “Another regular offender,” the judge lectured, “is the
lawyer who takes it on himself or herself to decline to respond to an
allegation because it ‘states a legal conclusion.’”122 Judge Shadur noted
that this answer violated “the express Rule 8(b) requirement that all
allegations must be responded to.” And, “perhaps even more
importantly,” he wrote that refusing to answer because an allegation
states a legal conclusion “disregards established law from the highest
authority on down that legal conclusions are an integral part of the federal
notice pleading regime.”123 He concluded with an example: “[C]ould
anything be more of a legal conclusion than a plaintiff’s allegation of

117. Id.
118. King Vision Pay Per View, Ltd. v. J.C. Dimitri’s Rest., Inc., 180 F.R.D. 332, 333 (N.D.
Ill. 1998).
119. Id. at 333.
120. Id. at 333 n.2.
121. Id.
122. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley (State Farm v. Riley), 199 F.R.D. 276, 278 (N.D.
Ill. 2001).
123. State Farm v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. at 278 (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325
(1989); Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); and Jackson v. Marion County, 66 F.3d 151,
153–54 (7th Cir. 1995)).
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subject matter jurisdiction, which must of course be answered?”124
Assistant Attorney General DeMoon had run afoul of the first two
items in Shadur’s Appendix. The judge’s order reveals how Mr. DeMoon
had answered. Judge Shadur’s order specifies that “Answer ¶¶ 1, 4–10
and 12–20 run afoul of App. ¶ 1,”125 which means that for seventeen
paragraphs, Mr. DeMoon answered with a variant of “Defendant lacks
the knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations
of paragraph—and, therefore, neither admits nor denies such allegations,
but demands strict proof thereof.”126 Judge Shadur also specified in his
order that Mr. DeMoon’s “Answer ¶¶ 2, 3, 4, 11, 14 and 18 are at odds
with App. ¶ 2,”127 which means that Mr. DeMoon avoided answering six
paragraphs by claiming that State Farm’s allegation called for a legal
conclusion. With twenty-one paragraphs in the complaint, Mr. DeMoon
used forbidden pleading responses twenty-three times, doubling up on
three paragraphs, and denying or refusing to answer all but one
paragraph. The stubborn refusal to admit the allegations may explain
Judge Shadur’s apparent fury.128
Judge Shadur did not point out that the lone allegation that Mr.
DeMoon did admit, that “William G. Riley, Jr. is a developmentally
disabled adult due to mental retardation, and is a ward of the Illinois State
Guardian. The State Guardian is a division of the Guardinaship [sic] and
Advocacy Commission,” contains at least two legal conclusions—that
the son was a ward of the state, and that the Office of State Guardian was
a division of the Illinois Guardianship and Advocacy Commission.
Continuing, Judge Shadur moved on to misdeeds that Mr. DeMoon
had not committed. He titled the third section of his Appendix “Speaks
for Itself.”129 “Another unacceptable device,” he opened, “used by
lawyers who would prefer not to admit something that is alleged about a
document in a complaint (or who may perhaps be too lazy to craft an
appropriate response to such an allegation), is to say instead that the

124. State Farm v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. at 278. Judge Shadur was also impatient with defense
lawyers who wrongly claimed lack of subject matter as an affirmative defense. See McCain v.
Merrill Pub. Co., No. 90-C-707, 1990 WL 37671, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 1990) (“A[ffirmative]
D[efense] ¶ 2—an asserted lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter—is stricken as clearly
frivolous.”).
125. State Farm v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. at 278.
126. Gilbert v. Johnston, 127 F.R.D. 145, 146 (N.D. Ill. 1989); State Farm v. Riley, 199 F.R.D.
at 278.
127. State Farm v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. at 278.
128. Though Mr. DeMoon felt ambushed by Judge Shadur’s order and Appendix, the judge had
made his concerns about “strict proof” clear in Gilbert v. Johnston, 127 F.R.D. 145, 146 (N.D. Ill.
1989), just as he had addressed “legal conclusions” in King Vision Pay Per View, Ltd. v. J.C.
Dimitri’s Rest., Inc., 180 F.R.D. 332, 333 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
129. State Farm v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. at 279.
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document ‘speaks for itself.’”130 Humorously—but imperiously—Judge
Shadur noted that “[t]his Court has been attempting to listen to such
written materials for years (in the forlorn hope that one will indeed give
voice)—but until some such writing does break its silence,” he continued,
“this Court will continue to require pleaders to employ one of the three
alternatives that are permitted by Rule 8(b) in response to all allegations
about the contents of documents (or statutes or regulations).”131 Those
alternatives, of course, were to admit, deny, or state the pleader lacked
“knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief” in order to gain a
deemed denial.132
Judge Shadur then included in the Appendix a catchall category titled
“Other Failure to Answer.” He emphasized, “this Court regularly requires
that every allegation in a complaint be responded to in conformity with
Rule 8(b).”133
After Rule 8(b), Judge Shadur turned to Rule 8(c) and affirmative
defenses.134 Regarding affirmative defenses, Judge Shadur became a bit
more technical, which is not out of place for a judge, especially not a
federal judge, just as pedantry is part of the law professor’s portfolio.
“Some defense counsel,” Judge Shadur noted, “are inordinately fond of
following the direct responses to a complaint’s allegations with a set of
purported affirmative defenses (‘ADs’) that don’t really fit that
concept.”135 Judge Shadur lectured that an affirmative defense
“essentially takes the . . . approach of admitting all of the allegations of a
complaint, but of then going on to explain other reasons that defendant is
not liable to plaintiff anyway . . . .”136 Put simply, an affirmative defense
says, “If so, so what?”137 Judge Shadur then included two conditions that
would cause him to strike affirmative defenses. The first condition was
where the defense attorney pleaded an affirmative defense “inconsistent
with a complaint’s allegation . . . .”138 Such a defense fails the “if so”
prong of the “if so, so what?” test of affirmative defenses. However, as
Judge Shadur noted, “nothing is lost by defendant in that situation,
because the denial of that allegation in the answer has already put the

130. Id.
131. Id.
132. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b).
133. State Farm v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. at 279.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. He noted, too that an affirmative defense might admit the allegations but plead that the
damages should be less because of the plaintiff’s comparative fault failure to mitigate. Id.
137. Russell, supra note 7, at Part IV.
138. State Farm v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. at 279.
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matter at issue.”139
Second, Judge Shadur demanded that the pleader include a predicate—
an underlying or foundational fact—to support any affirmative defenses.
“It is unacceptable for a party’s attorney,” he wrote in the Appendix,
“simply to mouth ADs in formula-like fashion (‘laches,’ ‘estoppel,’
‘statute of limitations’ or what have you), for that does not do the job of
apprising opposing counsel and this Court of the predicate for the claimed
defense—which is after all the goal of notice pleading.”140
Judge Shadur was not just tidying up affirmative defenses that did not
spark joy.141 As he wrote in 2015, he recognized that “[c]onventional
wisdom teaches that motions to strike under Rule 12(f) are
disfavored . . . .”142 “But where a defendant’s asserted A[ffirmative]
D[efense]s are both legion and mostly frivolous,” he countered, “a motion
to strike can aid the parties in resolving the case by removing irrelevant
issues from consideration.”143 Removing frivolous defenses aided the
parties and the court. Judge Shadur referred to Judge Daniel Manion’s144
1989 opinion for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Heller
Financial v. Midwhey Powder,145 which, Judge Shadur noted, “is worth
quoting at length . . . .”146
Long before United States Supreme Court opinions in Iqbal and
Twombly,147 Judge Manion struck affirmative defenses that were
“nothing but bare bones conclusory allegations.” The defendant
Midwhey, he explained, “omitted any short and plain statement of facts
and failed totally to allege the necessary elements of the alleged
claims.”148 Judges Shadur and Manion had the same goals. Judge Manion
had written that “Midwhey places great reliance on the general rule that
motions to strike are disfavored. This is because,” the Seventh Circuit
139. Id. Judge Shadur may have been slyly encouraging defendants to be sure to deny
allegations, because evading answering—through the document speaks, legal conclusion, or strict
proof gambits—could lead a court to deem an allegation admitted because not denied.
140. Id.
141. MARIE KONDO, THE LIFE-CHANGING MAGIC OF TIDYING UP: THE JAPANESE ART OF
DECLUTTERING AND ORGANIZING (2014).
142. NewNet Commc’n Techs., LLC v. VI E-Cell Tropical Telecom, Ltd., 85 F. Supp. 3d 988,
993 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (citing 5C CHARLES WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1380 (3d ed.2004)).
143. Id.
144. Manion, Daniel Anthony, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/maniondaniel-anthony [https://perma.cc/3AF3-QESM] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
145. Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1294 (7th Cir. 1989); NewNet
Commc’n Techs., LLC, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 993.
146. NewNet Commc’n Techs., LLC, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 993.
147. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007).
148. Heller Fin., Inc., 883 F.2d at 1295.
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judge explained, “motions to strike potentially serve only to delay.”149
Striking a chord that resonated with Judge Shadur, Judge Manion wrote,
“[b]ut where, as here, motions to strike remove unnecessary clutter from
the case, they serve to expedite, not delay.”150 Pleadings that define rather
than hide the contested issues, Judges Manion and Shadur understood,
speed the process. Many judges either disagree or do not care.
Judge Shadur’s Appendix next deals, in items 6 and 7, with
housekeeping matters related to answering. Though prosaic, these
important sections keep front and center that the purpose of the Appendix
and Judge Shadur’s insistence on proper pleading was to generate
pleadings that identified the issues in controversy, were useful to the
parties and the court, and, as Judge Manion wrote in Heller, “serve[d] to
expedite, not delay.”151 The Northern District had, and still has, local rule
10.1, which specifies that “[r]esponsive pleadings shall be made in
numbered paragraphs each corresponding to and stating a concise
summary of the paragraph to which it is directed.”152 Judge Shadur
explained the rule simply and concretely: “As a matter of practice,” local
rule 10.1 “is most often complied with by a defendant’s verbatim copying
of the complaint’s allegations in each paragraph, followed immediately
by defendant’s response to that paragraph.”153 Judge Shadur noted the
convenience of local rule 10.1, which “avoids a kind of patchwork
pleading, in which more than one document must be examined to see the
totality of the responding party’s pleading.”154 The judge focused on the
utility of a “self-contained pleading, so that the judicial or adversary
reader can avoid the inconvenience of having to flip back and forth
between two pleadings to see just what is or is not being placed at
issue.”155 Ultimately, his rules—fussy and angry as lawyers may have
experienced them—focused on the utility of efficiently laying bare the
controverted issues for the parties and the judge in order to expedite the
case.
Last, Judge Shadur created an innovative cost mechanism to promote
adherence to the pleading rules of his Appendix. He began the eighth and
final of the Appendix’s items by noting that “[b]ecause all of the matters
that have been addressed here are the product of some lawyer’s deficient
149. NewNet Commc’n Techs., LLC, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 993 (quoting Heller Fin., Inc., 883 F.2d
at 1294).
150. Heller Fin., Inc., 883 F.2d at 1294.
151. NewNet Commc’n Techs., LLC, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 993 (quoting Heller Fin., Inc., 883 F.2d
at 1294).
152. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley (State Farm v. Riley), 199 F.R.D. 276, 279 (N.D.
Ill. 2001) (quoting N.D. ILL. R. 10.1).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 280.
155. Id. at 279.
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performance, there is no reason that the client should bear the cost of
correction via a revised pleading . . . .”156 He therefore directed that “no
charge is to be made to the client by its counsel for the added work and
expense incurred in correcting counsel’s own errors.”157 Further, he
ordered the repleading attorneys to send a letter to their clients letting
them know the lawyers would not bill them for their time correcting the
pleading.158 And, what’s more, counsel was to deliver a copy of the nobilling letter to the “Court’s chambers as an informational matter (not for
filing).”159 I wonder whether a file folder of those letters is extant? They
would surely be interesting.
V. FEDERAL RULES DECISIONS (FRD) AND SHADUR’S APPENDIX
The Appendix to State Farm v. Riley, now twenty years old, is living
a rich life. The number of citations to the case is approaching 800.160
Judges have cited Judge Shadur’s order and appendix 232 times.161
Litigants have cited the case 454 times in trial court motions and filings
as well as 14 times in appellate matters.162 Westlaw reports 52 citations
in secondary sources and another 13 in a directory West calls “Practical
Law.”163
Judge Shadur deliberately sought publication of the order and
appendix in a specific West reporter. In the second paragraph of the order
directing Mr. DeMoon to replead, Judge Shadur explained that by issuing
the “Appendix as a compendium of most of those frequently-encountered
errors, . . . future flaws of the same types in later cases can be addressed
by a simple reference to the Appendix rather than by a set of repeated
substantive discussions from case to case.”164 The judge then added a
footnote: “To facilitate such future references, this opinion is being sent
in to West Publishing Company for publication.”165
West Publishing included Judge Shadur’s order and appendix in the
Federal Rules Decisions or FRD. Roughly as a matter of course, appellate
opinions appear in reporters and the online databases of Westlaw, Lexis,
156. Id. at 280.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley: Citing References, WESTLAW EDGE,
https://1.next.westlaw.com/RelatedInformation/I8ded740353dc11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/kcCiting
References.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2021) [hereinafter Riley Citing References] (reporting 776
total citations).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. State Farm v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. at 277–78.
165. Id. at 278 n.1.
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Bloomberg, and other companies. The work product of trial court
judges—as opposed to appellate judges and justices—does not
automatically find publication; most of the output is not sufficiently
interesting or important to merit a wider audience.166 The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure went into effect in 1938. West published the first
volume of the Federal Rules Decisions in 1940 with numbers 1–12 that
year and 13–20 the following year.167 The title page of the first volume
describes the reporter as including “opinions, decisions and rulings
involving the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”168 Myron Jacobstein,
my law librarian while I was a law student; Roy Mersky, my law librarian
during the first decade of my career as a law professor; and Dean Donald
J. Dunn explain that the FRD “contains cases of the federal district courts
since 1939 that construe the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and cases
since 1946 decided under the Rules of Criminal Procedure.”169 Jacobstein
et al. note that “[i]n addition to court cases, [the FRD] also included
articles on various aspects of federal courts and federal procedure”170 and
that “these cases are not published in the Federal Supplement.”171 Brian
Lizotte has examined West Publishing Company’s Publication Guide for
Judges of the United States District Courts and reports that “[i]n selecting
cases for publication in the Federal Supplement, the Federal Rules
Decisions, and the Bankruptcy Reporter, West’s publication guide
similarly favors cases dealing with issues of first impression, modifying
or explaining a rule of law, or reviewing or criticizing a body of law.”172
Just as law professors battle it out for citation of their work, judges do
the same. In 1966, Professor Allan D. Vestal published his article titled
“Reported Federal District Court Opinions: Fiscal 1962.”173 Professor
Vestal examined patterns of selection by various publishers of judicial
opinions. Professor Vestal noted critically that “[t]here are numerous
reasons why a judge or a publisher might want to publish an opinion

166. Allan D. Vestal, Reported Federal District Court Opinions: Fiscal 1962, 4 HOUS. L. REV.
185, 188–89, 190 (1966).
167. 1 FEDERAL RULES DECISIONS at iv (1941).
168. Id. at iii.
169. J. MYRON JACOBSTEIN, ROY MERSKY & DONALD J. DUNN, FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL
RESEARCH 254 (7th ed. 1998).
170. Id. at 51.
171. Id.
172. Brian N. Lizotte, Publish or Perish: The Electronic Availability of Summary Judgments by
Eight District Courts, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 107, 127 n.121, 139 (2007) (citing WEST PUBLISHING
CO., PUBLICATION GUIDE FOR JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS (1994)).
Thomson Reuters has similar guidelines for judges. See Submission Guidelines for Court Opinions,
THOMSON REUTERS, https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/solutions/government/court-opinionsubmission-guidelines [https://perma.cc/9BKD-2LZT] (last visited Mar. 25, 2021).
173. See generally Vestal, supra note 166.
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which is valueless as far as contributing to the corpus juris.174 For
instance,” he explained, “a judge might feel that one way of gaining
recognition is publication of a large number of opinions, and, as a result,
he wants everything he writes published regardless of its value.”175
Compounding this judicial egocentricity, Professor Alexander Reinert
remarks that “[t]here is thus a perception among judges and lawyers that
cases published in the bound case reporters are more ‘important’ to the
development of the law.”176
Judge Shadur, as should be clear, thought of himself and his ideas as
important, and he may have thought that his interpretation of the Federal
Rules—both of Civil Procedure and of Criminal Procedure—was
particularly important. West Publishing and Thomson Reuters, which
now publishes the FRD, apparently agree, as 154 of Judge Shadur’s
orders and opinions have appeared in the Federal Rules Decisions
reporters.177 The first of his opinions in the FRD was from August 26,
1980, just three months after he took the bench.178 Thirty-five years later,
in 2015, the FRD for the last time included one of his orders.179 That year,
Judge Shadur stopped carrying a full load of cases, but he did not
completely leave the courtroom until 2017 and only handed off his final
case shortly before his death in 2018.180 Judge Shadur’s State Farm v.
Riley order and appendix is his second-most-cited case within the FRD

174. Vestal, supra note 166 at 188 n.28 (explaining why judges may want opinions published
even if they do not add anything to the law). Though Professor Vestal never defines the term,
“corpus juris” of course means “body of law.” The Romans, who did not use the letter J, referred
to the Corpus Iuris Civilis, which, roughly speaking, was supposed to be all of the civil law. See,
e.g., Quirinus Breen, Justinian’s Corpus Juris Civilis, 23 OR. L. REV. 219, 219 (1944); Cary R.
Alburn, Corpus Juris Civilis: A Historical Romance, 45 A.B.A. J. 562, 562 (1959). As always
happens with encyclopedic projects that try to organize (or restate) everything, a second effort
became necessary. Hence, Corpus Juris Secundum. See generally C.J.S. (2021) (providing
alphabetic encyclopedic information on legal topics from Abandonment to Zoning and Land
Planning). I understand “corpus juris” to be a synonym for “The Law,” a phrase that reifies the
output of the legal system as a discrete body to which one may add or not.
175. Vestal, supra note 166 at 188 n.28.
176. Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring Selection Bias in Publicly Available Judicial Opinions,
38 REV. LITIG. 255, 261 n.17 (2019) (citing Ross E. Davies, Supreme Court Sluggers: Samuel A.
Alito of the Philadelphia Phillies and Marvin Miller of the MLBPA, 3 J.L.: PERIODICAL
LABORATORY LEG. SCHOLARSHIP 77, 82–83 (2013)).
177. Federal
Rules
Decisions
Cases,
WESTLAW
EDGE,
https://1.next.westlaw.com/Browse/Home/Cases/FederalDistrictCourtCases/FederalRulesDecisio
nsCases [https://perma.cc/H4KJ-78PM] (last visited Mar. 25, 2021) (select “Advanced Search” and
enter “Shadur” in the “Judge” box to yield 154 cases).
178. See generally Edmondson v. Simon, 87 F.R.D. 487 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Shadur, Milton Irving,
supra note 1 (showing that Judge Shadur received his commission on May 23, 1980); Briscoe,
supra note 1; Pratt, supra note 21, at 4.
179. See generally Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1 v. Bd. of Educ., 307 F.R.D. 475 (N.D. Ill.
2015).
180. See Briscoe, supra note 1.
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with 776 citations.181 The only Shadur opinion from the FRD with more
citations than State Farm v. Riley is his 1988 order in Quaker Alloy
Casting Company v. Gulfco Industries, Inc.182 Quaker Alloy has attracted
about 1,300 citations,183 with most of those centering on Judge Shadur’s
tart comments about Gulfco’s attorneys’ motion for reconsideration of an
order Judge Shadur issued. “Despite what Gulfco appears to think,” Judge
Shadur scolded, “this Court’s opinions are not intended as mere first
drafts, subject to revision and reconsideration at a litigant’s pleasure.”184
Of Judge Shadur’s 154 cases within the FRD, West’s filtering
identifies 144 as concerning federal civil procedure with 24 narrowly
concerned with pleadings.185 Among these FRD cases, a half-dozen or so
cluster around the issues concerning answers that Judge Shadur raised in
State Farm v. Riley. In 1997, Judge Shadur presented an early draft of his
pithy remarks about listening to documents—language that he later
incorporated in the State Farm v. Riley Appendix.186 As noted above, in
1989 Judge Shadur had addressed deemed denials and the foolishness of

181. Riley Citing References, supra note 160.
182. Quaker Alloy Casting Co. v. Gulfco Indus., Inc., 123 F.R.D. 282 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
183. Quaker Alloy Casting Co. v. Gulfco Indus., Inc.: Citing References, WESTLAW EDGE,
https://1.next.westlaw.com/RelatedInformation/Id739b70455ac11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/kcCiting
References.html [https://perma.cc/97BK-V43M] (last visited Mar. 25, 2021) (reporting 1,301 total
citations).
184. Quaker Alloy Casting Co., 123 F.R.D. at 288.
185. The twenty-four cases concerning pleadings are Darling & Co. v. Klouman, 87 F.R.D. 756
(N.D. Ill. 1980); Badillo v. Central Steel & Wire Co., 89 F.R.D. 140 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Fields v.
Village of Skokie, 89 F.R.D. 576 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Board of Education of Evanston Township High
School District No. 202 v. Admiral Heating & Ventilation, Inc., 94 F.R.D. 300 (N.D. Ill. 1982);
Amelio v. Yazoo Manufacturing Co., 98 F.R.D. 691 (N.D. Ill. 1983); SFM Corp. v. Sundstrand
Corp., 99 F.R.D. 101 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Skokie Gold Standard Liquors, Inc. v. Joseph E. Seagram &
Sons, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 108 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Pete Thoesen Tractor & Equipment Repair Co. v. City
of Chicago, 101 F.R.D. 734 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Ovitz v. Jefferies & Co., Inc., 102 F.R.D. 242 (N.D.
Ill. 1984); In re Ronco, Inc., 105 F.R.D. 493 (N.D. Ill. 1985); National Union Fire Insurance Co. v.
Continental Illinois Corp., 113 F.R.D. 527 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Checker Taxi Co. v. National
Production Workers Union, 113 F.R.D. 561 (N.D. Ill. 1986); McCarthy v. PaineWebber, Inc., 127
F.R.D. 130 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Gilbert v. Johnston, 127 F.R.D. 145 (N.D. Ill. 1989); McDowell v.
Sullivan, 132 F.R.D. 501 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Gwin v. Curry, 161 F.R.D. 70 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. v. William M. Mercer, Inc., 173 F.R.D. 235 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Umar v.
Johnson, 173 F.R.D. 494 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Controlled Environment Systems v. Sun Process Co.,
173 F.R.D. 509 (N.D. Ill. 1997); King Vision Pay Per View, Ltd. v. J.C. Dimitri’s Restaurant, Inc.,
180 F.R.D. 332 (N.D. Ill. 1998); State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Riley, 199 F.R.D.
276 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Azza International Corp. v. Gas Research Institute, 204 F.R.D. 109 (N.D. Ill.
2001); Smith v. Nike Retail Services, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 648 (N.D. Ill. 2006); and Santana v. Cook
County Board of Review, 270 F.R.D. 388 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
186. Controlled Env’t Sys., 173 F.R.D. at 510 (“This Court has been attempting to listen to such
written materials for years (in the forlorn hope that one will indeed give voice)—but until some
such writing does break its silence, this Court will continue to require pleaders to employ one of
the three alternatives that are permitted by Rule 8(b) in response to all allegations about the contents
of documents.”).
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defense demands for “strict proof” in Gilbert v. Johnston.187 In 1998,
Judge Shadur also developed his arguments against the “strict proof”
claim in King Vision Pay Per View v. Dimitri’s Restaurant.188 In a couple
of FRD cases from the 1980s and 1990s, he presented his technical
arguments about labeling claims “affirmative defenses.”189 The existence
of these orders undermines Mr. DeMoon’s claim of ambush; someone in
his office knowledgeable about Judge Shadur’s view of pleading might
have tipped off the assistant attorney general.
VI. JUDGE SHADUR’S CITATION OF THE APPENDIX
After publication in the Federal Rules Decisions reporter in 2001,
Judge Shadur’s Opinion and Appendix has received considerable
attention. This part covers the citation of the Appendix first by Judge
Shadur himself. Part VII reviews citations of the Appendix by Judge
Shadur’s Northern District of Illinois colleagues. Part VIII then reviews
citations within the Seventh Circuit but outside Judge Shadur’s home
district, and Part IX moves to the other circuits. Last, Part X considers the
few citations in state courts finishing, though, with the epitome of
Shadur’s Appendix, in a rule change by the Arizona Supreme Court in
2018, the year of Shadur’s death.
There are 776 citations of State Farm v. Riley in the twenty years since
Judge Shadur wrote his order, attached the appendix, and sent it to West
Publishing.190 More than 450 of these citations are in motions and other
filings that lawyers have filed in trial courts, and there are just over 50
citations in secondary sources of varying sources.191 My focus is citation
by judges, although I do want this catalog of citation to the Shadur
Appendix to be useful to attorneys filing motions to strike frivolous
defenses.
Not shy about promoting his own work, Judge Shadur cited his
Appendix 167 times—more than ten times per year from 2001 to early
2017.192
187. Gilbert, 127 F.R.D. at 145. See also supra notes 112–117 and accompanying text.
188. King Vision Pay Per View, Ltd., 180 F.R.D. at 333. See also supra notes 118–121 and
accompanying text.
189. Amelio, 98 F.R.D. at 693; Gwin, 161 F.R.D. at 71.
190. Riley Citing References, supra note 160.
191. Id.
192. Azza Int’l Corp. v. Gas Rsch. Inst., 204 F.R.D. 109, 110 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Howard
Commc’ns Ltd. v. Golf Gifts & Gallery, Inc., No. 01-C-1419, 2001 WL 428168, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 25, 2001); Fisher-Townsell v. Syregelas, No. 01-C-2930, 2001 WL 699108, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
June 20, 2001); Kaczkowski v. Daimlerchrysler Corp., No. 01-C-3739, 2001 WL 766872, at *1
(N.D. Ill. July 5, 2001); Broadmark Cap. Corp. v. GlobalNet, Inc., No. 01-C-3855, 2001 WL
800096, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 12, 2001); Lee’s Scrap Metal Co. v. Elec. Recovery Specialists, Inc.,
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No. 01-C-2672, 2001 WL 803659, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 17, 2001); Jet Support Servs., Inc. v.
WW191, Inc., No. 01-C-4264, 2001 WL 811152, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 17, 2001); Adams v. Schlyer,
No. 01-C-1408, 2001 WL 883657, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2001); Kim v. Lim, No. 01-C-3741,
2001 WL 987465, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2001); Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Bundy-Howard,
Inc., No. 01-C-1618, 2001 WL 987584, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 2001); Kim v. Lim, No. 01-C3741, 2001 WL 1035714, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 2001); Flohr v. Comdisco, Inc., No. 01-C-3187,
2001 WL 1117328, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2001); Bus. Elec. Soldering Techs., Inc. v. Smith, No.
01-C-5693, 2001 WL 1135944, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2001); Cement Masons Pension Fund,
Loc. 502 v. King & Larsen, Inc., No. 01-C-2919, 2001 WL 1155082, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27,
2001); Laborers’ Pension Fund v. King & Larsen Const., Inc., No. 01-C-6855, 2001 WL 1196177,
at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 2001); Comerica Bank v. Patil, No. 01-C-7156, 2001 WL 1223558, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2001); Scott v. Arrow Chevrolet, Inc., No. 01-C-7489, 2001 WL 1263498, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 22, 2001); C.H. Robinson Co. v. Sw. Motor Transp., Inc., No. 01-C-8107, 2001 WL
1512533, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 2001); C.H. Robinson Co. v. Sw. Motor Transp., Inc., No. 01C-8107, 2001 WL 1593147, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 12, 2001); Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Ridge Chrysler
Plymouth L.L.C., No. 01-C-8146, 2001 WL 1631870, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2001); Washington
Mut. Bank v. Morrison, No. 01-C-8988, 2002 WL 5583, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 2002); Tevlin v.
Metro. Water Reclamation Dist., No. 01-C-9098, 2002 WL 69489, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2002);
Dixon v. Parker, No. 01-C-7419, 2002 WL 99747, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 25, 2002); Mountain
Funding-Z, Inc. v. Goldenberg, No. 02-C-121, 2002 WL 221520, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2002);
Flohr v. Comdisco, Inc., No. 01-C-3187, 2002 WL 598522, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2002);
Baumann v. Bayer, No. 02-C-2351, 2002 WL 1263987, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 5, 2002); Judt v. Doyle,
No. 02-C-3155, 2002 WL 31386976, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2002); Sherrod-Bey v. Griffin, No.
02-C-0600, 2002 WL 31399130, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2002); United States v. Tarcom Corp.,
No. 02-C-6822, 2002 WL 31509777, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 2002); Banske v. Tarka, No. 02-C7359, 2003 WL 23149, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 2003); Smith v. Westfield Ford, Inc., No. 02-C-9288,
2003 WL 288956, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 2003); Hubbard v. Certified Grocers Midwest, Inc., No.
02-C-9178, 2003 WL 744733, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 2003); Beckman v. Pajian, No. 03-C-1511,
2003 WL 1563699, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2003); Dean v. Liberty Funding Servs., Inc., No. 03C-0947, 2003 WL 1748637, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 2003); Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc. v.
Plastech Engineered Prods., Inc., No. 01-C-5878, 2003 WL 21145630, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 13,
2003); Marshall v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., No. 02-C-9365, 2003 WL 21254360, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
May 30, 2003); Feld v. Altschuler, No. 03-C-940, 2003 WL 21360879, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 11,
2003); Gelso v. Sheahan, No. 03-C-2468, 2003 WL 21641926, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 10, 2003);
Alexian Bros. Health Providers Ass’n v. Humana Health Plan, Inc., 277 F. Supp. 2d 880, 885 (N.D.
Ill. 2003); Gulf Ins. Co. v. United Nat’l Ins. Co., No. 03-C-5156, 2003 WL 22717769, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 17, 2003); Dugan v. Carpentersville Quarry, Inc., No. 03-C-6895, 2003 WL 22717770, at
*1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 2003); U.S. EEOC v. PepsiAmericas, Inc., No. 03-C-6576, 2003 WL
22764869, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 2003); Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Dominick’s Finer Foods, Inc.,
No. 03-C-7477, 2003 WL 22872114, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2003); Moriarty v. B. Michael Muzyka,
Ltd., No. 03-C-7946, 2003 WL 22964370, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 2003); IFC Credit Corp. v. B.
Braun Med., Inc., No. 03-C-8815, 2004 WL 2700491, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 4, 2004); Liners Direct,
Inc. v. Luxury Bath Liners, Inc., No. 04-C-0108, 2004 WL 442605, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2004);
A-Tech Int’l, Ltd. (USA) v. Schiller, No. 04-C-2038, 2004 WL 792815, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 9,
2004); Lathom v. City of Des Plaines, No. 04-C-1249, 2004 WL 870829, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 22,
2004); Burke v. J.B. Hunt Transp. Servs., Inc., No. 04-C-2678, 2004 WL 1166637, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
May 19, 2004); Benson v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. 04-C-3860, 2004 WL 2034774, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2004); Kudish v. Freedland, No. 04-C-1164, 2004 WL 2033400, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 9, 2004); United States v. Jimenez Landscaping Corp., No. 04-C-2806, 2004 WL 2203396,
at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2004); Hsieh v. RR Donnelley & Sons Co., No. 04-C-5956, 2004 WL
2260629, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 2004); Ross v. Garcia, No. 04-C-5332, 2004 WL 2358297, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 2004); Comcast of Illinois X, LLC v. Thull, No. 04-C-4724, 2004 WL 2403781,
at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2004); DirecTV, Inc. v. Woodlock, No. 04-C-5922, 2004 WL 2973744, at
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*1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2004); Vergara v. City of Waukegan, No. 04-C-6586, 2004 WL 2958686, at
*1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2004); Morris v. Household Mortg. Servs., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 786, 788 n.1
(N.D. Ill. 2004); Canadian Nat’l Ry. Co. v. GE Cap. Rail Servs., No. 04-C-7901, 2005 WL 43303,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2005); Smith v. Condell Med. Ctr., No. 05-C-339, 2005 WL 221239, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 21, 2005); Lamar v. Experian Info. Sys., No. 05-C-817, 2005 WL 1026573, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2005); Bal Glob. Fin., LLC v. Neoplan USA Corp., No. 05-C-1799, 2005 WL
8177383, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 10, 2005); Clardy v. FCStone, LLC, No. 05-C-2920, 2005 WL
8179233, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 9, 2005); Meyers v. Smith-Nephew Richards, No. 05-C-4447, 2005
WL 2848382, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2005); Wattyl (No. 2) Inc. v. Goldmeier, No. 05-C-4979,
2005 WL 8179286, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 2005); Ciampi v. CCC Info. Servs. Inc., No. 05-C7056, 2006 WL 681049, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 2006); Stark v. Abex Corp., No. 05-C-6987, 2006
WL 695464, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 2006); Ciampi v. CCC Info. Servs. Inc., No. 05 C 7056, 2006
WL 8459888, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2006); Mote v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 05-C-6212, 2006
WL 763652, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 2006); Stark v. Abex Corp., No. 05-C-6987, 2006 WL
1472555, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 3, 2006); Weigert v. Newly Weds Foods, Inc., No. 06-C-2082, 2006
WL 1308625, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 2006); Aster Telesolutions, Inc. v. Premier Tech. Sols. Inc.,
No. 06-C-2144, 2006 WL 1547980, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2006); Trustees of N.E.C.A.-IBEW v.
L&S Elec. Co., No. 05-C-6188, 2006 WL 1547982, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2006); Bd. of Educ.
of City of Chicago v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., No. 06-C-3078, 2006 WL 1735287, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. June 16, 2006); Cordero v. Cent. DuPage Hosp., No. 06-C-2938, 2006 WL 1765429, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. June 22, 2006); Grillaert v. Capgemini U.S. LLC, No. 06-C-4814, 2006 WL 3210042, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 2006); McCutcheon v. Zimmer Holdings, Inc., No. 06-C-6256, 2006 WL
3431937, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2006); Breakwater Trading, LLC v. Maslin, No. 06-C-4242,
2007 WL 163163, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2007); Breeze Med. Equip., Inc. v. Companion Health
Servs., Inc., No. 07-C-673, 2007 WL 917577, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2007); Garcia v. City of
Chicago, No. 06-C-4340, 2007 WL 9814431, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 9, 2007); Smilie v. Comcast
Corp., No. 07-C-3231, 2007 WL 2688450, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 2007); Pacer v. Rockenbach
Chevrolet Sales, Inc., No. 07-C-5173, 2007 WL 4109291, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2007);
Goosinow v. Monterey Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 07-C-5353, 2007 WL 4215835, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
29, 2007); Ochoa v. City of Aurora, No. 07-C-4421, 2007 WL 4294683, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3,
2007); Zapalik v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., No. 08-C-295, 2008 WL 268708, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 30,
2008); Martinez v. Freedom Mortg. Team, Inc., No. 07-C-3442, 2008 WL 4372036, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 1, 2008); Fusion Cap. Fund II, LLC v. Millenium Holding Grp., Inc., No. 07-C-4543, 2008
WL 719247, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 2008); Matz v. Zebra Techs. Corp., No. 08-C-1046, 2008 WL
824251, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2008); J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Stephanie Medina, No. 07-C5623, 2008 WL 907436, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2008); Chicago Reg’l Council of Carpenters v.
Boldt Co., No. 08-C-1000, 2008 WL 927955, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 4, 2008); In re Egan Marine
Corp., No. 05-C-4074, 2008 WL 978832, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 8, 2008); Minter v. G & D Integrated
Distrib., Inc., No. 08-C-2050, 2008 WL 2022442, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 9, 2008); White v. Cnty. of
Cook, No. 08-C-1349, 2008 WL 2485686, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 16, 2008); Brown v. Cnty. of Cook,
No. 06-C-617, 2008 WL 2510185, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 19, 2008); Cubrovic v. Luxury Motors,
Inc., No. 08-C-3069, 2008 WL 4865583, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 20, 2008); Mauch v. Advoc. Health
& Hosps. Corp., No. 08-C-1920, 2008 WL 4866325, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 23, 2008); Brown v. Cnty.
of Cook, No. 06-C-617, 2008 WL 2741373, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 7, 2008); Poulos, Inc. v. Hartford
Fire Ins. Co., No. 08-C-3396, 2008 WL 2961315, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 2008); Johnson v. Garza,
No. 07-C-6862, 2008 WL 3849906, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2008); Trustees of Chicago Reg’l
Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v. S. & E. Carpentry Servs., Inc., No. 08-C-3580, 2008 WL
3891312, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2008); Gonzalez v. Abbott Lab’ys, No. 08-C-3718, 2008 WL
4164569, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 2008); Ochoa v. City of Aurora, No. 07-C-4421, 2008 WL
4812675, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 2008); Tempco Elec. Heater Corp. v. J.L. Becker Co., No. 08-C2870, 2008 WL 4834135, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 2008); Gittings v. Tredegar Film Prod.-Lake
Zurich, LLC, No. 08-C-4972, 2008 WL 4856106, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 2008); Vitale v. Blitt &
Gaines, P.C., No. 08-C-5413, 2008 WL 5100316, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 2008); Tempco Elec.
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Heater Corp. v. J.L. Becker Co., No. 08-C-2870, 2008 WL 5111195, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 2008);
Salata v. City of Berwyn, No. 08-C-7448, 2009 WL 855634, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2009); Targin
Sign Sys., Inc. v. Preferred Chiropractic Ctr., Ltd., No. 09-C-1399, 2009 WL 1010450, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Apr. 14, 2009); Cobra Cap., LLC v. Pomp’s Servs., Inc., No. 08-C-6884, 2009 WL 1098716,
at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 2009); Moede v. Pochter, No. 07-C-1726, 2009 WL 1449054, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. May 22, 2009); Nash v. Fair Collections & Outsourcing, Inc., No. 09-C-294, 2009 WL 1636950,
at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2009); Sauk Valley Bank v. Borchardt, No. 09-C-2144, 2009 WL 1767934,
at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 23, 2009); Bryndal v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 09-C-3075, 2009 WL
1904385, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 2009); Pena v. Williams, No. 08-C-7389, 2009 WL 2163463, at
*1 (N.D. Ill. July 20, 2009); Fish v. Greatbanc Tr. Co., No. 09-C-1668, 2009 WL 2487073, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2009); Claisse v. Boeing Co., No. 09-C-3722, 2009 WL 2916828, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 2, 2009); Sabani v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., No. 09-C-4633, 2009 WL 3007676, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 18, 2009); Favila v. City of Chicago, No. 09-C-3265, 2009 WL 3066595, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
23, 2009); Vitale v. Palisades Collection, L.L.C., No. 09-C-3233, 2009 WL 3255307, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 6, 2009); Jackson v. Subway No. 25488, No. 09-C-3276, 2009 WL 3788894, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 12, 2009); Jasper v. Saint Anthony Hosp., No. 09-C-4445, 2009 WL 3857434, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 18, 2009); Trustees of Auto. Mechs. Loc. No. 701 Pension & Welfare Funds v. Union
Bank of California, N.A., No. 08-C-7217, 2009 WL 4668580, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2009); Barakat
v. Martin, No. 09-C-7625, 2009 WL 4894597, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 11, 2009); Performance Proxy
Rsch., LLC v. Microsoft Corp., No. 09-C-6884, 2010 WL 4193272, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2010);
Sullivan v. Life Fitness, Inc., No. 09-C-7787, 2010 WL 747620, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2010); Bell
v. Delta Mgmt. Assocs., Inc., No. 10-C-513, 2010 WL 1611088, at *1 n.2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 2010);
Coach, Inc. v. City of Chicago, No. 10-C-3108, 2010 WL 2610668, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2010);
Amer Sports Winter & Outdoor Co. v. Nordica U.S.A. Corp., No. 10-C-1534, 2010 WL 2635785,
at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 28, 2010); Western v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 10-C-374, 2010 WL
2720760, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 2010); Galvez v. Kovalchuk, No. 10-C-4381, 2010 WL
2891669, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 21, 2010); Bisharat v. Vill. of Niles, No. 10-C-594, 2010 WL
3019962, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 2010); J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Blancarte, No. 09-C-7310,
2010 WL 3025224, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2010); Boose v. Oak Park Elementary Sch. Dist. No.
97, No. 10-C-3495, 2010 WL 3034673, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2010); Young v. Marianjoy, Inc.,
No. 10-C-4427, 2010 WL 3715148, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 2010); Drager v. PNC Bank, N.A.,
No. 10-C-4155, 2010 WL 3734015, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 2010); Davis v. ABM Sec. Servs.,
Inc., No. 10-C-5958, 2010 WL 3880675, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2010); Lengor v. St. Mary’s &
St. Elizabeth Hosp. Med. Ctr., No. 10-C-3077, 2010 WL 3855181, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2010);
Hyatt v. Experian Info. Sys., No. 10-C-5602, 2010 WL 4038825, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 14, 2010);
Gburek v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, No. 08-C-3188, 2010 WL 4286277, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18,
2010); Channon v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., No. 10-C-6963, 2010 WL 4483348, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
1, 2010); C.S. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, No. 10-C-7395, 2011 WL 13382832, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 26, 2011); Moore v. Vendor/Aramark Corr. Food Servs., No. 11-C-2327, 2011 WL 2601582,
at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 30, 2011), supplemented, No. 11-C-2327, 2011 WL 2637242 (N.D. Ill. July 6,
2011); Williams v. Raheel Foods Inc., No. 11-C-4965, 2011 WL 4945008, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18,
2011); Juhasz v. Groupon, Inc., No. 11-C-6577, 2011 WL 7713912, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 2011);
United Cent. Bank v. JJST Inc., No. 10-C-5550, 2012 WL 171128, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 20, 2012);
O’Toole v. Sears Roebuck & Co., No. 11-C-4611, 2012 WL 1511766, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 26,
2012); Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. ABS Freight Transp., Inc., No. 12-C-6838, 2012 WL 4754955, at
*1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 2012); Clark v. Enter. Recovery Sys., Inc., No. 12-C-9989, 2013 WL 664044,
at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2013); Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr. Co. v. Dionicio, No. 13-C-521, 2013 WL
1282785, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 2013); Xiamen Lota Int’l Co. v. Integrated Sales Sols. LLC, No.
13-C-2778, 2013 WL 3819641, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 23, 2013); Kalmes v. MKM Oil, Inc., No. 13C-363, 2013 WL 3975289, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2013); FirstMerit Bank N.A. v. Wolf, No. 13C-2661, 2013 WL 4565649, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 2013); ADT Sec. Servs., Inc. v. LisleWoodridge Fire Prot. Dist., 973 F. Supp. 2d 842, 847 (N.D. Ill. 2014); Payne v. City of Chicago,
No. 13-C-8643, 2014 WL 585310, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 14, 2014); Stuart v. Loc. 727, Int’l Bhd. of
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After 2001, though, Judge Shadur appears to have let references to the
State Farm v. Riley Appendix carry the instructional weight regarding
Rule 8. He had already said what needed to be said. There were
exceptions, of course, for new challenges. For example, in 2001, soon
after Judge Shadur issued the State Farm v. Riley Appendix, a single
Chicago firm filed three separate answers on behalf of three different
defendants. The Chicago lawyers refused to answer various allegations
that, they claimed, were “not directed against this Defendant.”193
A defense lawyer’s refusal to respond to allegations about someone
other than his or her client is not an issue that Shadur specifically
addressed in the Appendix. This particular dodge is common. In my study
of answers in Colorado car crash answers, insurance defense lawyers did
the same thing in 48.2% of the cases in which there were codefendants.194
They claimed that they need not respond to an allegation that, in their
determination, was directed at someone other than their client.195 The
Chicago case is an extreme extension of this view, because the lawyers
demonstrated that they could answer when they admitted or denied on
behalf of Defendant 1 but clammed up regarding the same issue when
they got to Defendants 2 and 3. Perhaps we could call this denying in the
alternative? The Chicago lawyers also claimed, unsuccessfully, that at
least one document “speaks for itself.”196 Judge Shadur struck their
answers; ordered them to replead a single answer for the three defendants;
and noted that “it is of course far easier for Azza’s counsel and this Court
to identify any areas of divergence among the defendants from a single
answer than to be compelled to leaf back and forth among three
pleadings . . . .”197
From time to time, Judge Shadur would express disappointment that
Teamsters, No. 13-C-9262, 2014 WL 1089117, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2014), rev’d, 771 F.3d
1014 (7th Cir. 2014); Hicks v. Clark, 107 F. Supp. 3d 905, 907 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 2015); Hobbs v. Bayer
Healthcare Pharms., Inc., No. 15-C-4933, 2015 WL 4429185, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 20, 2015); First
Merit Bank, N.A. v. Teets Fam. P’ship, No. 15-C-1573, 2015 WL 4508575, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July
24, 2015); Chaban v. Williams, No. 15-C-1926, 2015 WL 5897858, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2015);
Sharifi v. Stellar Recovery, Inc., No. 15-C-10587, 2016 WL 246134, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 20, 2016);
Murphy v. Vill. of Univ. Park, No. 15-C-8673, 2016 WL 317082, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2016);
Okere v. Chicago Transit Auth., No. 14-C-10115, 2016 WL 3538931, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 29,
2016); Robinson v. Hyundai of Matteson, LLC, No. 16-C-5821, 2016 WL 4366601, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. Aug. 16, 2016); Moore v. City of Chicago, No. 16-C-7143, 2016 WL 5792528, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 4, 2016); TCF Inventory Fin., Inc. v. SS/T Auto LLC, No. 16-C-8315, 2016 WL 6124453, at
*2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 2016); Sanchez v. Spex 3624, Inc., No. 16-C-8834, 2016 WL 6395583, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 2016); Webb v. Medicredit, Inc., No. 16-C-11125, 2017 WL 74854, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Jan. 9, 2017).
193. Azza Int’l Corp. v. Gas Research Inst., 204 F.R.D. 109, 110 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
194. Russell, supra note 7, at Section III.B.
195. Id.
196. Azza Int’l Corp., 204 F.R.D. at 110.
197. Id.
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his efforts with the Appendix were unavailing. In 2016, for example, he
explained that “[f]or many years this Court has been calling the attention
of lawyers (1) to the very different function of ‘counts’ as set out in Rule
10(b) . . . and (2) to the distinction between the federal ‘claim for relief’
and the state law concept of ‘causes of action . . . .’”198 This, like the Rule
8 issue he addressed in the Appendix, was a pleading issue. “Regrettably
this Court’s efforts to stanch the flow of wrongly conceived and wrongly
asserted complaints in that respect,” Judge Shadur lamented, “has had
much the same degree of success as Mickey Mouse in Walt Disney’s
classic Fantasia, seeking to sweep back the sea with a broom to the tune
of Dukas’ Sorcerer’s Apprentice.”199 He must have felt the same way
about stanching the flow of frivolous pleading, although he never
deployed the Fantasia reference regarding Rule 8. He had, however, cited
Mickey Mouse, Dukas, and Fantasia at least three other times.200
Judge Shadur’s final citation of the Appendix, on January 9, 2017, just
about a year before he died, was a lot. He started his Memorandum Order
by recounting that
[s]omething more than a decade and a half has elapsed since this Court,
in large part to spare its then secretary the chore of repeatedly
transcribing of this Court’s efforts to address a number of venial (not
mortal) sins committed by all too many defense lawyers who view
pleading as a sort of shell game, rather than as a means for identifying
what is or is not at issue between the litigants, published a multipart
Appendix to its opinion in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Riley . . . .201

Perhaps, at this point, he was whistling the tune of the Sorcerer’s
Apprentice or imagining Mickey Mouse sweeping the sea. “Regrettably,”
the ninety-two-year-old jurist continued, “the filing of such defensive
pleadings still continues apace, and this Court has concluded that
egregious examples of such questionable practices ought to be considered
for possible sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. (‘Rule’) 11(c)(3).”202
Sua Sponte Shadur went to work on the answer that Taylor Nicole
Rollinson, Esq., from the Chicago law firm of Ogletree Deakins Nash
Smoak & Stewart, PC, had filed on behalf of Medicredit, Inc. Just how
any Chicago lawyer filed an answer in Judge Shadur’s courtroom without
198. Keesler v. Electrolux Home Prods., Inc., No. 16-C-199, 2016 WL 3940114, at *1 n.1 (N.D.
Ill. July 21, 2016).
199. Id.
200. Betts v. Container Corp. of Am., No. 94-C-242, 1994 WL 66113, at *3 n.1 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
2, 1994); Haven v. Rzeczpospolita Polska, 68 F. Supp. 2d 947, 961 n.6 (N.D. Ill. 1999), aff’d 215
F.3d 727 (7th Cir. 2000); Haven v. Rzeczpospolita Polska, No. 99-C-1727, 1999 WL 965719, at
*2 n.6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 14, 1999).
201. Webb v. Medicredit, Inc., No. 16-C-11125, 2017 WL 74854, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 9, 2017).
202. Id. Judge Shadur was born June 25, 1924. Shadur, Milton Irving, supra note 1.
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knowing of his predilections is hard to fathom. In 2001, Mr. DeMoon felt
blindsided; sixteen years later, lawyers would had to have had their eyes
wide shut to provoke Judge Shadur. Applying arguments from the
Appendix, Judge Shadur first addressed “some problematic aspects of the
Answer” and then turned to a “grab bag of nine purported defenses.”203
The answer that Ms. Rollinson filed on behalf of her client ran afoul
first of Rule 8(b)(5).204 This part of Rule 8(b) specifies that “[a] party that
lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth
of an allegation must so state, and the statement has the effect of a
denial.”205 Judge Shadur complained that Ms. Rollinson pleaded lack of
“knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief” but then with her
responses to nine different allegations added the phrase “and, therefore,
denies the same.”206 A picayune point, perhaps, but Judge Shadur was
right that the lawyer’s addition of the denial was “of course
oxymoronic—how can a party disclaim knowledge or information even
to form a belief as to the truth of an allegation and then go on to deny
it?”207 “Accordingly,” he ordered, “the offending addition is stricken
from all paragraphs of the Answer where it appears.”208 Forty-five
words—gone. Judge Shadur reminds me of a professor nearing the end
of his life dutifully—and stubbornly—marking every passive verb in a
draft of a student’s paper.
More darkly, Judge Shadur commented that although “this Court will
credit most of Medicredit’s disclaimers as apparently advanced in the
objective and subjective good faith called for by Rule 11(b), that would
seem questionable as to at least a couple of them.”209 With commendable
acuity not just for an old judge but for any judge, Judge Shadur observed
that the plaintiffs alleged that they had listed Medicredit, Ms. Rollinson’s
client, in their bankruptcy petition and “that the Clerk of the Bankruptcy
Court mailed a notice of the bankruptcy petition to Medicredit . . . .”210
Pushing Rule 11 and Rule 8, Judge Shadur questioned, not rhetorically:
“[H]ow can lawyers acting as Medicredit’s counsel assert their client’s
lack of knowledge (or even more, its lack of information sufficient to
form a belief) of those facts?”211 He also doubted Medicredit’s claim to
203. Webb, 2017 WL 74854, at *1.
204. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(5).
205. Id.
206. Webb, 2017 WL 74854, at *1.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. In a footnote, Judge Shadur emphasized that “it is of course Medicredit’s duty to proffer
such disclaimers responsibly and not as a form of cop out. Medicredit’s counsel are expected to
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lack knowledge of its telephone credit collection activities. “Although
this instance is less troubling[]” than the denial of sufficient information
about Medicredit’s listing in the bankruptcy petition, Judge Shadur noted
that “a comparable disclaimer is advanced as to the Complaint ¶ 15
allegation that someone at Medicredit telephoned the Webbs in early
October 2016 to collect the indebtedness referred to in the Complaint. In
that respect it may well be,” Judge Shadur skeptically noted, “that
Medicredit’s business practice does not maintain detailed records as to
such debt collection efforts, so that this memorandum order simply raises
a query in that respect.”212 For the plaintiffs in this matter, Lisa and Jason
Webb, this is remarkable attention from an Article III judge in his ninth
decade.
Judge Shadur next turned to Ms. Rollinson’s decision regarding four
of the complaint’s paragraphs “that ‘no response is required’ to what they
regard as a ‘legal conclusion . . . .’”213 Again, could no lawyer or
paralegal at Rollinson’s firm have warned her? Regarding her refusal to
respond to a legal conclusion, Judge Shadur intoned—or thundered—
“[t]hat is of course dead wrong—see App’x ¶ 2 to State Farm.”214
Predictably, he then caught counsel contradicting herself because she
“found no difficulty in responding with an admission to the ultimate legal
conclusion—one that alleges subject matter jurisdiction (see Complaint
and Answer ¶ 1).”215 Counsel’s answers to two more paragraphs, he
noted, “compound the felony by nevertheless denying the corresponding
Complaint allegations, which appear accurate on their face.”216
Not finished, Judge Shadur turned his attention to the “grab bag” of
affirmative defenses that Medicredit’s attorney had included. He swept
away the first affirmative defense, noting that it was “not only
unnecessary but does not qualify as an A[ffirmative] D[efense] within the
purview of Rule 8(c) and the case law applying and construing that
Rule—in that regard also see App’x ¶ 5 to State Farm.”217 He hammered
the second affirmative defense, which must have simply mouthed that the
complaint had failed to state a claim, and, as noted above, called it “not
only frivolous in its approach to the ‘notice pleading’ concept that
underpins federal pleading but . . . also flawed as a conceptual matter.” If
Ms. Rollinson “really believes that the Webbs’ complaint is vulnerable in
question their client on that score in preparing the amended responsive pleading ordered hereafter.”
Id. at *1 n.1.
212. Id. at *1.
213. Id. at *2.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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Rule 12(b)(6) terms,” he wrote, “that should have been advanced up front
in a properly supported motion, rather than simply being planted as a
prospective bomb available to explode the Complaint at some future
date.”218
Next, Judge Shadur jumped on the defense lawyer’s third affirmative
defense, which was a “partial laundry list selected from the grab bag of
defenses listed in Rule 8(c),” emphasizing, as Judge Manion had in Heller
in 1989, that this list was “totally uninformative as to the predicate for
each of the listed grounds.”219 Moving right along, he found that the
fourth affirmative defense, lettered D, was “at odds with the principle that
an A[ffirmative] D[efense] must accept the allegations of a complaint
while then asserting some basis for denying liability anyway (in this
instance, for example, AD D is at odds with Complaint ¶ 17).”220 Next,
the defendant had pleaded that “the Webbs have failed to mitigate
damages, if any,” an assertion that, Judge Shadur noted, “by definition is
totally speculative and must be stricken.”221 Continuing, Judge Shadur
busted defense counsel for a cutting and pasting error; the affirmative
defenses labeled F and H “provide living evidence of the carelessness
with which defense counsel have approached the task of pleading—they
are identical to the letter. Moreover,” he exhorted, “their blunderbuss
approach is really unacceptable.”222
Last, he blasted the ninth purported affirmative defense as “yet another
example of poor practice. There is of course no reason to reserve the
possibility of future A[ffirmative] D[efense]s that may emerge during the
course of litigation,” he noted, without bothering to cite the liberality of
Rule 15, “so this too is another illustration of sheer boilerplate rather than
thoughtful lawyering.”223 Oof! But again, nothing surprising here from
the senior federal judge.
Fed up, Judge Shadur in his penultimate paragraph complained that
“[t]his Court regrets having to waste so much time on a patently
thoughtless pleading, which regrettably is the work product of a large
national law firm with a number of branches in other countries as well.”
Then, “because of the multiple flaws recounted here,” he struck the
answer and gave counsel two weeks to replead.224 Finally, consistent with
his practice since issuing the Appendix, Judge Shadur noted that
“[c]ounsel are ordered to advise the client that no charge will be made,
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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with a copy of counsel’s letter of transmittal to be sent to this Court’s
chambers (purely for informational purposes, not for filing).”225 Whether
the old judge was exasperated by having to go through the same lessons
over and over again or whether instead he relished the opportunity is
impossible to know.
VII. SHADUR’S APPENDIX AMONG HIS NORTHERN DISTRICT
COLLEAGUES
Judge Shadur’s colleagues on the federal bench also cited his
Appendix in State Farm v. Riley, though not as often as he himself did.
Of the 232 judicial citations of the case, Judge Shadur’s colleagues on the
bench—both Article III judges and magistrates—cited the case 28 times
between 2001 and 2020.226 This amounts to not quite three citations every
two years or about one-seventh the rate at which Judge Shadur cited his
own case. I intend no criticism of Judge Shadur for citing his own work;
he resembles a professor who posts and refers to suggestions or rules on
how to write better final exams.
Judge Shadur’s Appendix did not have the status of a local rule in the
Northern District of Illinois. For cases assigned to his courtroom, though,
his Appendix had the same power as a local rule. Although none of his
colleagues went so far as to adopt Judge Shadur’s approach of sua sponte
review of answers just after their filing, some of his colleagues did
present the interpretation of Rule 8 that Judge Shadur offered in his
Appendix as general rules either for pleading or within the Northern
District.
For example, in 2006, Judge George Marovich227 paid quiet tribute to
Judge Shadur with the parenthetical text that he included after citing State
Farm v. Riley.228 Judge Marovich, whom President Reagan appointed
and who now is an inactive senior judge, describes the Appendix simply
as “outlining proper way to answer complaint under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.”229
Judge Joan Humphrey Lefkow,230 in 2008, fully explained Judge
Shadur’s Appendix in an effort to head off the repetition of bad pleading
225. Id.
226. Riley Citing References, supra note 160 (filtering “Cases” by jurisdiction, “N.D. Ill.” and
by date range from “01/01/2001 through 12/31/2020” to get 195 cases total, including the 167
citations by Judge Shadur, supra note 192).
227. Marovich, George Michael, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/
marovich-george-michael [https://perma.cc/PZP6-ZG3B] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
228. Divane v. Sonake Elec. Contractors, Inc., No. 05-C-1211, 2006 WL 2497547, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. Aug. 24, 2006).
229. Id.
230. Lefkow, Joan Humphrey, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/lefkowjoan-humphrey [https://perma.cc/LUS3-AKU2] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
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in an answer that defendants were going to replead. Class action plaintiffs
had sued Playtex, Medela, and some other companies alleging that the
companies had used lead-containing plastic in the manufacture of coolers
or cases for carrying breast milk.231 As part of her order to consolidate
three separate lawsuits, Judge Lefkow noted that
because Medela and the other defendants might otherwise raise the
same or similar issues in their future responsive pleadings, and thus
prompt the plaintiffs to file another motion to strike on the same or
similar grounds, the court will, in the interest of judicial efficiency,
briefly address the concerns raised in plaintiffs’ motion.232

She then instructed the defendants how to replead their answer. First, the
judge noted that “a preliminary statement is generally unnecessary and
improper in the context of a defendant’s answer to a complaint.” Judge
Lefkow then reminded the defendants’ lawyers to comply with Local
Rule 10.1. Next, citing Judge Shadur’s Appendix, she instructed the
defendants not to use the “state a legal conclusion” gambit; to admit or
deny each paragraph per Rule 8(b); “to avoid the use of colloquialisms
such as ‘the document speaks for itself’”; that “the Rules provide no basis
for defendant to ‘demand strict proof’”; and last, that the defendants “are
instructed to plead their affirmative defenses in accord with Rule 8(c) and
to heed Judge Shadur’s advice,” which she included as an indented block
of text:
It is unacceptable for a party’s attorney simply to mouth [affirmative
defense]s in formula-like fashion (“laches,” “estoppel,” “statute of
limitations” or what have you), for that does not do the job of apprising
opposing counsel and this Court of the predicate for the claimed
defense-which is after all the goal of notice pleading.233

Judge Lefkow, in this instance, deployed Judge Shadur’s Appendix
prophylactically. In similar fashion, plaintiffs’ lawyers faced with a
defense attorney’s request for an extension of time to answer might say
yes but also ask that the defense counsel answer consistently with the
expectations of Judges Lefkow and Shadur. Then, after the defense
ignores the request, the plaintiff’s attorney will have a letter that can serve
as a useful exhibit for a motion to deem answers admitted or to strike
affirmative defenses.234
231. Ramos v. Playtex Prod., Inc., No. 08-CV-2703, 2008 WL 4066250, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug.
27, 2008).
232. Id. at *5.
233. Id. (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley (State Farm v. Riley), 199 F.R.D. 276,
279 (N.D. Ill. 2001)).
234. In 2005, Magistrate Judge Martin C. Ashman granted a motion to strike improperly
answered allegations but granted the defense counsel leave to amend the answers. In so doing, he
specifically reviewed Judge Shadur’s instruction regarding “speaks for itself,” “strict proof,” and
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Several of Judge Shadur’s colleagues dealt with the court’s local rule
10.1 in orders or other rulings in which they discussed the State Farm v.
Riley Appendix. In 2002, for example, Judge Elaine Bucklo referred to
the “imaginative device of photocopying Ramada’s Complaint and
inserting paragraph-by-paragraph typewritten responses on the
Complaint itself.”235 The defendant’s idea was an obvious response to
Local Rule 10.1, but Judge Bucklo might have gone further and
suggested, consistent with Judge Shadur’s Appendix, that plaintiffs
include after each paragraph in their complaint three checkboxes, as
follows:
☐ Admit
☐ Deny
☐ Insufficient knowledge or information to form a belief.

Three checkboxes, with no catchall “other” box to accommodate
departures from the Rules, might channel defense attorneys into Rule
8(b)’s three options.236
A. Speaking Documents
Over the years, several of Judge Shadur’s colleagues, like Judge
Lefkow, have cited the State Farm v. Riley Appendix in order to complain
about defense attorneys who claim that statutes, insurance policies,
contracts, or other documents speak for themselves. In July of 2019, after
Judge Shadur’s death, Magistrate Judge Iain Johnston237 wrote in a
footnote that “[t]he Court would be remiss if it failed to note its distaste
for the lawyer phrase that a ‘document speaks for itself.’” Paying tribute,
Judge Johnston noted that “[t]he late great Milton Shadur led the charge
to eliminate this phrase from pleadings.”238 A judge favorite from the
Appendix was Judge Shadur’s tart sentence that “this Court has been
“states a legal conclusion.” Donnelly v. Frank Shirey Cadillac, Inc., No. 05-C-3520, 2005 WL
2445902, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2005).
235. Ramada Franchise Sys., Inc. v. Royal Vale Hosp. of Cincinnati, Inc., No. 02-C-1941, 2002
WL 737283, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2002).
236. Another Northern District colleague referred to Local Rule 10.1 in an order that cited Judge
Shadur’s Appendix. Judge Blanche M. Manning noted that “[t]he answer does not satisfy that
requirement of Rule 10.1 because single paragraphs of the answer refer to multiple paragraphs of
the complaint. In addition,” Judge Manning explained, “the paragraphs of the answer fail to
concisely summarize the allegations to which they are responding, requiring the court to ‘lay two
pleadings side by side, and to shift constantly from one to the other, to see just what has and has
not been placed in issue,’ the very burden the local rule seeks to avoid.” Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Duckson,
No. 11-CV-00459, 2011 WL 2293873, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 9, 2011) (citing Liners Direct, Inc. v.
Luxury Bath Liners, Inc., No. 04-CV-108, 2004 WL 442605, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2004)).
237. Johnston, Iain David, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/johnston-iaindavid [https://perma.cc/4TDQ-PESR] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
238. PCM Leasing, Inc. v. BelGioioso Cheese, Inc., No. 16-CV-50076, 2019 WL 4567576, at
*3 n.2 (N.D. Ill. July 11, 2019) (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley (State Farm v. Riley),
199 F.R.D. 276, 279 (N.D. Ill. 2001)).
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attempting to listen to such written materials for years (in the forlorn hope
that one will indeed give voice)—but until some such writing does break
its silence, this Court will continue to require pleaders to employ one of
the three alternatives that are permitted by Rule 8(b).”239 Three Northern
District colleagues—Judge Arlander Keys,240 Judge Blanche
Manning,241 and Magistrate Judge Martin Ashman242—cited this
sentence in their own rulings.243
B. Legal Conclusions
Judge Shadur’s fellow jurists from the Northern District of Illinois also
cited his State Farm v. Riley Appendix in opposition to the defense notion
that they need not answer allegations of legal conclusions. In 2002, Judge
Bucklo walloped Royal Vale Hospitality of Cincinnati, Inc.’s idea—the
lawyers’ idea, that is—that they could refuse to answer six allegations
“on the stated premise that the . . . allegations contain legal conclusions
rather than facts. But that ignores the universal recognition,” Judge
Bucklo lectured using Judge Shadur’s language, “from the highest
judicial sources on down, that legal conclusions form an entirely proper
component of the federal notice pleading regime.”244 Two years later,
Judge Bucklo was less strident when picking through allegations to which
“defendants contend that they need not answer because the paragraph
asserts a legal conclusion.”245 Culling through the defendant’s answer,
she decided that the defendants’ coupling, for a majority of the challenged
answers, of the “legal conclusion” claim with a denial was sufficient for
Rule 8. She decided too, more murkily, that the other six answers that the
plaintiff challenged were implicitly denied—or, maybe, would be denied
if she forced the defendant to replead them—so she “decline[d] to strike
239. State Farm v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. at 279.
240. Arlander
Keys,
BALLOTPEDIA
https://ballotpedia.org/Arlander_Keys;
[https://perma.cc/D3UM-3N2V] (last visited Apr. 18, 2021); Patricia Manson, Retired Judge
Motivated by Courts’ Role in Ending Discrimination, CHI. L. BULL. (May 27, 2014, 2:50 PM),
https://www.chicagolawbulletin.com/archives/2014/05/27/arlander-keys-5-27-14
[https://perma.cc/P5UQ-FXE5].
241. Manning, Blanche M., FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/manningblanche-m [https://perma.cc/J3V4-Y742] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
242. Ronnie Reese, Martin Ashman, 1931–2012, CHI. TRIB. (June 10, 2012),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2012-06-10-ct-met-ashman-obit-20120610story.html [https://perma.cc/D2M6-YNPH].
243. Rudzinski v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 05-C-0474, 2007 WL 2973830, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
4, 2007); Rexam Beverage Can Co. v. Bolger, No. 06-C-2234, 2008 WL 217144, at *7 (N.D. Ill.
2008); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Duckson, No. 11-CV-00459, 2011 WL 2293873, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 9,
2011).
244. Ramada Franchise Sys., Inc. v. Royal Value Hosp. of Cincinnati, Inc., No. 02-C-1941,
2002 WL 737283, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2002) (citing State Farm v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. at 279
“and authorities cited there”).
245. Holzer v. Prudential Equity Grp. LLC, 520 F. Supp. 2d 922, 928 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
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them.”246
Two years later, Magistrate Judge Jeffrey Cole247 confronted refusal
to respond to legal conclusions by lawyers for Telezygology, Inc. The
plaintiff, Asta, LLC, sued to enforce a contract under which, Asta
claimed, Telezygology was to pay Asta one-half of the base salary of any
salesperson whom Telezygology hired.248 In the complaint’s eighth
paragraph, Asta recited a provision of the contract. Even though
Telezygology admitted “that it executed the contract, clearly concedes
that the provision was a part of the parties’ agreement throughout its brief,
and the contract is attached to the Complaint,” the defendant’s lawyers
nonetheless refused to admit the eighth paragraph and claimed instead
that the legal conclusion required no response.249 Citing cases from the
United States Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit, and his colleague’s
Appendix in State Farm v. Riley, Judge Cole held that the defendant was
wrong in thinking that legal conclusions required no answer250 and called
the answer oxymoronic for simultaneously claiming legal conclusions
required no answer while also denying some of them.251
In 2010, Northern District of Illinois Judge Amy St. Eve252 cited State
Farm v. Riley in support of the point that allegations of legal conclusions
required responses.253 Attorneys for the Federal Deposit Insurance
Company had responded to fourteen different averments by claiming they
were “legal conclusions as to which no response is required; to the extent
a response is deemed required, FDIC denies the allegations.”254 Judge St.
Eve allowed the FDIC to answer in this convoluted way, although she
246. Id.
247. Jeffrey Cole, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Jeffrey_Cole [https://perma.cc/SR2AMEV3]
(last
visited
Apr.
5,
2021);
Jeffrey
Cole,
BLOOMBERG,
https://www.bloomberg.com/profile/person/15879799
[https://perma.cc/L935-NWXD] (last
visited Apr. 5, 2021).
248. Asta, L.L.C. v. Telezygology, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 2d 837, 839–40 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
249. Id. at 840 n.1 (citation omitted).
250. Id. (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Jackson v. Marion County, 66
F.3d 151, 153 (7th Cir.1995); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley (State Farm v. Riley), 199
F.R.D. 276, 278 (N.D. Ill. 2001)).
251. Asta, L.L.C., 629 F. Supp. 2d at 840 n.1 (citing Cordero v. Central DuPage Hosp., 2006
WL 1765429, *1 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (striking “oxymoronic” responses)). See also Judge John Grady’s
Order in Illinois Wholesale Cash Register, Inc. v. PCG Trading, LLC, 08-C-363, 2009 WL
1515290, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 27, 2009) (“Rule 8(b) requires that all allegations be responded to;
there is no exception for ‘legal conclusions.’”).
252. St. Eve, Amy Joan, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/st-eve-amy-joan
[https://perma.cc/2DUY-GEYG] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021); see also Amy St. Eve & Michael A.
Zuckerman, The Forgotten Pleading, 7 FED. CTS. L. REV. 149 (2014).
253. Pavlik v. FDIC, No. 10-C-816, 2010 WL 3937621, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 2010).
254. Opposition of Defendant Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in Its Corporate
Capacity, to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Defendant FDIC’s Answers and Affirmative Defenses at
2, Pavlik, 2010 WL 5624815 (No. 10-C-816).
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might have struck all but the final four words of the evasive responses.255
In 2011, Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan256 cited Judge St. Eve’s FDIC
order along with Judge Shadur’s Appendix when he explained that
“[p]ursuant to Rule 8(b) an opponent must respond to all allegations in a
pleading and if legal conclusions included in an initial pleading can be
responded to in accordance with Rule 8(b), an opposing party must
respond to such allegations.”257 Judge Der-Yeghiayan did limit the
breadth of legal arguments a plaintiff might include in a complaint and
claimed that “[l]egal arguments are not appropriate in an initial pleading
if they are such that they ‘cannot be answered by a “short and plain”
admission,
denial,
or
defense
as
contemplated
by
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b).’”258
Twice now, I have heard the argument that no response to legal
conclusions is necessary because Black’s Law Dictionary defines
“averments” as assertions of fact not of law.259 Most recently, Mr.
DeMoon, the assistant attorney general who represented the guardian of
Mr. Riley, made this argument to me. The claim seems to be that an
averment of law is improper and therefore requires no response. That I
have heard this precise argument from lawyers in two different states
suggests that there is some common source or lore diffusing this idea.
There are at least three things wrong with the argument, from Black’s
Law Dictionary, that defendants need not answer averments of legal
conclusions. First, the current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
refer to “averments”; Rules 8 and 9 refer to claim or allegations.260
Second, before the 2007 amendment of the rules and in 2001 when Judge
Shadur created the Appendix, Rule 8(b) did include the word averments,
but 8(b) also referred to “averments and paragraphs.”261 Paragraphs
255. Pavlik, 2010 WL 3937621, at *3.
256. Der Yeghiayan, Samuel, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/deryeghiayan-samuel [https://perma.cc/4MND-BYVA] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
257. Walker v. Walker, 11-C-2967, 2011 WL 3757314, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2011) (citations
omitted).
258. Id. (citing Norton-Griffiths v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 2011 WL 884456, at *6 (D. Vt.
Mar. 11, 2011)).
259. As noted above, Rule 8 no longer includes the word “averment.” See supra note 104; see
also Averments, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
260. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(b) uses the word “claim” in subsection (b)(1)(A),
“allegations” in (b)(1)(B) and (b)(3), and “allegation” in (b)(2). FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b). Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 9 uses “allege” or “alleging” throughout, not “aver” or “averring.” FED. R. CIV.
P. 9.
261. Defenses; Form of Denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms the party’s defenses
to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments upon which the adverse party relies.
If a party is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an
averment, the party shall so state and this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the
substance of the averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part or a
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seems to have been a synonym for averments; if so, there is no argument
that Black’s defines “paragraphs” as proper only when alleging facts.
Third, the pleading of legal conclusions has always been part of federal
pleading, as Judges Shadur and Bucklo explained. Though a plaintiff may
not solely plead bare legal conclusions, a plaintiff may include legal
conclusions among the factual allegations.262
C. Strict Proof
Along with using Judge Shadur’s State Farm v. Riley Appendix to push
back defense refusals to answer based upon the legal conclusion and
speaking documents claims, Northern District of Illinois judges have also
used the Appendix to step on demands for “strict proof.” In a July 2013
order in a case with Wells Fargo Bank seeking to recover on a promissory
note against a defaulting debtor, Judge Aspen cited the Appendix in a
footnote after noting that the debtor included in his answer that he
“demands strict proof thereof.” Judge Aspen noted dryly that “[t]his
language has no legal effect.” He then cited the Appendix and two other
Shadur opinions.263 In another banking case that same year, Chief Judge
Rubén Castillo264 granted a motion to strike the phrase “demands strict
proof thereof” from eight responses that a bank’s lawyers had filed.265
Judge Shadur’s colleagues in the Northern District of Illinois also cited
the Appendix when confronting defendants’ formulaic claims regarding
their lack of knowledge of information. Judge Robert Gettleman,266 for
qualification of an averment, the pleader shall specify so much of it as is true and material and
shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends in good faith to controvert all the
averments of the preceding pleading, the pleader may make denials as specific denials of
designated averments or paragraphs or may generally deny all the averments except such
designated averments or paragraphs as the pleader expressly admits; but, when the pleader does
so intend to controvert all its averments, including averments of the grounds upon which the
court’s jurisdiction depends, the pleader may do so by general denial subject to the obligations set
forth in Rule 11.
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b) (2001) (emphasis added).
262. See infra pp. 964–65.
263. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Morgan, No. 12-C-4797, 2013 WL 3670243 at *2 n.2 (N.D.
Ill. July 12, 2013) (citing Donnelly v. Frank Shirey Cadillac, Inc., No. 05-C-3520, 2005 WL
2445902, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2005); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley (State Farm v.
Riley), 199 F.R.D. 276, 278 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Gilbert v. Johnston, 127 F.R.D. 145, 146 (N.D. Ill.
1989)).
264. Castillo, Rubén, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/castillorub%C3%A9n [https://perma.cc/CM7Y-9AJ2] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
265. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Great Lakes Bus. Credit LLC, 968 F. Supp. 2d 898,
904 (N.D. Ill. 2013). Chief Judge Castillo cited the State Farm v. Riley Appendix; Judge Shadur’s
opinions in Donnelly, 2005 WL 2445902, at *1; Gilbert, 127 F.R.D. at 146; and Judge Robert
Gettleman’s opinion in Jones v. Sabis Educ. Sys., Inc., No. 98-C-4252, 2000 WL 369720, at *4–5
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 7, 2000), which itself relied up on the Appendix.
266. Gettleman,
Robert
William,
FED.
JUD.
CTR.,
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example, cited the Appendix in a 2012 order in which “[d]efendant’s
contradictory answers state a lack of knowledge or information sufficient
to form a belief about the truth of the allegations and deny the same
allegations.”267 Judge Gettleman, having already cited Rule 11, lectured
that “[d]efendant is under an obligation to respond honestly to plaintiffs’
well-pled allegations.”268 He then quoted Judge Shadur’s explanation
that “very often it doesn’t require much in the way of information to form
a belief about the truth or lack of truth in someone else’s assertions.”269
The practice of claiming insufficient information while also denying an
allegation vexed Judge Gettleman. In 2013, he criticized the lawyering of
AFNI, Inc.’s lawyers, who responded to plaintiff-debtor’s allegation
about the defendant-creditor’s knowledge of an address. The judge wrote
that “Defendant both denies this and states it is ‘unable to determine the
truth or falsity’ of the allegation.”270 The lawyers should simply have said
that they lacked information sufficient to form a belief, which Rule 8
would deem a denial.
D. Affirmative Defenses
In addition to citing the State Farm v. Riley Appendix in order to
combat defense refusals to respond to legal conclusions, claims that
documents speak for themselves, demands for strict proof, oxymoronic
denials coupled with claims of insufficient information, and other
FRCP 8(b)-related questions, Judge Shadur’s colleagues in the Northern
District of Illinois also cited the Appendix regarding FRCP 8(c) issues:
affirmative defenses. In the answer that prompted the Appendix, Mr.
DeMoon had included no affirmative defenses at all—at least none that
violated Judge Shadur’s rules. Regarding affirmative defenses, Judge
Shadur laid down two rules in the Appendix. The first was that he would
strike purported affirmative defenses that did not “admit[] all of the
allegations of a complaint.”271 That sounds harsh, but he noted that
“nothing is lost by defendant in that situation, because the denial of that
allegation in the answer has already put the matter at issue.” 272 Second,
Judge Shadur knocked as “unacceptable for a party’s attorney simply to
mouth A[ffirmative] D[efense]s in formula-like fashion . . . for that does
not do the job of apprising opposing counsel and this Court of the
https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/gettleman-robert-william [https://perma.cc/7S4J-U43S] (last
visited Apr. 5, 2021).
267. Coach, Inc. v. Bella, 11-C-3987, 2012 WL 689266, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 29, 2012).
268. Id. at *2.
269. Id. (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley (State Farm v. Riley), 199 F.R.D. 276,
278 (N.D. Ill. 2001)).
270. Burnside v. AFNI, Inc., No. 13-C-2957, 2013 WL 5718438, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2013).
271. State Farm v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. at 279.
272. Id.
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predicate for the claimed defense . . . .”273 Notably, none of Judge
Shadur’s fellow judges seem to have adopted his practice of sua sponte
review of the answers soon after filing.
In 2004, Judge Marvin Aspen274 noted that “[c]ourts have held time
and time again that stringing together a long list of legal defenses is not
sufficient to satisfy Rule 8(a)’s short and plain statement requirement,”
before quoting Judge Shadur’s Appendix sentence about attorneys who
“mouth ADs in formula-like fashion (‘laches,’ ‘estoppel,’ ‘statute of
limitations,’ or what have you) . . . .”275 Before the judge was a lawsuit
between banks, with a list of eight affirmative defenses that the original
plaintiff bank offered up in response to the defendant’s counterclaims. In
the end, Judge Aspen struck three of the counterclaim defendant’s
affirmative defenses, including one that mouthed, “Plaintiff is barred
under the doctrine of unclean hands, and other equitable doctrines,
including waiver, estoppel, and laches, from seeking relief against First
Bank.”276
Judge Shadur’s Appendix instruction about unacceptable mouthing of
affirmative defenses was another judge favorite. In 2006, Judge Manning
cited this sentence in an order in which she struck thirteen affirmative
defenses.277 She also added her own criticism of catchall or blanket
defenses.278 “Blanket defenses incorporating ‘each and every’ defense
allowed by the relevant sections of the U.S. Code or ‘one or more’ of a
laundry list of defenses,” she lectured, “raise alarm bells with the court
because the connotation is ‘we’re not sure which ones are applicable so
we’re just going to assert all of them.’”279 She explained that “such an
expansive approach is unnecessary given the liberal amendment policy
provided in Fed. R. Civ. P. 15,” but, more darkly, the judge also warned
that “such ‘catch-all’ defenses could potentially signal that the required
investigation under Rule 11 may not have been completed . . . .”280
That same year, Judge Castillo, who would later become chief judge,
deployed the Appendix’s sentence about the unacceptable mouthing of
affirmative defenses when he struck an affirmative defense that said no
more than “Reis’s claims are barred or limited by laches, waiver,
273. Id.
274. Aspen, Marvin E., FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/aspen-marvin-e
[https://perma.cc/3VLH-RE2K] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
275. Builders Bank v. First Bank & Tr. Co., No. 03-C-4959, 2004 WL 626827, at *6 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 25, 2004)).
276. Id. at *1.
277. Grayline Housewares, Inc. v. Garden Ridge Corp., No. 06-C-699, 2006 WL 8460518, at
*1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 18, 2006).
278. Id. at *3.
279. Id.
280. Id.
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estoppel, unclean hands, or similar legal or equitable doctrines.”281 Judge
Castillo cited the Appendix and reminded counsel for the defendant,
Concept Industries, that “[l]aches, waiver, estoppel, and unclean hands
are equitable defenses that must be pled with the specific elements
required to establish the defense.”282 Then, like Judge Aspen, Judge
Castillo added another limitation on blanket defenses. The defendant’s
sixth affirmative defense was “Concept reserves the right to add
additional affirmative defenses as they become known through
discovery.” Judge Castillo crisply noted that “[t]his is not a proper
affirmative defense. If at some later point in the litigation Concept
believes that the addition of another affirmative defense is warranted,” he
lectured, “it may seek leave to amend its pleadings pursuant to Rule
15(a) . . . .”283
The best endorsement of Judge Shadur’s disruption of the defense
attorneys’ appending lists of frivolous defenses to their answers came in
2017. Judge Robert Dow, Jr.,284 struck the listing of waiver and estoppel
as defenses by counterdefendant Chicago Marine.285 Judge Dow quoted
Judge Shadur’s familiar sentence about the unacceptability of mouthing
affirmative defenses.286 Judge Dow then suggested the ultimate absurdity
of the prevalent defense practice of pleading laundry lists of fact-free
affirmative defenses. “Were it acceptable to allege boilerplate affirmative
defenses in this fashion,” the judge wrote, “a party could simply cut and
paste Rule 8(c)’s list of affirmative defenses (along with any other
recognizable affirmative defenses) into its answer so as to preserve each
281. Reis Robotics USA, Inc. v. Concept Indus., Inc., 462 F. Supp. 2d 897, 907 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
282. See id. (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley (State Farm v. Riley), 199 F.R.D.
276, 279 (N.D. Ill. 2001)).
283. See id. (citing State Farm v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. at 279). In 2007, Judge Keys cited both
Judge Castillo’s order in Reis Robotics and Judge Shadur’s sentence about mouthing lists of
affirmative defenses when he struck ten of Metropolitan Life Insurance’s affirmative defenses.
Rudzinski v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 05-C-0474, 2007 WL 2973830, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 2007).
See also Judge Lefkow’s order in Ramos v. Playtex Products, Inc., No. 08-CV-2703, 2008 WL
4066250, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2008), in which, as noted above, she reviewed Judge Shadur’s
order in toto in an effort to channel a defendant into proper repleading of an answer. Other Northern
District judges who quoted Judge Shadur’s sentence about the “formula-like” mouthing of
affirmative defenses included Magistrate Judge Susan Cox in Kmart Corp. v. Footstar, Inc., No.
09-C-3607, 2009 WL 4544700, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 2009); Magistrate Judge M. David Weisman
in Crabtree v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., No. 16-C-10706, 2017 WL 11473864, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 18, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. 16-CV-10706, 2017 WL
11473925 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 2017); and Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman, following Judge Shadur’s
death, in Pacific Construction Service, Inc. v. Stone City Ironworks, Inc., No. 19-CV-4036, 2020
WL 1139258, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 9, 2020).
284. Dow, Robert Michael Jr., FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/dow-robertmichael-jr [https://perma.cc/8U9E-9CB4] (last visited Apr. 7, 2021).
285. Manley v. Boat/U.S. Inc., No. 13-CV-5551, 2016 WL 1213731, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29,
2016).
286. Id. (citing State Farm v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. at 279).
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defense should a plausible argument arise at some point down the road.
This,” he continued, “is just the tip of the iceberg of potential abuses that
could arise from such a lax pleading standard.”287 Next, just as Judge
Manning had reminded that Rule 11 placed boundaries on pleading
defenses unsupported by facts, Judge Dow argued, “[b]ut of course this
[lax standard] would be unfair to the nonmovant and contrary to the ‘just,
speedy, and inexpensive’ guideposts that govern civil actions.”288
Not all Northern District judges were as animated as Judge Dow
regarding fact-free laundry lists of affirmative defenses. For example, in
2015, Judge Manish Shah289 faced the following list of fourteen factless
affirmative defenses and purported affirmative defenses that attorneys
William Sweetnam, Esq., and Phil Schlichting, Esq., had filed on behalf
of their client Mr. Robert Simms:
1. Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state any claim upon which relief may be
granted.
2. Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the applicable statutes
of limitations and/or the doctrines of laches, estoppel, release and waiver.
3. Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of frauds.
4. Plaintiff failed to give consideration for the covenants and promises
alleged in its Complaint.
5. The covenants and promises alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint were
obtained through duress, fraud and/or illegality.
6. Any injury that Plaintiff may have suffered, such being denied, was not
a result of any conduct on the part of Defendant.
7. Defendant’s actions or inactions were not the proximate, legal, or
substantial cause of any damages, injury, or loss suffered by Plaintiff, the
existence of which is denied.
8. Defendant’s actions were not intentional, willful or malicious.
9. Plaintiff has not suffered any injury and otherwise lacks standing.
10. Plaintiff is not entitled to the damages sought in the Complaint.
11. If Plaintiff suffered any damages or losses, such damages or losses were
caused, in whole or in part, by Plaintiff’s own conduct, acts or omissions.
12. Plaintiff failed to mitigate its damages.
13. Plaintiff’s claims are subject to arbitration.
14. Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.290

287. Id.
288. See id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 1). Other Northern District judges also cited Judge Shadur’s
Appendix approvingly with regard to affirmative defenses. See Meaden v. Meaden, No. 12-C-3534,
2012 WL 6019233, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2012) (“Courts have routinely held that simply listing
legal defenses is inappropriate.”) (citations omitted); U.S. Small Bus. Admin. for Cardinal Growth,
L.P. v. McInerney, No. 16-CV-7099, 2017 WL 1710271, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 2017); In re
Testosterone Replacement Therapy Products Liab. Litig. Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings, No. 14C-1748, 2017 WL 2574057, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 2017).
289. Shah, Manish Suresh, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/shah-manishsuresh [https://perma.cc/52NH-9ZGE] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
290. CDM Media USA, Inc. v. Simms, No. 14-CV-9111, 2015 WL 3484277, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
June 1, 2015).
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This list is what Judge Dow imagined when he complained “a party
could simply cut and paste Rule 8(c)’s list of affirmative defenses (along
with any other recognizable affirmative defenses) into its answer so as to
preserve each defense should a plausible argument arise at some point
down the road.”291
Judge Shah put the defendant’s lawyers only partway through the
wringer. The contrast with Judge Shadur’s approach illustrates, I think,
the superiority of Judge Shadur’s method. Plaintiff CDM Media USA,
Inc. moved to strike the list of fourteen groundless defenses. The
plaintiff’s lawyers, Ryan Mahoney, Esq., and Desmond Curran, Esq.,
moved to strike the sixth through tenth affirmative defenses because, as
Judge Shadur had been teaching for fourteen years, “those defenses are
not ‘true’ affirmative defenses.”292 Judge Shah cited Judge Shadur’s
Appendix and admitted that “[i]f a defense merely denies the truth of the
plaintiff’s allegations, the defense is not, in the proper sense, an
affirmative defense.”293 Judge Shah then described those five claims by
the defendant as “argumentative denials, since their purpose is instead to
deny the truth of CDM’s allegations . . . .”294 “Nevertheless,” Judge Shah
ruled, “these defenses will not be stricken because their presence or
absence does not alter the case in a meaningful way.”295 At this point,
Dukas’s Sorcerer’s Apprentice played in the background. Likewise,
Judge Shah refused to strike the second, third, fourth, fifth, eleventh, and
twelfth affirmative defenses. Judge Shah agreed that these defenses were
“indeed boilerplate” and quoted the defense attorneys’ mouthing
“applicable statutes of limitations, laches, estoppel, release and
waiver,”296 but “[o]n the other hand,” Judge Shadur’s colleague stated,
“there are no real efficiencies to be gained in striking them now, because
discovery on these issues would likely be permitted. Since removing the
defenses will not advance the case,” the judge claimed, “and as CDM
points to no harm in letting them stand, the motion to strike this group of
defenses is denied.”297 Here, Mickey Mouse stopped sweeping the water
altogether.
Judge Shah had signaled his reluctance to grant the motion to strike
affirmative defenses earlier in the opinion. He cited the Seventh Circuit’s
opinion in Heller Financial, but only for the “[t]he general rule is that
291.
2016).
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

Manley v. Boat/U.S. Inc., No. 13-CV-5551, 2016 WL 1213731, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29,
CDM Media, 2015 WL 3484277, at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
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motions to strike are disfavored, since, in many instances, such motions
serve only to delay the litigation.”298 “In my view,” Judge Shah
pronounced, “this general rule governs unless the matter to be stricken is
mere clutter and there are efficiencies to be gained in removing such
clutter from the case.”299 Further, he explained, “[a] party seeking to
strike matter from a pleading must show that the removal will alter the
pretrial process in a meaningful way, or that not removing the matter from
the litigation will prejudice the moving party.”300
Sua Sponte Shadur would have efficiently struck defendant Simms’s
list of fourteen frivolous claims—for calling them all affirmative
defenses is incorrect—the day the attorneys filed the answer or soon
thereafter. Perhaps more likely, the defense attorneys would not have
appended this list if the random assignment of the case had landed the
plaintiff in Judge Shadur’s courtroom rather than Judge Shah’s, because
Judge Shadur would also have required they replead their answer
according to the Appendix and also deliver to him a letter promising they
had not billed their client for the time they took to fix their errors. By the
luck of the draw, then, Messrs. Sweetnam and Schlichting avoided the
efficient force of Lord Shadur.
The pace of the Simms matter through Judge Shah’s courtroom
suggests the superiority of Judge Shadur’s early-strike-and-replead
approach. On October 1, 2014, CDM filed its complaint seeking an
injunction against Mr. Simms in the Chancery Division of Cook County’s
Circuit Court.301 Illinois rules required Mr. Simms to answer within thirty
days.302 Assuming the plaintiff served him with the complaint on the date
of filing, the answer was due on October 30, 2014.303 However, CDM’s

298. See id. at *2 (citing Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1294 (7th
Cir. 1989).
299. Id. (citing Heller Fin., Inc., 883 F.2d at 1294). See generally KONDO, supra note 141.
300. Id. Compare Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Frank Easterbrook, who wrote that
“[e]ach claim takes up the time of the legal system and the opposing side. A single claim in an
antitrust case may occasion the expenditure of hundreds or thousands of hours, as opposing counsel
try to verify or refute the allegations and theories . . . . Rule 11 applies to all statements in papers it
covers. Each claim must have sufficient support; each must be investigated and researched before
filing.” Judge Easterbrook wrote concerning claims by plaintiffs, but his concerns about cost apply
equally to defense claims. Frantz v. U.S. Powerlifting Fed’n, 836 F.2d 1063, 1067 (7th Cir. 1987).
Judge Shadur quoted Judge Easterbrook’s Frantz order in Integrated Measurement Systems, Inc. v.
International Commercial Bank of China, No. 89-C-9019, 1991 WL 136010, at *3 n.8 (N.D. Ill.
July 15, 1991).
301. Complaint, CDM Media USA, Inc. v. Simms, 2014-CH-15903 (Ill. Cir. Ct. October 1,
2014).
302. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 181(a).
303. Id. (“[T]he 30-day period shall be computed from the day the copy of the summons is left
with the person designated by law . . . .”).
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attorneys filed an amended complaint on October 20,304 which likely
pushed the answer date into November.305
On November 13, 2014—before the date to answer in the Cook County
Chancery Division arrived—Mr. Sweetnam, defendant Mr. Simms’s
attorney, filed a notice of removal to federal court.306 On November 14,
the federal system of random assignment placed the case on Judge Shah’s
docket, and Mr. Sweetnam entered his appearance on behalf of his client
that day.307 A defendant has twenty-one days to answer under the federal
rules, so Mr. Sweetnam’s answer would have been due on December 5,
just after Thanksgiving weekend.
On November 18, the second business day after Judge Shah received
the case, the judge granted Mr. Sweetnam’s motion to extend the time to
answer to December 22—eighty-two days after Sweetnam and his client
first received the complaint—and, therefore, had an opportunity to begin
investigating and collecting the facts and law that would support their
responses to the complaint’s allegations and that could support any
affirmative defenses they might choose to offer. Many judges and
litigants claim that the twenty-one days that Rule 12 allows for the filing
of answers is too short. In Frivolous Defenses, I found that defendants in
car crash cases had an average of around forty-seven days to answer, well
over twice the Rule’s limit.308 The claim that twenty-one days is too short
to answer presumes that defendants have no idea that a lawsuit is coming
until served with papers, which is an unlikely scenario for nearly every
lawsuit. For car crash cases, a claim investigation opens as soon as either
or both parties contact their insurance companies.309
With Christmas in the air around the Dirksen Federal Building in the
Chicago Loop, December 22 arrived and, the answer was due. Did Mr.
Sweetnam, the defendant’s attorney, file his answer? No, he filed a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.310 Filing the FRCP 12(b)(6)
motion reset the answer clock to fourteen days after Judge Shah would
304. Amended Complaint, CDM Media, 2015 WL 1399050 (No. 14-CV-9111).
305. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(3) gives a defendant at least fourteen days to answer
an amended complaint. (“Unless the court orders otherwise, any required response to an amended
pleading must be made within the time remaining to respond to the original pleading or within 14
days after service of the amended pleading, whichever is later.”) There is no corresponding Illinois
rule. However, amended complaints would fall under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 182(a), which
states that “[a]ny subsequent pleadings allowed or ordered shall be filed at such time as the court
may order.”
306. Notice of Removal, CDM Media, 2015 WL 1399050 (No. 14-CV-9111).
307. Minute Entry, Case Assigned to the Hon. Manish S Shah., CDM Media, 2015 WL 1399050
(No. 14-CV-9111).
308. Russell, supra note 7, at Section III.D.
309. Id.
310. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, CDM Media, 2015 WL 1399050 (No. 14CV-9111).
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decide the motion to dismiss.311 Judge Shah set a briefing schedule for
the motion, with plaintiff’s response to the motion due forty-three days
after its filing on February 3 and defendant’s reply due three weeks later
on February 24.312 Plaintiff timely responded, but as the deadline for the
reply approached, the defendant’s lawyers sought an extension, which
Judge Shah granted to March 10, 2015.313 On March 25, 2015, Judge
Shah granted in-part and denied in-part the motion to dismiss, so the case
continued.314
Because Judge Shah did not grant the defendant’s motion to dismiss
the case, the defendant now really had to file an answer. Under Rule 12,
as noted above, the defendant had to answer by fourteen days after Judge
Shah ruled on the motion to dismiss, and, indeed, the defendant filed an
answer on April 8, 2015.315
The defendant’s lawyers answered more than six months (189 days)
after the filing of the complaint in Cook County’s Circuit Court, 170 days
after the first amendment of the state court complaint, and 145 days after
Judge Shah received the removed case in the Northern District.
Notwithstanding the passage of several seasons between the first filing of
the complaint and the answer, the defendant’s lawyers marshaled not a
single foundational or predicate fact in support of their laundry list of
fourteen purported affirmative defenses. I would say shame on these
defense lawyers, except that they were defending against an injunction
that CDM Media sought against Mr. Simms, who had been “a member of
the company’s senior management team” before “he left to work for one
of the company’s customers . . . .”316 Delay, among a defendant’s most
powerful tools, may be the most powerful tool available when fighting an
effort to get an injunction. Mr. Simms’s lawyers strung out answering
from thirty days to six months. In late February of 2016, the case ended
with a dismissal with prejudice by the plaintiff, which suggests the parties
settled, although the filing of an uncontested bill of costs for $860.88 by
Mr. Sweetnam suggests that his client may have come out ahead.317
311. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(4)(A).
312. See Notification of Docket Entry (Jan. 6, 2015), CDM Media, 2015 WL 1399050 (No. 14CV-9111).
313. See Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, CDM Media, 2015 WL
1399050 (No. 14-CV-9111); Defendant’s Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply in Support
of His Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Verified Complaint, CDM Media, 2015 WL
1399050 (No. 14-CV-9111); Notification of Docket Entry (Feb. 20, 2015) CDM Media, 2015 WL
1399050 (No. 14-CV-9111).
314. Memorandum Opinion and Order, CDM Media, 2015 WL 1399050 (No. 14-CV-9111).
315. Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Amended Verified Complaint, CDM Media, 2015
WL 1399050 (No. 14-CV-9111).
316. CDM Media, 2015 WL 3484277, at *1.
317. Order, CDM Media, 2015 WL 1399050 (No. 14-CV-9111); Bill of Costs, CDM Media,
2015 WL 1399050 (No. 14-CV-9111).
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Though the defendant’s lawyers seem to have been doing their job
well, with all respect due an Article III judge, I might say shame on Judge
Shah. Within the Northern District, Judge Shadur provided a good
example of what Judge Shah might have done when the defendant’s
lawyers—who were already playing the delay game—filed their answer
on April 14, 2015. Sua sponte, Judge Shadur would have reviewed and
rejected the answer, which would have expedited not delayed the case.
Instead, the plaintiffs filed their motion to strike the fourteen factless,
frivolous defenses two weeks later; the cycle of response and reply
ensued; and Judge Shah decided on June 1, 2015, not to strike the
frivolous defenses because he did not believe there were “efficiencies to
be gained in removing such clutter from the case,” nor that the plaintiff
had shown “that the removal will alter the pretrial process in a meaningful
way, or that not removing the matter from the litigation will prejudice the
[plaintiff].”318
In denying the motion to strike affirmative defenses that Judge Shadur
would have tossed sua sponte, Judge Shah added an additional burden to
the plaintiff’s effort to enforce the Rules of Civil Procedure. In a case that
reeked of inefficient delay that hurt the plaintiff, the judge might have
reflected on the efficiency of Judge Shadur’s method of sua sponte review
of answers. As well, Judge Shah might have noted that during the twentyseven weeks between the first filing of the complaint for an injunction
and the answer, if the defendant had, through investigation and research,
uncovered a single fact every two weeks, then they might have supported
thirteen of their fourteen affirmative defenses with a predicate fact.
Even without the Appendix, a local rule, or defendants who read the
Rules of Civil Procedure, any judge from whom a defendant seeks an
extension of time to answer has an opportunity to ensure efficiency by
granting the extension of time subject to an order for proper answers and
defenses as Judge Lefkow did with her prophylactic order in advance of
repleading. Judges would hasten the identification of the disputed facts
and issues in every case if they included a Shadur-style appendix—or
even the Appendix itself—with every grant of a motion for extension of
time to answer. Judges might make clear that the defendant must include
sufficient factual predicate in support of each affirmative defense. If,
instead, the defendant’s lawyers produce factless, bare-bones allegations,
judges should feel comfortable striking frivolous affirmative defenses
with prejudice rather than allowing the defendant a second bite to replead.
Lawyers understand that they should pay attention to what judges order.
My practice, when opposing counsel asks me to agree to an extension
of time to answer, is to agree subject to the condition that the defendant
318. CDM Media, 2015 WL 3484277, at *2.
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answer according to Rule 8 and provide a factual predicate for each
affirmative defense. Defendants typically ignore my condition and
answer frivolously but would be more likely to do what the judge says.
VIII. SHADUR’S APPENDIX IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Within the Northern District of Illinois, many judges treated Judge
Shadur’s Appendix as something akin to a local rule. Judge Gettleman,
for example, in 2012 noted that a defendant’s responses to allegations
“are not in the form approved by this district” and then cited Shadur’s
Appendix as the proper way to answer.319 Judges adopted—and continue
to adopt—the Shadur Appendix with approval and, I believe, to good
effect. However, whether Judge Shadur’s fellow judges in the Northern
District of Illinois were simply being good colleagues by citing his work,
we cannot know for sure.
Outside the Northern District of Illinois, where Judge Shadur’s
Appendix could have only persuasive force without even the power of a
shadow local rule, many judges cite his Appendix approvingly. Some
would call citation of the case a measure of Judge Shadur’s influence, but
I happen to not believe in this model of “influence.” My own views of
judging incline more toward a realist model than a formalist model.320
Like Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,321 I understand doctrinal support more
as something that judges add to justify a decision and less as a guide to
how they decide. When reviewing the second edition of Professor
Langdell’s contracts casebook in 1880, Mr. Holmes—then a practicing
lawyer and not yet either a professor or justice—wrote that “[t]he form
of continuity has been kept up by reasonings purporting to reduce
everything to a logical sequence; but that form,” Mr. Holmes argued, “is
nothing but the evening dress which the new-comer puts on to make itself
presentable according to conventional requirements. The important
phenomenon is the man underneath it, not the coat;” he continued, “the
justice and reasonableness of a decision, not its consistency with
previously held views.”322
Mr. Holmes’s view of judging was akin to that of James Kent, who
described his practice when he ascended to the position as chief of New

319. Meaden v. Meaden, No. 12-C-3534, 2012 WL 6019233, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2012)
(citations omitted).
320. RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 108–26 (2013) (ebook) (comparing
legalist and realist judging).
321. Holmes, Oliver Wendell, Jr., FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/holmesoliver-wendell-jr [https://perma.cc/YQ3Y-Z4JF] (last visited June 9, 2021).
322. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Book Notice, 14 AM. L. REV 233, 234 (1880) (reviewing
CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, WITH A
SUMMARY OF THE TOPICS COVERED BY THE CASES (2d ed. 1879)).
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York’s equity courts. Chancellor Kent wrote, “My practice was, first, to
make myself perfectly and accurately (mathematically accurately) master
of the facts.”323 He worked through the pleadings and depositions, he
explained, until he was “master of the cause and ready to decide it.”324
The chancellor said that he then “saw where justice lay, and the moral
sense decided the court half the time: and I then sat down to search the
authorities until I had examined my books.”325 Sometimes, he admitted,
he “might once in a while be embarrassed by a technical rule, but I most
always found principles suited to my views of the case . . . .”326
Chancellor Kent, of course, sounds a bit like the legal realist Judge Joseph
Hutcheson,327 who rather famously wrote:
I, after canvassing all the available material at my command, and duly
cogitating upon it, give my imagination play, and brooding over the
cause, wait for the feeling, the hunch—that intuitive flash of
understanding which makes the jump-spark connection between
question and decision, and at the point where the path is darkest for the
judicial feet, sheds its light along the way.328

Whether one believes that Judge Shadur’s Appendix influenced judges to
rule against frivolous defenses or, by contrast, that hunches, justice, or a
moral sense guided judges who then cited Shadur’s Appendix as “evening
dress” is probably of little importance. The pattern of citations suggests
that judges who agreed with Shadur cited his work, while those who did
not rarely did so.
For simplicity’s sake, we can sort citation of Judge Shadur’s Appendix
into three principal categories: speaking documents, legal conclusions,
and affirmative defenses.

323. WILLIAM KENT, MEMOIRS AND LETTERS OF JAMES KENT 158–59 (1898).
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Hutcheson, Joseph Chappell Jr., FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/
hutcheson-joseph-chappell-jr [https://perma.cc/7T5W-W2ZS] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
328. Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the “Hunch” in Judicial
Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 278 (1929).
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A. Speaking Documents
The judges of the nearby Northern District of Indiana have been
particular fans of Shadur’s Appendix. In 2006, Magistrate Judge Paul
Cherry329 noted that “[c]ourts have expressly held that a response
indicating that a document ‘speaks for itself’ is insufficient under the
Federal Rules.”330 He cited the Appendix and two other Shadur orders.331
In 2008, Judge Cherry focused the geographic scope to say that “[d]istrict
courts within the Seventh Circuit have consistently found that a
responsive pleading indicating that a document ‘speaks for itself’ is
insufficient and contrary to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” 332 He
then cited Shadur’s Appendix, the same two Shadur orders he had cited
in 2006, and an opinion by one of his Indiana colleagues, which may have
established broader currency within the circuit.333
In 2013, Magistrate Judge Roger Cosbey334 of the Northern District of
Indiana joined in citing Judge Shadur. Magistrate judges handle much of
the routine motions work, including fights over pleadings and discovery,
so they are likely producers of orders related to the issues that concerned
Shadur.335 However, by herself, a magistrate judge would lack the
authority to review answers as they arrived unless a district court judge
referred the task to the magistrate judge.336 Judge Cosbey stated that “[a]s
both parties recognize, district courts within the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals have consistently found that responses that an allegation is a
‘legal conclusion’ or that a document ‘speaks for itself’ are insufficient

329. IL Staff, Retired Magistrate Judge Cherry to Serve Southern District as Criminal Duty
Magistrate, IND. LAW. (Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.theindianalawyer.com/articles/magistratejudge-cherry-to-serve-southern-district-as-criminal-duty-magistrate
[https://perma.cc/4NMXRBDR].
330. Indiana Reg’l Council of Carpenters Pension Tr. Fund v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Maryland,
No. 06-CV-32, 2006 WL 3302642, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 9, 2006) (citations omitted).
331. Indiana Reg’l Council, 2006 WL 3302642, at *2 (citing Banske v. Tarka, No. 02-C-7359,
2003 WL 23149, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 2003) (providing that several assertions in the Answer that
a document ‘speaks for itself’ ‘are also not permissible responses’); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Riley (State Farm v. Riley), 199 F.R.D. 276, 279 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (providing that a party may not
respond to complaint allegations about contents of document by saying that the ‘document speaks
for itself’); Donnelly v. Frank Shirey Cadillac, Inc., No. 05-C-3520, 2005 WL 2445902, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 29, 2005) (same)).
332. N. Indiana Metals v. Iowa Exp., Inc., No. 07-CV-414, 2008 WL 2756330, at *3 (N.D. Ind.
July 10, 2008).
333. N. Indiana Metals, 2008 WL 2756330, at *3 (citing Donnelly, 2005 WL 2445902, at *1;
Banske, 2003 WL 23149, at * 1; State Farm v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. at 279; McGrath v. Godshalk, No.
07-CV-34, 2007 WL 2746865, at * 12 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 18, 2007)).
334. The
Honorable
Roger
B.
Cosbey,
AM.
CONF.
INST.
https://www.americanconference.com/speakers/the-honorable-roger-b-cosbey/
[https://perma.cc/44RP-5SMW] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
335. 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(A).
336. Id.
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and contrary to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”337 He cited
Magistrate Judge Cherry’s two orders on this issue, Shadur’s Appendix,
and another Shadur order.338
In Do It Best Corp. v. Heinen Hardware, Judge Cosbey confronted
weasel words. The defendant’s lawyers argued that they had coupled each
assertion that a document spoke for itself with a denial of the allegation.
Not quite, said the magistrate judge. The defense lawyers had responded
to the eleventh paragraph of the complaint by “deny[ing] the material
allegations contained in the corresponding paragraph of Plaintiff’s
Complaint; the same calls for a legal conclusion and documents or other
items therein speak for themselves.”339 Judge Cosbey pointed out that
“[n]ot only are there no documents or other items referenced in this
paragraph, but,” citing Judge Cherry’s order in Indiana Regional Council
of Carpenters Trust Fund, “[t]his cryptic answer begs the question:
according to the Defendant[s], what allegations are material in ¶ [11]?”340
Judge Cosbey cited Judge Cherry to make clear that “by responding to
only the material allegations contained in a specific paragraph,
Defendants ‘fail to provide adequate substantive guidance to the Plaintiff
as to the Defendant[s’] position on the allegations in that respective
paragraph.’”341 The magistrate judges understood Rule 8 to require the
defendant to communicate a clear position to the plaintiff, that is, to
answer.
Another Magistrate Judge from the Northern District of Indiana, Susan
Collins,342 piled on in 2015. Citing nine different cases from the Northern
Districts of Indiana, Illinois, and Georgia, Judge Collins described what
she found in the answer: “After reciting that the document ‘speaks for
itself,’ [Defendant] Hartford Iron states: ‘To the extent that further
response may be required, the paragraph is denied.’” Quoting Judge
337. Do It Best Corp. v. Heinen Hardware, LLC, No. 13-CV-69, 2013 WL 3421924, at *5 (N.D.
Ind. July 8, 2013).
338. Do It Best Corp., 2013 WL 3421924, at *5 (citing N. Ind. Metals, 2008 WL 2756330, at
*3–4; Indiana Reg’l Council of Carpenters Pension Tr. Fund v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Maryland,
No. 06-CV-32, 2006 WL 3302642, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 9, 2006); Donnelly, 2005 WL 2445902,
at *1; State Farm v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. at 278).
339. Do It Best Corp., 2013 WL 3421924, at *5 (citing Amended Answer ¶ 11, CDM Media,
2015 WL 1399050 (No. 14-CV-9111).
340. Do It Best Corp., 2013 WL 3421924, at *5 (citing Complaint ¶ 11, CDM Media, 2015 WL
1399050 (No. 14-CV-9111) (citing Indiana Reg’l Council of Carpenters Pension Tr. Fund v. Fid.
& Deposit Co. of Maryland, No. 06-CV-32, 2006 WL 3302642, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 9, 2006)).
341. Do It Best Corp., 2013 WL 3421924, at *5 (citing Ind. Reg’l Council, 2006 WL 3302642,
at *3).
342. Susan
Collins
(Federal
Judge,
Indiana),
BALLOTPEDIA
https://ballotpedia.org/Susan_Collins_(Federal_judge,_Indiana) [https://perma.cc/AAY3-ZJGM]
(last
visited
Apr.
5,
2021);
Susan
L.
Collins,
BLOOMBERG
L.,
https://www.bloomberg.com/profile/person/19160583 [https://perma.cc/K6K7-X3UJ] (last visited
Apr. 5, 2021).

2021]

Disrupting Frivolous Defenses

963

Cherry’s order in Northern Indiana Metals, she wrote that a “response
that the document speaks for itself could either be interpreted as an
admission or denial and does not directly respond to the allegations in the
[c]omplaint.”343 “Therefore,” she explained, “in stating that the
document ‘speaks for itself’ and ‘[t]o the extent that further response may
be required, the paragraph is denied,’ Hartford Iron could be denying
none, some, or all of the paragraph.”344 Sounding like Judge Shadur,
Judge Collins wrote: “Valley Forge and the Court are left to wonder
which it is.”345 Again, the goal of pleading is to clarify not obscure the
facts and issues in contention.346
Wisconsin’s federal judges also cited Judge Shadur’s Appendix
approvingly. In 2008, District Judge J. P. Stadtmueller347 of the Eastern
District of Wisconsin cited Judge Shadur’s Appendix and another of his
orders in support of his writing that “Rule 8 does not permit a defendant
to respond that the document ‘speaks for itself.’”348 “Such a response is,”
he noted tersely, “inadequate.”349
Likewise, Judge Catherine Furay,350 United States Bankruptcy Judge
for the Western District of Wisconsin, cited Shadur’s Appendix in 2020
when finding that “a party’s response that ‘documents speak for
themselves’ is ‘insufficient and contrary to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.’”351 Judge Furay also explained that judges need not let
defendants replead answers that departed from the Rules, that is, no fresh
start for frivolous pleaders in her bankruptcy court. “A party’s response
that fails to properly deny allegations in a complaint may be stricken and
343. Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Hartford Iron & Metal, Inc., No. 14-CV-00006, 2015 WL
5730662, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2015) (quoting N. Indiana Metals v. Iowa Exp., Inc., No. 07CV-414, 2008 WL 2756330, at *3 (N.D. Ind. July 10, 2008)).
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Other citations of Judge Shadur’s Appendix regarding documents speaking for themselves
include Keller v. Enhanced Recovery Co., No. 18-CV-15, 2018 WL 5650036, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Oct.
31, 2018); and Axis Insurance v. American Specialty Insurance & Risk Services, Inc., No. 19-CV00165, 2019 WL 5783355, at *2 n.2 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 6, 2019).
347. Stadtmueller, Joseph Peter, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/
stadtmueller-joseph-peter [https://perma.cc/7ZEG-2YL4] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
348. Thompson v. Ret. Plan for Employees of S.C. Johnson & Sons, Inc., No. 07-CV-1047,
2008 WL 5377712, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 22, 2008) (citing Judge Shadur’s appendix in State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. 276, 279 (N.D. Ill. 2001) and his order in
Rudzinski v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., No. 05-C-0474, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75668, at
*10–11, 2007 WL 2973830 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 2007)).
349. Thompson, 2008 WL 5377712, at *2.
350. Catherine J. Furay, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Catherine_J._Furay
[https://perma.cc/6W2X-R24K] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
351. Garnett v. Harvey (In re Harvey), No. 18-13398-7, 2020 WL 1237936, at *4 (Bankr. W.D.
Wis. Mar. 13, 2020) (citing Do It Best Corp. v. Heinen Hardware, LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
94567, No. 13-CV-69, 2013 WL 3421924, at *5 (N.D. Ind. July 8, 2013); State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Riley (State Farm v. Riley), 199 F.R.D. 276, 279 (N.D. Ill. 2001)).
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the referenced allegations may be regarded as admitted,” Judge Furay
explained.352
The judges within the Seventh Circuit—district court judges,
magistrate judges, and, most recently, a bankruptcy judge—have cited
Judge Shadur’s Appendix approvingly for the proposition that defendants
may not answer allegations by claiming that documents speak for
themselves.
B. Legal Conclusions
Outside the Northern District of Illinois, judges and magistrate judges
within the Seventh Circuit have also cited Judge Shadur’s Appendix
regarding the refusal of some defense attorneys to answer pleaded legal
conclusions.
As discussed above regarding documents speaking for themselves,
Judge Stadtmueller, of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, cited Judge
Shadur’s Appendix in his 2008 order in Thompson v. Retirement Plan for
Employees of S.C. Johnson & Sons, Inc. Judge Stadtmueller cited the
Appendix when he held that “Rule 8 does not permit a defendant to
respond only by stating that the plaintiff’s allegations ‘constitute
conclusions of law.’”353 He also cited a different Shadur order from
1999354 and a 1995 opinion by Chief Judge Richard Posner355 of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in which Judge
Posner stated, simply, that “a plaintiff in a suit in federal court need not
plead facts; he can plead conclusions.”356 Judge Posner further specified
that “although plaintiffs can plead conclusions, the conclusions must
provide the defendant with at least minimal notice of the claim.” 357 Of
course, since 1995, the United States Supreme Court has tightened
pleading standards to require factual specificity and not mere bare-bones
conclusory allegations in pleading.358 But neither Iqbal nor Twombly
disallowed the pleading of legal conclusions; they are simply insufficient
bases alone for complaints. Nothing about Iqbal or Twombly undermines
352. Garnett, 2020 WL 1237936, at *4 (citing Rudzinski, 2007 WL 2973830, at *4). Judge
Furay acknowledged that some “courts allow for the filing of an amended answer to cure any
impermissible pleadings.” Id. (citing Clarendon Am. Ins. Co. v. All Bros. Painting, Inc., No. 13CV-0934-ORL-22, 2013 WL 5921538, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 2013); Thompson, 2008 WL
5377712, at *4).
353. Thompson, 2008 WL 5377712, at *1 (citing State Farm v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. at 278).
354. Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Int’l Union Welfare Fund v. Aramark Servs., Inc., No. 99-C5726, 1999 WL 1016260, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 1999).
355. Posner, Richard Allen, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/posnerrichard-allen [https://perma.cc/XHX6-2QKM] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
356. Jackson v. Marion Cnty., 66 F.3d 151, 153 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
357. Id. at 154.
358. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007).
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Judge Stadtmueller’s order, which states that “legal conclusions must be
addressed in one of the three ways contemplated by Rule 8.”359
In 2013, Magistrate Judge Andrew Rodovich,360 from the Northern
District of Indiana, used Judge Shadur’s Appendix to support his striking
of seven paragraphs of a defendant’s answer while noting that “[d]istrict
courts within the Seventh Circuit consistently have found that responses
that an allegation is a ‘legal conclusion’ or that a document ‘speaks for
itself’ are insufficient and contrary to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.”361 Further, Judge Rodovich dealt with additional weasel
words that the defendant had added. For seven different paragraphs,
defendants’ lawyers answered: “The allegation that [synopsis of
allegation] is a legal conclusion, and therefore, Defendant is not required
to respond. To the extent a response is required, Defendant denies the
allegations contained in Paragraph [X] of the Amended Complaint.” The
plaintiff’s lawyers called these responses “impermissible qualified
responses” and “argued that due to [defendant] Enhanced Recovery’s use
of the language ‘to the extent’ the court and the plaintiff are unable to
determine what facts it is admitting or denying.”362
Judge Rodovich considered but ultimately disagreed with the
plaintiff’s lawyers regarding the defense lawyers’ appending of the words
“to the extent that further response may be required, the allegations in this
paragraph are denied” to its refusal to respond to allegations of legal
conclusions. Instead, concerning “impermissible qualified denial[s],”
Judge Rodovich first cited three cases from the Seventh Circuit’s district
courts.363 Judge Rodovich cited Judge Collins’s order in Valley Forge
Insurance,364 Judge Castillo’s Reis Robotics,365 and Judge Shadur in
Trustees of Automobile Mechanics Local No. 701 Pension & Welfare
Funds v. Union Bank of California, for which Judge Rodovich included
a parenthetical quotation from Judge Shadur who wrote, with
characteristic color, that the phrase “‘to the extent that’ is a telltale tipoff
359. Thompson, 2008 WL 5377712, at *1. See also id. at *2 (striking the response to paragraph
10 for the same reason).
360. Andrew P. Rodovich, VALPARAISO UNIV. L., https://www.valpo.edu/law/about-us/fulltime-faculty/andrew-p-rodovich/andrew-p-rodovich [https://perma.cc/TBH2-GQKR] (last visited
Apr. 5, 2021).
361. Keller v. Enhanced Recovery Co., No. 18-CV-15, 2018 WL 5650036, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Oct.
31, 2018) (citing N. Indiana Metals v. Iowa Exp., Inc., No. 07-CV-414, 2008 WL 2756330, at *1
(N.D. Ind. July 10, 2008); Donnelly v. Frank Shirey Cadillac, Inc., No. 05-C-3520, 2005 WL
2445902, *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2005); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley (State Farm v.
Riley), 199 F.R.D. 276, 278 (N.D. Ill. 2001)).
362. Keller, 2018 WL 5650036, at *2.
363. Id.
364. Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Hartford Iron & Metal, Inc., No. 14-CV-6, 2017 WL 1101096, at
*2 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 21, 2017).
365. Reis Robotics USA, Inc. v. Concept Indus., Inc., 462 F. Supp. 2d 897 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
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that [the party] has failed to comply with the notice pleading requirements
that the federal system imposes on defendants as well as plaintiffs.”366
Judge Rodovich then noted that “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(b)(1)(B) requires that the responding party admit or deny the
allegations. Despite, using the language ‘to the extent a response is
required,’” he explained, “Enhanced Recovery unequivocally has denied
the allegations contained in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, and 18.”367
Though the defendant qualified its denials, and although the cases he
cited from other of the Seventh Circuit district courts suggested those
qualifications were impermissible, Judge Rodovich allowed the
responses to stand as denials.368
Sua sponte, Judge Shadur would have struck Enhanced Recovery’s
answer, required the defendant to replead, and, in place of qualified
denials, they would have answered like this: denied. In Judge Rodovich’s
courtroom, arriving at the determination that the sentences “the
allegation . . . is a legal conclusion, and therefore, Defendant is not
required to respond. . . . To the extent a response is required, Defendant
denies the allegation” means “denied” was a much longer and costlier
process.369 The plaintiff could not know in advance whether Judge
Rodovich would tolerate the defendant’s claim that legal conclusions
required no response. If the judge did, then the plaintiff would be left with
no response to those allegations. If the judge did not tolerate the “legal
conclusion, no response needed” answer, then the judge’s response would
mean that “a response is required.” In which case, the defendant denied
the allegation. To push through the decision tree that the defendant
created, the plaintiff had to confer with the defendant about the answer,
file a motion, await a response, file a reply, perhaps have a hearing, and
then await the judge’s decision. Both the work and the wait are costly to
the plaintiff as well as to the defendant and the court, whereas a single,
true word—denied—costs just six keystrokes and takes almost no time.

366. Keller, 2018 WL 5650036, at *2 (quoting Trs. of Auto. Mechs. Loc. No. 71 Pension &
Welfare Funds v. Union Bank of Cal., N.A., No. 08-C-7217 2009 WL 4668580, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 2, 2009)).
367. Id.
368. Id. (discussing how Enhanced Recovery’s answers are ascertainable, and therefore the
court denies the motion to strike the relevant paragraphs).
369. Id.
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What did Judge Rodovich decide that Enhanced Recovery had denied?
These are the allegations defendant claimed required no answers because
they were legal conclusions but, if required to answer, the defendant
denied:
9. Jurisdiction of this court arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1337.
10. Jurisdiction of this court arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
11. Declaratory relief is available in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2201–2202.
....
13. ERC is subject to the personal jurisdiction of this Court.
14. ERC resides in the State of Indiana and this judicial district under
the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2).
15. Venue is proper in this judicial district pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(b)(1).
....
17. Venue is proper in this judicial district pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(b)(2).370

Denying these allegations about jurisdiction and would seem, to me at
least, to run afoul of Rule 11.371
By contrast, earlier the same year, in Do It Best Corp. v. Heinen
Hardware, Judge Cosbey did it better. He opened a section of the order
titled “Defendants’ Formulaic Responses Will Be Stricken” by
recounting that “Defendants respond to thirteen of Plaintiff’s allegations
in essentially the same way; they ‘deny material allegations contained in
the corresponding paragraph of Plaintiff’s Complaint’ and state that ‘the
same calls for a legal conclusion and documents or other items therein
speak for themselves.’”372 Judge Cosbey then recited Rule 8(b)(1)(B) that
a party must admit or deny, Rule 8(b)(5) about lack of “knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief,” and noted, “[a]s both parties
recognize, district courts within the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
have consistently found that responses that an allegation is a ‘legal
conclusion’ or that a document ‘speaks for itself’ are insufficient and
contrary to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”373 He cited Magistrate
Judge Cherry’s orders in Northern Indiana Metals and Indiana Regional

370. Complaint at 2, Keller, 2018 WL 5650036 (No. 18-CV-15).
371. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (requiring that all pleadings, motions, or papers are not being
presented for improper purposes and are warranted by existing laws and arguments).
372. Do It Best Corp. v. Heinen Hardware, LLC, No. 13-CV-69, 2013 WL 3421924, at *4 (N.D.
Ind. July 8, 2013).
373. Id. at *4–5.
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Council of Carpenters and then Judge Shadur’s orders in Donnelly v.
Frank Shirey Cadillac and the Appendix.374
Next, as noted above, Judge Cosbey focused attention on the
defendant’s filtered or layered denial of the allegations. The defendant
first had denied “the material allegations contained in the corresponding
paragraph of Plaintiff’s Complaint,” appended the refusal to answer the
legal conclusions, and thereby left unclear which “immaterial”
allegations might be left standing.375 Unlike Judge Rodovich, Judge
Cosbey was not willing to just throw a blanket denial over the allegations
and instead ordered the defendant to replead with clarity. Like Judge
Shadur, Judge Cosbey’s goal was that the pleadings yield a clear
statement of what facts and issues remained to be contested. That goal
should not be controversial.
In 2017, in the Central District of Illinois, District Judge Sue
Myerscough376 clarified the relationship of Iqbal to the pleading of legal
conclusions. In a bit of a turnabout, “Defendants Decatur Boys & Girls
Club and America Boys & Girls Club request[ed] that the Court . . . strike
paragraphs 42, 43, 44, 48, 68, 69, and 70 because those paragraphs are
legal conclusions.”377 Judge Myerscough explained that, consistent with
Iqbal, “[p]laintiffs are required to plead facts that indicate they have a
plausible, as opposed to a speculative, right to relief”; however, she
continued, “they are not prohibited from also pleading legal conclusions
that might help to provide Defendants with notice of the claims brought
against them or provide context for the factual allegations.”378 Here, the
judge cited the versatile Shadur Appendix and a 1989 Supreme Court of
the United States opinion, which Judge Shadur cited in the Appendix to
show that “legal conclusions are an integral part of the federal notice
pleading regime . . . .”379 Judge Myerscough then refused the defense
request to strike the allegations of legal conclusions from the
complaint.380
374. Id. at *5 (citing N. Ind. Metals v. Iowa Express, Inc., No. 07-CV-414, 2008 WL 2756330,
at *3–4 (N.D. Ind. July 10, 2008); Ind. Reg’l Council of Carpenters Pension Tr. Fund v. Fid. &
Deposit Co. of Md., No. 06-CV-32, 2006 WL 3302642, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 9, 2006); Donnelly
v. Frank Shirey Cadillac, Inc., No. 05-C-3520, 2005 WL 2445902, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2005);
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley (State Farm v. Riley), 199 F.R.D. 276, 278 (N.D. Ill. 2001)).
375. Id.
376. Myerscough, Sue Ellen, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/myerscoughsue-ellen [https://perma.cc/ZP7S-V6NP] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
377. T.K. ex rel. Killings v. Boys & Girls Clubs of Am., No. 16-CV-03056, 2017 WL 2464435,
at *5 (C.D. Ill. June 7, 2017).
378. Id.
379. Id. (citing State Farm v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. at 278 (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989))).
380. Id. (discussing the court’s decision to only strike paragraph 27 of the Seconded Amended
Complaint, as duplicative of paragraph 25).
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Fewer judges have cited Judge Shadur’s Appendix with regard to
answering pleaded legal conclusions than regarding documents speaking
for themselves. Any number of reasons might account for this. Judges
may believe the defendants need not answer legal conclusions, or, if they
do, they may cite other cases. To be sure, Judge Shadur was a self-styled
oracle on Rule 8 issues, but other judges have addressed the issue as well.
This Article tracks Judge Shadur’s Appendix into various jurisdictions
but does not attempt to canvass the entire web of orders and opinions
addressing the issues that Judge Shadur tackled in the Appendix. Perhaps,
too, there are fewer citations of Judge Shadur’s view about answering
legal conclusions because none of his sentences about legal conclusions
were as snappy as the one he began by recounting that “[t]his Court has
been attempting to listen to such written materials for years (in the forlorn
hope that one will indeed give voice)—but until some such writing does
break its silence,” the Judge’s lessons about pleading would continue.381
C. Affirmative Defenses
In 2008, Magistrate Judge Byron Cudmore382 of the Central District of
Illinois cited the Shadur Appendix regarding affirmative defenses. Doing
the grunt work of a magistrate judge, Judge Cudmore combed through
the fourteen affirmative defenses that Alan Silberman, Esq., of the
Chicago firm of Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal, and William B. Koffel,
Esq., of Boston’s Foley Hoag, had filed on behalf of their client, Patni
Computer Systems, Inc.383 Notably, the defendant’s attorneys neither
admitted nor denied nine of the complaint’s 108 allegations “as they
call[ed] for conclusions of law . . . .”384 Plaintiff’s attorneys might have
but did not seek to have the magistrate judge deem these allegations
admitted.
Judge Cudmore first reviewed the Seventh Circuit Judge Manion’s
1989 opinion in Heller Financial, Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co.,385 which
had set forth requirements for pleading affirmative defenses. He noted
the Seventh Circuit had made clear that Rule 12(f) motions to strike “are
disfavored,” but, again, that removal of clutter that speeds the case along
was okay.386 Again citing Heller, Judge Cudmore explained that
“[a]ffirmative defenses are pleadings and, therefore, are subject to all
381. State Farm v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. at 279.
382. Byron
Cudmore,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Byron_Cudmore
[https://perma.cc/UG4N-EURX] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
383. Goel v. Patni Comput. Sys., Inc., No. 07-CV-1034, 2008 WL 11365217, at *1 (C.D. Ill.
Nov. 13, 2008).
384. Answer at 1–3, Goel, 2008 WL 11365217 (No. 07-CV-1034).
385. Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1294 (7th Cir. 1989).
386. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f); Goel, 2008 WL 11365217, at *1.
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pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”387 He
also explained that “bare bones conclusory allegations” were insufficient
under Rules 8 and 12, citing Heller and Judge Castillo’s order in Reis
Robotics.388 However, he also cited an order from a district judge in the
Central District of Illinois, Michael Mihm,389 “declining to strike bare
bones statute of limitation defense at an early stage in litigation.” 390 The
magistrate judge also noted, citing Heller, that a judge might properly
strike affirmative defenses “if they repeat arguments made in a motion to
dismiss that have been rejected by the Court.”391
With the rules thus set out before him, Judge Cudmore addressed the
fully briefed motion. The Chicago and Boston defense lawyers had first
typed—or cut and pasted—“[t]he First Amended Complaint fails to state
claims upon which relief may be granted” into their laundry list.392 Citing
an order by Northern District Judge James Alesia,393 Judge Cudmore
struck the first affirmative defense because “Defendant’s ‘bare bones’
recitation does not give notice of the grounds upon which it rests.”394 The
defendant’s attorneys argued that they had already presented the grounds
for this defense in their motion to dismiss, and, likewise, they had
similarly supported their second through fifth affirmative defenses when
briefing the motions to dismiss. Why the defense attorneys relied upon
that argument is unclear, because Judge Cudmore reminded that these
were “arguments that were already addressed and rejected by this
[Magistrate] Court and the District Court.”395
“The sixth affirmative defense,” Judge Cudmore continued, “states
that ‘Plaintiffs were “exempt” employees under applicable Federal and
State law who were not entitled to receive additional pay for “overtime”
hours of work.’”396 However, he noted that “Defendant does not state any

387. Goel, 2008 WL 11365217, at *1 (citing Heller, 883 F.2d at 1294).
388. FED. R. CIV. P. 8; FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f); Goel, 2008 WL 11365217, at *1 (citing Heller,
883 F.2d at 1295; Reis Robotics USA, Inc. v. Concept Indus., Inc., 462 F. Supp. 2d 897, 905–07
(N.D. Ill. 2006)).
389. Mihm, Michael Martin, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/mihmmichael-martin [https://perma.cc/5CGC-GM3N] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
390. Goel, 2008 WL 11365217, at *1 (citing Jackson v. Methodist Med. Ctr. of Ill., No. 061235, 2007 WL 128001 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2007)).
391. Id. (citing Heller, 883 F.2d at 1295).
392. Id.
393. Alesia, James Henry, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/alesia-jameshenry [https://perma.cc/E9TM-UXKG] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
394. Goel, 2008 WL 11365217, at *1 (citing Renalds v. S.R.G. Rest. Grp., 119 F. Supp. 2d 800,
803 (N.D. Ill. 2000)). Judge Shadur would also have struck this 12(b)(6) claim masquerading as an
affirmative defense, because the claim does not admit the allegations of the complaint. See supra
pp. 941–42.
395. Goel, 2008 WL 11365217, at *2.
396. Id.
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grounds for this conclusion. Defendant should presumably have some
idea why Plaintiffs are not entitled to overtime.”397 He therefore
ordered—or more properly, recommended to the district judge—the
striking of the defense with leave to replead.398
Likewise, the judge recommended the striking of “the seventh
(laches/unclean hands) and eighth (estoppel) affirmative defenses
[because they] merely recite[d] the name of defense.”399 For these cutand-paste laundry list items, Judge Cudmore observed that “[n]o factual
grounds are pled to suggest that Defendant is entitled to relief on those
defenses. There is no hint of what conduct by Plaintiffs might support
these defenses,” he continued, “nor is it otherwise apparent.”400 He
offered guidance that “[d]etailed allegations are not required, but
Defendant should be able to set forth a short statement of the facts
supporting these defenses.”401
With eight of fourteen affirmative defenses already gone, Judge
Cudmore allowed the ninth—failure to mitigate damages—to remain.
Appearing to make the argument for the defendant’s Chicago and Boston
lawyers, the judge claimed that “it is at least arguable that discovery
might be needed to uncover the factual basis for this defense.”402 Here,
Judge Cudmore cited three cases—none of them Judge Shadur’s—with
two supporting not striking bare-bones affirmative defenses early in the
litigation and a third supporting their striking.403 Notwithstanding Rule
11’s requirement of investigation before pleading and Rule 15’s liberal
amendment provision, Judge Cudmore allowed the bare-bones failure-tomitigate affirmative defense to remain pending more discovery.404
With the eleventh affirmative defense—the statute of limitations—
Judge Cudmore also allowed the bare-bones pleading to remain even
though “Defendant does not identify the applicable statute of limitations
[n]or explain why Goyal’s claim is barred. However,” the judge predicted
that the plaintiff “presumably knows when his claim accrued and knows
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id. (citing Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1294 (7th Cir. 1989);
Builders Bank v. First Bank & Tr. Co., No. 03-C-4959, 2004 WL 626827 *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25,
2004)).
402. Goel, 2008 WL 11365217, at *3.
403. Id. (citing AAR Intern., Inc. v. Vacances Heliades S.A., 202 F. Supp. 2d 788, 800 (N.D.
Ill. 2002); Codest Eng’g v. Hyatt Int’l Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1224, 1230 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Surface
Shields, Inc. v. Poly-Tak Prot. Sys., Inc., 213 F.R.D. 307, 308 (N.D. Ill. 2003)).
404. Goel, 2008 WL 11365217, at *2. In Colorado, where the author teaches and practices law,
Rule 8 requires the pleading of details to support failure to mitigate damages. Rule 8—General
Rules of Pleading, COLO. R. CIV. P. 8 (“Any mitigating circumstances to reduce the amount of
damage shall be affirmatively pleaded.”).
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the applicable statute of limitations. Goyal therefore has sufficient notice
of this defense,” he concluded.405 Whether there were arguments between
the parties as to the applicable statute of limitations is unclear, but the
judge did not require the defendant’s lawyers to plead the statute or the
date that statute started running—minimal facts that would have taken
almost no research or investigation. Again violating the norm of party
presentment by making the defendant’s argument, the magistrate judge
noted that “[i]t may also be that Defendant needs some discovery to
determine whether the statute of limitations applies, though Defendant
does not specifically assert this.”406 He then again cited Judge Mihm’s
order “declining to strike bare bones statute of limitations defense at early
stage in litigation and discussing cases,” but also included, with a cf.
signal, citation to Judge Shadur’s Appendix and quotation of his language
on the unacceptable mouthing of statute of limitations and other defenses
“in formula-like fashion.”407
The only other affirmative defense that the magistrate judge preserved
was the thirteenth, which stated that “Counts III and VI [of the First
Amended Complaint] are barred by the ‘doctrine of contract.’”408 What
that defense might mean is a mystery to me, and I teach Contracts.
However, the magistrate judge found that though this was a repetition of
the defendant’s attorneys’ argument in their motion to dismiss, the district
judge had not dismissed this argument, and therefore the defense could
remain. The gist, which the Chicago and Boston attorneys failed to
present in their pleading, may have been that plaintiff’s unjust enrichment
claim was invalid because there was a contract between the parties that
would serve as the basis for the claim. Could not the attorneys have
fleshed out their defense with a few more words?
That leaves the tenth, twelfth, and fourteenth affirmative defenses, all
of which Judge Cudmore discussed and recommended striking. The tenth
responded to claims that the court had already dismissed and therefore
was unnecessary.409 The twelfth failed to “give notice of the grounds
upon which the ‘unjust enrichment’ defense rests,”410 which the
magistrate judge found problematic (though mouthing “doctrine of
contract” was not). And, last, the fourteenth “simply reserves the right to

405. Goel, 2008 WL 11365217, at *3.
406. Id.
407. Id. (citing Jackson v. Methodist Medical Center of Ill., No. 06-1235, 2007 WL 128001, at
*3 (C.D. Ill. 2007); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley (State Farm v. Riley), 199 F.R.D. 276,
278 (N.D. Ill. 2001)).
408. Goel, 2008 WL 11365217, at *4; see also Complaint at 18, 20, Goel, 2008 WL 11365217
(No. 07-CV-1034).
409. Goel, 2008 WL 11365217, at *3.
410. Id.
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amend the Answer to add affirmative defenses revealed in discovery.”411
Judge Cudmore noted, “That is not an affirmative defense and the
reservation is unnecessary.”412 Indeed, that’s what Rule 15 is for.413
Of course, had Judge Cudmore been a magistrate judge assigned to a
case in Judge Shadur’s courtroom, he would not have had to have gone
through the tedious examination of the defendant’s laundry list of
affirmative defenses. Sua Sponte Shadur would have done the work had
the attorneys been foolish enough to ignore his Appendix. Without
additional charge to the defendant, and without the plaintiff’s attorney
having to file a motion and, later, a reply in support of the motion, Judge
Shadur would have directed the defense lawyers to plead proper
affirmative defenses supported by foundational facts and, along the way,
would have required they answer the allegations they dodged with the
claim they were conclusions of law.
Back in the Northern District, Judge Cosbey demonstrated he was a
complete Shadur acolyte with his handling of the affirmative defenses in
Do It Best v. Heinen Hardware, which I discussed above.414 He wrote
that “[a]pplying the three-part [Heller] test to the instant case, all of
Defendants’ fifteen affirmative defenses should be stricken.” Kaboom!
“[T]he fifteenth affirmative defense, in which Defendants reserve the
right to assert additional affirmative defenses discovered during the
litigation,” he explained while unsheathing his sword, “fails the first part
of the test because reserving the right to add additional affirmative
defenses is not a proper affirmative defense.”415 He then noted that “[t]he
remaining fourteen affirmative defenses are merely one word or a phrase
identifying the defenses, but wholly failing to set forth a short and plain
statement of their nature . . . .”416 At the end of his discussion of the
affirmative defenses, Judge Cosbey cited Shadur’s Appendix and quoted
him on the unacceptable, formula-like mouthing of purported affirmative
defenses.417
Likewise, in 2013, Judge Cosbey used Shadur’s Appendix to dispatch
other fact-free, frivolous affirmative defenses en masse. In Malibu Media
v. John Doe, the defendant was nameless but did have the IP address of
411. Id. at *4.
412. Id. (citing Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1294 (7th Cir. 1989)).
413. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15.
414. See Do It Best Corp. v. Heinen Hardware, LLC, No. 13-CV-69, 2013 WL 3421924, at *3–
5 (N.D. Ind. July 8, 2013); supra pp. 962, 967.
415. Do It Best Corp., 2013 WL 3421924, at *3 (citing United States v. Global Mortg. Funding,
Inc., No. 07-CV-1275, 2008 WL 5264986, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 15, 2008); Reis Robotics USA,
Inc. v. Concept Indus., Inc. , 462 F. Supp. 2d 897, 907 (N.D. Ill. 2006)). On the use of this purported
defense, see Russell, supra note 7, at Part IV.
416. Do It Best Corp., 2013 WL 3421924, at *3 (citing Heller, 883 F.2d at 1294).
417. Id. at *4.
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50.148.89.255. Malibu Media’s attorneys moved to strike
50.148.89.255’s “second affirmative defense—that ‘Plaintiff’s claims are
barred by the equitable doctrines of laches, unclean hands, waiver and
estoppel’—as a bare conclusory allegation unsupported by any factual
basis.”418 Without belaboring the analysis or worrying whether discovery
might turn up facts that could support these four, foundationless, and
therefore frivolous affirmative defenses, Judge Cosbey cited Shadur’s
Appendix as he chopped the second affirmative defense with all its
subparts.419
In 2017, Magistrate Judge Cherry, a regular user of Shadur’s
Appendix, struck two defenses masquerading as one but, at the same
time, demonstrated how easily defense attorneys might avoid having
judges strike their defenses. First, he cited Reis Robotics and Shadur’s
Appendix and noted that “[f]ormula-like statement of the defenses listed
in Rule 8(c) will not do.”420 The attorney for defendant Ms. Rau, David
Holub, Esq., had pleaded the series “reformation, waiver, or estoppel” as
an affirmative defense. There being no predicate facts for either waiver
or estoppel, Judge Cherry struck them both. However, “[r]egarding
reformation, Rau has provided a basis for the defense. She asserts,” Judge
Cherry explained, “that the absence of the vehicle from the policy was
due to MIC’s errors or mistakes and are [sic] subject to equitable
reformation.”421 For Judge Cherry, for me, and, I think, for Judge Shadur,
that is a sufficient predicate or foundational fact to move the defense from
frivolous to legitimate. The plaintiff has a factual basis on which to
investigate the absence of the vehicle from the policy. A little predicate
goes a long way.
IX. SHADUR’S APPENDIX OUTSIDE THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Judge Shadur used his Appendix to discipline—in a Foucaultian
sense—and punish defense attorneys who answered in his courtroom.422
He cited the Appendix freely and often. His colleagues in the Northern
District of Illinois also cited the Appendix, though they have less
aggressively enforced Judge Shadur’s rules, particularly concerning
affirmative defenses. Likewise, judges in his home circuit cited the
418. Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, No. 13-CV-30, 2013 WL 4048513, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 9,
2013).
419. Id. (citing Reis Robotics, 462 F. Supp. 2d at 907 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Riley (State Farm v. Riley), 199 F.R.D. 276, 279 (N.D. Ill. 2001))).
420. Markel Ins. Co. v. United Emergency Med. Servs., LLC, No. 16-CV-220, 2017 WL
942723, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 10, 2017) (citing Reis Robotics, 462 F. Supp. 2d at 907 (quoting
State Farm v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. at 279)).
421. Id.
422. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON
(2d ed. 1995).
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Appendix in order to ensure, as Judge Cherry explained, that the answer
provides “adequate substantive guidance to the Plaintiff as to the
Defendant[s’] position on the allegations . . . .”423 More succinctly, Judge
Cherry did not want either the plaintiff or the court to be “left to wonder”
just what position defendants were adopting.
A. Speaking Documents
Outside Judge Shadur’s Seventh Circuit home, district court judges
and magistrate judges also cited the Appendix in support of their own
desire not to be left wondering what defendants meant by their answers.
Within the First Circuit, for example, Magistrate Judge John Rich III424
cited—approvingly might be too strong a word—Judge Shadur’s
Appendix in a matter in which the plaintiff was suing the United States
Attorney General Eric Holder in 2012. The U.S. Attorney who answered,
John Osborn, Esq., deployed “the document speaks for itself” regarding
the allegations of seven different paragraphs in the complaint.425 Judge
Rich cited the Appendix and quoted at length Judge Shadur on lawyers
avoiding admissions or being lazy by claiming that a document “‘speaks
for itself.’ This Court,” Judge Rich quoted, “has been attempting to listen
to such written materials for years (in the forlorn hope that one will indeed
give voice)—but until some such writing does break its silence, this Court
will continue to require pleaders to employ one of the three alternatives
that are permitted by Rule 8(b) in response to all allegations about the
content of documents (or statutes or regulations).”426
The long quotation was a nice endorsement of Judge Shadur’s
approach, but David Webbert, Esq., the plaintiff’s lawyer, had bungled
and misquoted the documents that were speaking for themselves. Judge
Rich “agree[d] with the defendant that Rule 8(b)(4) cannot reasonably be
read to require a defendant, faced with a block quotation from a document
in one paragraph of a complaint, to deny only those portions that are
misquoted or mischaracterized and admit the rest.”427 I feel that Judge
Shadur would likely have agreed; when in federal court, if a lawyer wants
to benefit from Shadur’s rule that defendants may not claim documents
423. Do It Best Corp. v. Heinen Hardware, LLC, No. 13-CV-69, 2013 WL 3421924, at *5 (N.D.
Ind. July 8, 2013) (quoting Indiana Reg’l Council of Carpenters Pension Tr. Fund v. Fid. & Deposit
Co. of Maryland, No. 06-CV-32, 2006 WL 3302642, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 9, 2006)).
424. John Rich, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/John_Rich [https://perma.cc/W4XZY8W4] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021); Notice of Re-appointment of Magistrate Judge Rich, U.S. DIST.
CT., DIST. ME., https://www.med.uscourts.gov/news/notice-re-appointment-magistrate-judge-rich
[https://perma.cc/G79Z-KP2N] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
425. Sebunya v. Holder, No. 12-CV-67, 2012 WL 5993160, at *2 (D. Me. Nov. 30, 2012).
426. Id. (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley (State Farm v. Riley), 199 F.R.D. 276,
279 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
427. Id. at *3.

976

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 52

speak for themselves, the lawyer ought to quote the documents correctly.
Judge Rich, though, was more doubtful. “In any event, even assuming
dubitante that the rule imposes such a requirement,” he wrote, “I am at a
loss to understand how a failure to admit that a document is partially
accurately quoted or characterized inflates the cost of discovery:
ultimately, there can be no real dispute that the document says what it
says.”428
Judges within the Fifth Circuit also engaged Judge Shadur’s State
Farm v. Riley Appendix.429 In 2018, Professor Lisa Lavie Jordan and her
Tulane Law School Environmental Law Clinic students schooled federal
government lawyers on how to answer properly under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.430 Professor Jordan and her students, on behalf of and
in league with some environmental groups, challenged the United States
Environmental Protection Agency’s “approval of Louisiana’s lowered
requirements for dissolved oxygen levels in thirty-one water bodies north
and west of Lakes Ponchartrain and Maurepas . . . .”431 The EPA’s
lawyers answered the complaint and amended complaint in the familiar,
evasive fashion. Professor Jordan and her group moved to strike the
answer claiming, inter alia, that the answer was “nonresponsive and not
properly pleaded,” that the EPA claimed that “documents or reports . . .
‘speak for themselves,’” and, of course, that “the EPA also refused to
respond to many of the allegations by contending they are ‘conclusions
of law to which no response is required.’”432
Mary Ann Vial Lemmon,433 United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Louisiana, instructed her fellow government
employees from the Department of Justice and U.S. Attorney’s Office
how to answer complaints. Judge Lemmon first noted, in a header, that
“Defendants’ answer does not meet the requirements of Rule 8(b).”434
She then included Rule 8(b) and its six subsections in her order, lest the
government attorneys be unable to find a copy of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure either online or in print.435 Next, Judge Lemmon quoted
from Federal Rules commentators Professors Steven Gensler and Lumen
Mulligan, whose commentary about Rule 8 cites Shadur and sounds a lot
428. Id.
429. I found no citations of the Appendix in opinions or orders concerning speaking documents
in the Second, Third, or Fourth Circuits.
430. Gulf Restoration Network v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 18-CV-1632, 2018
WL 5297743 (E.D. La. Oct. 25, 2018).
431. Id. at *1.
432. Id.
433. Lemmon, Mary Ann Vial, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/lemmonmary-ann-vial [https://perma.cc/A2LL-UPZW] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
434. Gulf Restoration Network, 2018 WL 5297743, at *1.
435. Id. at *2.
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like him: “It is (unfortunately) common for lawyers to use responses other
than the three options of admitting, denying, and stating lack of
information. For example,” Judge Lemmon continued quoting, “lawyers
sometimes will respond to an allegation by saying that ‘it is a legal
conclusion that requires no response.’ Also,” the judge continued, “when
an allegation concerns the content of a document, lawyers sometimes will
respond by saying that ‘the document speaks for itself.’”436 Next, the
judge noted that “[a]s numerous district courts have concluded:
Responses that documents speak for themselves and that allegations are
legal conclusions do not comply with rule 8(b)’s requirements.”437 She
then cited the Appendix, a number of other Shadur opinions, and some
fellow travelers.438 Applying these cases and principles, Judge Lemmon
handed the clinic professor and her students a win and “conclude[d] that
the defendants’ answer does not comply with Rule 8(b).”439 Judge
Lemmon struck the government’s answer and ordered the federal
attorneys to replead.440 In so doing, she also handed the students another
lesson: when defendants ignore the Federal Civil Rules of Procedure in
answering, they usually get a do-over.
Within the Fifth Circuit, a Mississippi Bankruptcy Judge also has cited
Judge Shadur’s Appendix. In 2019, Judge Neil Olack441 observed that “a
litigant’s failure to deny that documents are what they purport to be,
combined with a statement that the documents ‘speak for themselves,’
may constitute an admission as to their authenticity,” but he did not find
that the answering party had thereby admitted signing any of the
documents.442 In a footnote, Judge Olack quoted Judge Shadur’s sentence
about “attempting to listen to such written materials for years” and noted
that “[w]hether an answer to an allegation in a complaint that a written
document ‘speaks for itself’ satisfies the minimum pleading standards of
Rule 7008(b) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy is not before the

436. Id. (citing and quoting 1 FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULES AND
COMMENTARY RULE 8).
437. Id. at *3.
438. In addition to twice citing State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Riley (State
Farm v. Riley), 199 F.R.D. 276, 278 (N.D. Ill. 2001), Judge Lemmon cited Thompson v. Retirement
Plan for Employees of S.C. Johnson & Sons, Inc., Nos. 07-CV-1047, 08-CV-0245, 2008 WL
5377712, at *1–2 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 22, 2008); Northern Indiana Metals v. Iowa Express, Inc., No.
07-CV-414, 2008 WL 2756330, at *3 (N.D. Ind. July 10, 2008); Rudzinski v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co., No. 05-C-0474, 2007 WL 2973830, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 2007); and Lane v. Page,
272 F.R.D. 581, 602–03 (D.N.M. 2011).
439. Gulf Restoration Network, 2018 WL 5297743, at *3.
440. Id. at *4.
441. Hon. Neil P. Olack, AM. COLL. BANKR., https://www.americancollegeofbankruptcy.com/
directory/neil-p-olack-311 [https://perma.cc/DM6G-7RY3] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
442. In re World Health Jets LLC, 610 B.R. 118, 143 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2019).
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Court.”443 Though the question was not before the court, Judge Olack
swung the door open wide. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7008
shares the title “General Rules of Pleading” with FRCP 8. Rule 7008
begins by noting that “[FRCP 8] applies in adversary proceedings.”444
Thus, Judge Olack connected Judge Shadur’s pleading rules to the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.
Judge Shadur’s Appendix has also found an audience within the Sixth
Circuit’s district courts. In 2009, Judge Denise Page Hood,445 of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, cited
the Shadur Appendix approvingly when a plaintiff suing the Ford Motor
Company “challenged 19 responses that indicated that the document and
testimony ‘speaks for themselves.’” After quoting Judge Shadur’s pithy
language about lawyers who engaged in avoidance or laziness by using
the “unacceptable device” of “speaks for itself,” Judge Hood ordered
Ford to “answer each paragraph of Plaintiffs’ complaint in accordance
with the requirements set forth in Rule 8(b).”446 Again, as in Louisiana,
the judge allowed a do-over with no penalty for Ford after the plaintiff
and the court expended considerable effort.
In 2013, four years after Judge Hood’s citation of Judge Shadur’s
Appendix when she struck Ford’s answers, a Kentucky district court
judge, Karen K. Caldwell,447 noted that “[w]hile some courts have been
quite colorful in their opposition to the practice of stating documents
‘speak for themselves,’ the Court has found little, if any, guidance from
courts within the Sixth Circuit.”448 Judge Caldwell considered a
plaintiff’s motion seeking to strike forty-four paragraphs of the answer
that “state that certain documents ‘speak for themselves’ and that they
‘deny anything stated or implied to the contrary.’ The other paragraphs,”
Judge Caldwell noted, “follow a similar pattern.”449
Judge Caldwell found and cited the Shadur Appendix in a footnote,450
but within the Sixth Circuit, Judge Caldwell found only one “speaks for
itself” case, which involved a response to a request for admission, not an

443. Id. at 143 n.10.
444. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7008.
445. Hood, Denise Page, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/hood-denise-page
[https://perma.cc/9LNA-2X9Q] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
446. Joseph v. Ford Motor Co., No. 06-10274, 2009 WL 10680506, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30,
2009).
447. Caldwell, Karen K., FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/caldwell-karen-k
[https://perma.cc/LDU7-QGEA] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
448. Solis v. Hofmeister, No. 12-CV-250, 2013 WL 12180720, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 21, 2013).
449. Id. (citation omitted).
450. Id. at *1 n.2 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley (State Farm v. Riley), 199
F.R.D. 276, 279 (N.D. Ill. 2001)).
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answer to a complaint.451 Notwithstanding Judge Hood’s citation of the
State Farm v. Riley Appendix in her order involving Ford, Judge
Caldwell did not cite her Sixth Circuit colleague’s case. “Recognizing
that the Sixth Circuit generally disfavors the striking of pleadings,” Judge
Caldwell wrote, “the Court finds such a remedy is not clearly warranted
in this case.”452
Just a few months after Judge Caldwell decided not to strike any of the
forty-four paragraphs that departed from Rule 8’s pathways, District
Court Judge Timothy Black,453 of the Sixth Circuit’s Southern District of
Ohio, engaged in the same inquiry. Citing the Shadur Appendix, he
noted—perhaps a little disapprovingly—that “[w]hile some courts have
strongly opposed the practice of stating documents ‘speak for
themselves,’ this Court has found little, if any, guidance from courts
within the Sixth Circuit and therefore relies on the persuasive caselaw
from other districts.”454 Judge Black either did not find or chose not to
cite the related orders of Judges Caldwell and Hood. Judge Black
explained that “[w]hile Defendants’ answer repeatedly states that ‘the
policies/documents/ERISA speak for themselves,’ they also either admit
or deny each allegation.”455 Impatient with the whole exercise, Judge
Black ordered everyone to plead better. “After careful review of both the
complaint and the answer, the Court finds that both documents need to
be amended in order to proceed,” he held. “Specifically,” he lectured,
“Plaintiff must advance specific allegations from the language of the
documents/policy instead of interpreting or paraphrasing to avoid
Defendants need to state that the documents/policy ‘speaks for itself.’
Defendants,” he continued, “shall provide less-evasive answers and not
rely on ‘the document speaks for itself.’” Raising his tone, Judge Black
wrote, “[m]oreover, this Court is not interested in additional satellite
litigation. The parties need to work cooperatively to narrow the relevant
issues and elicit the relevant facts rather than,” he complained, “engage
in a game of litigation semantics.”456 I understand his exasperation,
however, this sort of judicial impatience most often leaves plaintiffs in
the dark, not defendants.

451. Robert Weiler Co. v. Kingston Twp., No. 07-CV-0760, 2008 WL 4758682, at *5 (S.D.
Ohio Oct. 27, 2008).
452. Solis, 2013 WL 12180720, at *1.
453. Black, Timothy Seymour, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/blacktimothy-seymour [https://perma.cc/A8RF-3CHJ] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
454. Alcorn v. Parker Hannifin Corp., No. 13-CV-119, 2013 WL 12121515, at *1 (S.D. Ohio
June 27, 2013) (citation omitted).
455. Alcorn, 2013 WL 12121515, at *1 (citing Pavlik v. FDIC, No. 10-C-816, 2010 WL
3937621, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 2010)).
456. Alcorn, 2013 WL 12121515, at *2.

980

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 52

In 2019, United States Magistrate Judge H. Bruce Guyton457 of the
Sixth Circuit’s Eastern District of Tennessee, issued an order in a matter
in which the plaintiff sued under the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act.458 Among the plaintiff’s complaints was that for fourteen
allegations, the defendant creditor “improperly state[d] that the statute or
document speaks for itself and do[es] not require a response.”459 The
plaintiff asked “the Court to enter an order requiring the Defendants to
amend their Answer to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(b),
or for the Court to deem the allegations in the Complaint admitted.”460
Judge Guyton found and cited Judge Hood’s order in the Ford case,461
cited Judge Shadur’s Appendix, added citations from North Carolina,462
Texas,463 and Indiana,464 and then without hemming or hawing ordered
that “Defendants are instructed to amend their answers to the challenged
paragraphs to clearly state whether they admit, deny, or lack sufficient
information to form a belief as to the truth of an averment.”465
The Eighth Circuit has thus far not been friendly to Judge Shadur’s
approach. Only one case cites his Appendix. And not approvingly.
Magistrate Judge Daneta Wollman,466 from the Western Division of
the District of South Dakota, dealt in 2018 with a plaintiff’s motion to
strike twenty paragraphs of an answer in which the defendant claimed the
“documents speak for themselves.”467 Judge Wollman noted that “[i]n
support of his motion, Plaintiff relies on caselaw from the Northern
District of Indiana, the Northern District of Georgia, the Middle District

457. Bruce
Guyton,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Bruce_Guyton
[https://perma.cc/EE67-9VUV] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021); H. Bruce Guyton, BLOOMBERG,
https://www.bloomberg.com/profile/person/15879383
[https://perma.cc/C3UB-H5SG]
(last
visited Apr. 5, 2021).
458. Forsythe v. First Fin. Inv. Fund Holdings, LLC, No. 19-CV-79, 2019 WL 3979642, at *1
(E.D. Tenn. Aug. 22, 2019); 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.
459. Forsythe, 2019 WL 3979642, at *1.
460. Id.
461. Joseph v. Ford Motor Co., No. 06-10274, 2009 WL 10680506, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30,
2009).
462. Farrell v. Pike, 342 F. Supp. 2d 433, 440 (M.D.N.C. 2004).
463. Nichia Corp. v. Vizio, Inc., No. 16-CV-00875, 2017 WL 10442228, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Nov.
15, 2017).
464. Do It Best Corp. v. Heinen Hardware, LLC, No. 13-CV-69, 2013 WL 3421924, at *6 (N.D.
Ind. July 8, 2013).
465. Forsythe, 2019 WL 3979642, at *2.
466. Daneta
Wollmann,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Daneta_Wollmann
[https://perma.cc/43UT-LRZ3] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021); U.S. Attorney Attends Investiture of U.S.
Magistrate Judge, U.S. ATT’Y’S OFF., DIST. S. DAK. (May 15, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sd/pr/us-attorney-attends-investiture-us-magistrate-judge
[https://perma.cc/Y9Q4-AUJS].
467. Hobbs v. Emps. Mut. Cas. Co., No. 17-CV-05040, 2018 WL 1221166, at *2 (D.S.D. Mar.
8, 2018).
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of Pennsylvania, and the Northern District of Illinois.”468 “However,”
Judge Wollman wrote, “Plaintiff fails to identify a single Eighth Circuit
case in support of his position.”469 Judge Wollman then noted that
“[o]ther federal district courts have arrived at a conclusion opposite to
that urged by Plaintiff,” citing two cases from the Western District of
Missouri.470
Within the Ninth Circuit, the first citation of Judge Shadur’s Appendix
was in 2008 in the Eastern District of California. District Judge
Lawrence J. O’Neill471 stated, as the topic sentence of a paragraph, that
“[c]ourts do not tolerate the ‘speaks for itself response . . . .’”472 Judge
O’Neill then inserted Judge Shadur’s sentences about his forlornly
hoping over the years that a document might speak after lazy (or
concealing) lawyers claimed the document could indeed speak.473
In 2015, Judge Susan Watters474 of the District of Montana cited
Shadur’s Appendix regarding an odd argument that the plaintiff really
should not have raised. The Billings Clinic had answered a number of the
plaintiff’s allegations, which he brought as personal representative of the
estate of a woman who died after being admitted to the Billings Clinic.
The Clinic’s three lawyers, from the Speare Law Firm in Billings,
answered first that “documents speak for themselves” but then either
admitted or denied the allegation.475 Judge Watters noted correctly that
Judge Shadur’s Appendix “simply says what Rule 8 says, which is that it
is not sufficient for a party to assert only that the document ‘speaks for
itself.’” Correctly explaining the Appendix, Judge Watters noted that
“[t]he party must also still ‘employ one of the three alternatives that are

468. Id. at *2 n.2 (citing Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Hartford Iron & Metal Inc., No. 14-CV-00006,
2015 WL 5730662 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2015); Sinclair Cattle Co. v. Ward, No. 14-CV-1144, 2015
WL 6125260 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2015); FDIC v. Stovall, No. 14-CV-00029, 2014 WL 8251465
(N.D. Ga. Oct. 2, 2014); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Riley (State Farm v. Riley), 199 F.R.D.
276 (N.D. Ill. 2001)).
469. Hobbs, 2018 WL 1221166, at *2.
470. Id. at *3 (citing Thornburg v. Open Dealer Exch., LLC, No. 17-CV-6056, 2018 WL
340050 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 9, 2018); Eternal Invs., LLC v. City of Lee’s Summit, No. 05-CV-5021,
2006 WL 573919 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 8, 2006)).
471. O’Neill, Lawrence Joseph, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/oneilllawrence-joseph [https://perma.cc/SJ48-G28N] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
472. Frank v. Wilbur-Ellis Co. Salaried Emps. LTD Plan, No. CV-F-080284, 2008 WL
4370095, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2008).
473. Id. (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley (State Farm v. Riley), 199 F.R.D. 276,
279 (N.D. Ill. 2001)).
474. Watters, Susan Pamela, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/watterssusan-pamela [https://perma.cc/42UN-JJHX] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
475. Osborne v. Billings Clinic, No. 14-CV-126, 2015 WL 13466114, at *2 (D. Mont. Mar. 30,
2015).
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permitted by Rule 8(b).’”476 The judge then gave the plaintiff a bit of a
swat, saying, “[h]is motion with respect to this issue is denied and it is
questionable whether this portion of Osborne’s motion was brought in
good faith.”477
Within the Tenth Circuit, Judge James Browning478 of the District for
New Mexico was the first judge to cite the Shadur Appendix concerning
documents that speak.479 In a 2011 order in Lane v. Page, Judge
Browning encountered a variety of evasive defense tactics, including the
claims that a Proxy Statement “speaks for itself.”480 Citing the Shadur
Appendix and other support, Judge Browning made the defendants
replead their answers.481 Judge Browning’s order appears in the FRD.482
In 2018, Judge Browning issued another order—one that also appears
in the FRD—that cites Lane v. Page, includes again citation of the Shadur
Appendix, and addresses again the pleading issues that concerned
Shadur—speaking documents, refusal to respond to legal conclusions—
and is heavy with citations from within the Seventh Circuit.483 The
defendant had answered a number of allegations with this model:
“Defendants admit the allegations contained in Paragraph 56 of the
Complaint and state that the letter speaks for itself.” The plaintiff moved
to strike or for more definite statement. Citing his own order from a 2015
case, Judge Browning makes clear that if a defendant states that an
allegation seeks a legal conclusion but also admits or denies the
allegation, the response is proper.484 He mapped that same analysis onto
answers that admit or deny before adding that the document speaks for
itself.485
Last, and hardly least among the federal cases in the various circuits
that cite Judge Shadur’s Appendix regarding answers that documents
speak for themselves is the 2014 order from the Eleventh Circuit’s
Northern District of Georgia. Senior District Judge William C.
476. Id. (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley (State Farm v. Riley), 199 F.R.D. 276,
278 (N.D. Ill. 2001)).
477. Id.
478. Browning, James O., FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/browningjames-o (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
479. Lane v. Page, 272 F.R.D. 581, 603 (D.N.M. 2011), overruled by Tanner v. McMurray, 429
F. Supp. 3d 1047 (D.N.M. 2019).
480. The phrase “proxy statement” literally mean speaks for someone else, so the lawyers really
were answering that the proxy statement spoke for itself when it spoke for someone else.
481. Lane, 272 F.R.D. at 603.
482. Id. at 581.
483. Martinez v. Naranjo, 328 F.R.D. 581 (D.N.M. 2018).
484. Id. at 599.
485. See also Judge Browning’s order in Kassa v. Plans Admin. Comm. of Citigroup, Inc., No.
CIV 10-0933, 2011 WL 13289818, at *4 (D.N.M. Apr. 27, 2011), which presents the same analysis
using sometimes identical language.
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O’Kelley486 titled the third section of his order “The Document Speaks
for Itself.” He then wrote: “A pox upon these words. They have no place
in a proper response—whether it be made in response to discovery
requests or an allegation in a complaint or counterclaim.”487 One suspects
that he and Judge Shadur were friends.
Judge O’Kelley experienced the frustration that plaintiffs’ lawyers feel
when they read answers. “More than half of defendants’ responses to
plaintiff’s complaint begin with the statement that ‘[t]he [referenced
documents] are written documents that speak for themselves,’” he noted
unhappily. “Stating that a document ‘speaks for itself’ is nonsensical and
completely contrary to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” he
thundered.488 In a paragraph that cited the Shadur Appendix, the judge
tried an analogy: “No reasonable party would deny an allegation
describing an event on the basis that ‘the events described in paragraph
[x] speak for themselves.’”489 “There is no reason to change that
eminently reasonable position,” he explained, “because a fact is or may
have been described in a document rather than described in the
abstract.”490
Like Judge Shadur, Judge O’Kelley focused on the actual impact of
courts allowing bad answers. “The practical implication of these pseudoresponses is that a party must request much broader discovery because
the opposing party did not really admit anything,” the senior judge
explained. He continued, “Not only does this needlessly increase the costs
of litigation—something that this court strives to avoid—but the
discovery process may devolve into a battle royale of broad requests
against worthless responses. At this juncture,” he explained, “the
‘document speaks for itself’ line may reappear as a faux-answer to a
request for admission or interrogatory where it will be equally
unwelcome.”491 He concluded by noting that “[t]wo things are certain:
the exercise is a waste of the parties’ money and scarce judicial
resources.”492 Like other judges, Judge O’Kelley focused on the waste of
486. O’Kelley, William Clark, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/okelleywilliam-clark [https://perma.cc/2QSH-KN3Z] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
487. FDIC v. Stovall, No. 14-CV-00029, 2014 WL 8251465, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 2, 2014).
See Josh Sundloff, The Document Speaks for Itself: “A Pox Upon These Words”, UTAH B.J.,
September/October 2016, at 30 (2016) (describing the emptiness of the phrase “the document
speaks for itself”).
488. Stovall, 2014 WL 8251465, at *11.
489. Id. at *12.
490. Id.
491. Id. (citing Lewis v. Michaels Stores, Inc., No. 05-CV-1323, 2007 WL 2021833, at *3 n.1
(M.D. Fla. July 12, 2007) (“The tautological ‘objection’ that the finder of fact can read the
document for itself to see if the quote is accurate is not a legitimate objection but an evasion of the
responsibility to either admit or deny a request for admission.”)).
492. Id.
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the court’s time—his time—and the additional expense to the plaintiff in
investigating, proving, or forcing the admission of allegations that the
Rules required defendants to simply admit or deny. Judge O’Kelley
understood that plaintiffs, in response to their complaints, ought to
receive the truth costlessly. Imposing costs on the plaintiff to receive
information that the defendant is obliged to admit for free is inefficient.
Of course, Judge O’Kelley ordered the defendants to replead.493
B. Legal Conclusions
Moving numerically through the circuits again, no judges in the First
through Fourth Circuits cited Judge Shadur’s Appendix on the issue of
answering pleaded legal conclusions. However, district court judges in
the Fifth Circuit have twice cited Judge Shadur’s Appendix when
touching the issue.
As noted above, Professor Jordan of Tulane’s Environmental Law
Clinic and her students successfully challenged an answer from the
United States Department of Justice. The federal government’s lawyers
claimed unsuccessfully that documents spoke for themselves, and
“[l]ikewise, defendants’ answer repeatedly states that certain allegations
are ‘legal conclusions requiring no answer.’”494 Not so, said Judge
Lemmon, citing the Shadur Appendix and other cases that she included
when rejecting the speaking documents claim.495
In 2019, another judge within the Fifth Circuit cited Judge Shadur’s
Appendix when forcing a defendant to replead an answer. District Judge
Andrew Hanen496 of the Southern District of Texas considered a motion
by the state of New Jersey, as defendant-intervenor, challenging the
answers of Justice Department lawyers in Texas v. United States.497
Judge Hanen included some examples. The amended complaint alleged
that:
219. The Plaintiff States have standing because they have a “personal
stake” in the outcome of this litigation. Susan B. Anthony List v.
Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014).498

493. Id. at *1.
494. Gulf Restoration Network v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, CV 18-1632, 2018 WL
5297743, at *2–3 (E.D. La. Oct. 25, 2018).
495. Goel v. Patni Computer Sys., Inc., No. 07-CV-1034, 2008 WL 11365217, at *2 (C.D. Ill.
2008).
496. Hanen, Andrew S., FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/hanen-andrew-s
(last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
497. Texas v. United States, No. 18-CV-00068, 2019 WL 10984476, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 9,
2019).
498. Id. at *2 (citing Amended Complaint at 52, Texas, 2019 WL 10984476).
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To which the defendant United States’ lawyers responded:
219. Paragraph 219 sets forth Plaintiffs’ jurisdictional allegations that
present legal conclusions and questions of law to be determined solely
by the Court, and to which no response is necessary. Defendants aver
that Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014) speaks
for itself.499

Judge Hanen first educated the government’s lawyers about the
purpose of pleading. Citing my late colleague Charles Alan Wright and
Arthur Miller’s treatise, the judge noted that the “theory of Rule 8(b) is
that a defendant’s pleading should apprise the opponent of those
allegations in the complaint that stand admitted and will not be in issue
at trial and those that are contested and will require proof to be established
to enable the plaintiff to prevail.”500 After this necessary, pedestrian start,
he then noted that “[l]egal conclusions, like factual allegations, require a
response,” and in support cited a case from the Middle District of
Pennsylvania, the Tulane Environmental Law Clinic’s case, and Judge
Shadur’s Appendix.501 Speaking personally, I am disappointed that
Justice Department lawyers choose to practice law in this fashion as if
they were, for example, auto insurance defense lawyers trying to wear
down a TV-advertising plaintiff’s lawyer and an injured client.502 I am
naïve, I suppose, in thinking that Justice Department lawyers ought to set
a good example for the legal profession. Judge Hanen did not express the
same disappointment, but he did make the federal government’s lawyers
replead their answer.503
No district courts within the Sixth Circuit have cited Judge Shadur’s
Appendix regarding refusal to answer legal conclusions, and I have
already discussed the Seventh Circuit. One judge within the Eighth
Circuit has cited the Shadur Appendix on the legal conclusions issue.
Within the Eastern District of Missouri, District Judge Charles
Shaw504 cited Judge Shadur’s Appendix in 2013 after a defendant’s
lawyer’s evasive answers appear to have gotten under the judge’s skin; in
response, he gave the defendants pretty much the full Shadur
499. Id. (citing Federal Defendants’ Answer at 28, Texas, 2019 WL 10984476).
500. Id. (citing 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1261 (3d ed. 2018)).
501. Id. (citing Kegerise v. Susquehanna Twp. Sch. Dist., 321 F.R.D. 121, 124 (M.D. Pa. 2016);
Gulf Restoration Network v. EPA, No: 18-1632, 2018 WL 5297743, at *2–3 (E.D. La. Oct. 25,
2018); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley (State Farm v. Riley), 199 F.R.D. 276, 278 (N.D.
Ill. 2001)).
502. Nora Freeman Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1485, 1494
n.38 (2009); Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805, 818
(2011); Russell, supra note 7, at Section III.B.
503. Texas, 2019 WL 10984476, at *2.
504. Shaw, Charles Alexander, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/shawcharles-alexander (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
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treatment.505 In a diversity matter, some Lloyds of London underwriters
sought “a declaration that a commercial property insurance policy they
issued to defendant SSDD, LLC” was void because of the insured’s
misrepresentations and omissions.506 Judge Shaw noted that, sua sponte,
he had “ordered Underwriters to amend its complaint to allege, among
other things, ‘the state of citizenship of each member of defendant SSDD,
LLC, including the state of principal place of business for corporate
members, and the state of citizenship of all members of any LLC or
partnership members.’”507 Complying with the Court’s order, the
Underwriter’s Amended Complaint alleged:
3. SSDD is the Named Insured under the Policy. SSDD is a limited
liability company organized under the laws of Delaware with its
principal place of business in Dallas, Texas and SSDD is authorized
and/or licensed to do business in Missouri. Paul Weismann is the sole
owner, member, manager and shareholder of SSDD and is a citizen of
Connecticut.508

Apparently oblivious to the Court’s having ordered the plaintiff to
upgrade this paragraph of the complaint to identify details sufficient to
establish (if admitted) diversity of citizenship, defendant SSDI’s lawyers,
from the St. Louis law firm of Behr and McCarter,509 responded with a
paragraph of complete evasion:
3. SSDD admits that it is the named insured on the Policy, but further
states that there are legal conclusions contained in Paragraph 3 and,
therefore, Paragraph 3 does not require a response. To the extent a
response is required, SSDD denies the remainder of Paragraph 3.510

After smelling the allegation of a legal conclusion, the St. Louis
lawyers refused to address anything other than that their client, SSDD,
was the insured. Taken seriously, their denial of “the Remainder of
Paragraph 3” was a denial that their client, SSDD, LLC was a limited
liability company; that the LLC had organized in Delaware; that the
LLC’s principal place of business was in Dallas; and that Paul Weismann,
with whom one can presume the lawyers dealt with on a regular basis,
lived in Connecticut and was the sole owner, member, manager, and
shareholder of the LLC. Imagining how the plaintiff might have alleged
that the defendant was a limited liability company or that Mr. Weissman
505. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London Subscribing to Certificate No. IPSI 12559 v.
SSDD, LLC, No. 13-CV-193, 2013 WL 6801832 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 23, 2013).
506. Id. at *1.
507. Id. at *4.
508. Amended Complaint ¶ 3, Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 2013 WL 6801832 (No. 13CV-193).
509. Anthony R. Behr, Esq., and Jason W. Kinser, Esq., of Behr and McCarter, St. Louis, MO,
represented the defendant. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 2013 WL 6801832.
510. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 2013 WL 6801832, at *4.
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was the sole member of the LLC without alleging a legal conclusion is
difficult—impossible really. Exactly what set of facts the defendant’s
lawyers might have been willing to admit that satisfied the diversity
jurisdiction requirements—as Judge Shaw had specified—is also
impossible to imagine.
Sounding beyond annoyed, Judge Shaw’s order is a Shaduresque order
that lawyers within the Eighth Circuit might adapt for their own use when
facing frivolous answers. Judge Shaw reviews Rule 8’s three options of
admit, deny, or lack of sufficient knowledge or information to form a
belief; and the effect of failing to deny.511 Judge Shaw next covered
ground that Judge Shadur did not explore in detail in his Appendix,
namely, when a defendant may not claim to lack “sufficient information
or knowledge.” Quoting fellow federal judges from Pennsylvania and the
District of Columbia as well as Professors Wright and Miller’s treatise,
Judge Shaw explained that answering defendants must be honest and may
not capriciously claim to lack information; that a defendant cannot claim
to lack knowledge that easy investigation will reveal; that defendant may
claim to have insufficient information about matters of general
knowledge or public record; and that federal courts will treat a
corporation as knowing the acts of its agents.512
Perhaps writing a draft of his own Shadur-like Appendix, Judge Shaw
noted “SSDD’s answer that it need not respond to ‘legal conclusions’
finds no support in the language of Rule 8(b), which requires a response
to all allegations.”513 He cited the Shadur Appendix as well as a
magistrate judge’s 2013 order from the Middle District of Florida.514 In
a footnote, Judge Shaw addressed the Iqbal issue: “[e]ven under the
Supreme Court’s recent pronouncements concerning pleading standards,
legal conclusions remain an integral part of a complaint . . . .”515 Like
Judge Shadur, he wrote that “[m]ost notably, a plaintiff’s allegation of
subject matter jurisdiction is certainly a legal conclusion, but it must be
answered.”516 Unlike Judge Shadur, Judge Shaw held that “[t]he fact that
SSDD’s answer to paragraph 3 concludes with a general denial does not
make the otherwise improper response proper.”517 He further explained
511. Id. at *3.
512. Id. (citing Djourabchi v. Self, 240 F.R.D. 5, 12 (D.D.C. 2006); David v. Crompton &
Knowles Corp., 58 F.R.D. 444, 446 (E.D. Pa. 1973); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 500, § 1262).
513. Id. at *4 (citations omitted).
514. Clarendon Am. Ins. Co. v. All Brothers Painting, Inc., No. 13-CV-934, 2013 WL 5921538,
at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 2013).
515. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 2013 WL 6801832, at *4 n.1 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) and quoting from the case as follows: “While legal conclusions can
provide the framework for a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”).
516. Id.
517. Id. at *5.
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that “the concluding denial leaves plaintiffs and the Court to guess
whether SSDD is denying the entire paragraph because it disputes all the
averments, or because it disagrees with some part of the paragraph.”518
After observing that “many paragraphs of [Plaintiff] Underwriters’
Complaint lend themselves to convoluted answers because they contain
multiple factual assertions,”519 Judge Shaw dissected the denials and
refusals to answer of defendant SSDD’s lawyers. “SSDD, as the entity at
issue,” Judge Shaw explained, “has ‘knowledge or information sufficient
to form a belief about the truth of the allegation,’ Rule 8(b)(5), concerning
its states of incorporation and principal place of business, and therefore
must either admit or deny those allegations.”520 Likewise, SSDD had
knowledge about its authority to do business in Missouri, a fact—or legal
conclusion?—that SSDD had alleged in its own counterclaim.521
After all this brain damage, Judge Shaw made the defendants replead
their answer properly. In place of their original dodge in responding to
the Complaint’s third paragraph, in which SSDD had admitted only to
being the insured, SSDD filed an amended answer that crisply stated:
3. SSDD denies that its principal place of business is Dallas, TX. SSDD
admits the remainder of the allegations contained in Paragraph 3 of the
Complaint.522

Of course, SSDD had sufficient information to respond to this
allegation in precisely this informative way when the lawyers had
answered nearly six months before. After conferrals, a motion, response,
reply, and the judge’s labor to create a long order, the defendant-insured’s
lawyers answered the complaint’s allegations as Sua Sponte Shadur
would have required. But getting there took more effort in Judge Shaw’s
courtroom than would have been the case in Judge Shadur’s. So far as I
can tell, defendant SSDD’s lawyers repleaded their answer without any
further sanction; the plaintiff’s lawyers did not receive the costs or fees
of their efforts; and Mr. Weissman, the Connecticut man who was the
LLC’s sole member, likely received from his lawyers a bill—to quote
Judge Shadur—“for the added work and expense incurred in correcting
[his] counsel’s own errors.”523
On the topic of pleading legal conclusions, Ninth Circuit courts have
not cited Judge Shadur’s Appendix, but several in the Tenth Circuit have.
518. Id.
519. Id. at *4.
520. Id.
521. Id.
522. Defendant SSDD, LLC’s Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaims to
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Other Relief, at 2 ¶ 3, Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 2013 WL 6801832 (No. 13-CV-193).
523. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley (State Farm v. Riley), 199 F.R.D. 276, 279 (N.D.
Ill. 2001).
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As discussed above, Judge Browning parried the defendant’s refusal to
answer when documents spoke for themselves in Lane v. Page.524 In the
same order, he addressed defense refusal to respond to the allegation of
legal conclusions. Citing Shadur’s Appendix and Judge Stadtmueller’s
2008 order in Thompson v. Retirement Plan,525 which I discussed
above,526 he noted that “[r]esponses that documents speak for themselves
and that allegations are legal conclusions do not comply with rule 8(b)’s
requirements.”527 Carrying this pleading torch for New Mexico, Judge
Browning has since written three orders that cite both the Shadur
Appendix and his own order in Lane v. Page.528 In 2018, Judge Browning
made clear that rather than deeming improperly answered allegations
admitted, he would order defendants to replead.529 I believe his allowing
defendants to replead guarantees that defendants will continue to evade
answering.
Last, the Eleventh Circuit and Florida. Ms. Lilia Gomez, a pro se
plaintiff, sued the United States in the Southern District of Florida
seeking a refund of money she had paid to the IRS. Justice Department
lawyers answered and counterclaimed, and Ms. Gomez refused to answer
seven paragraphs because the allegations were “legal conclusion[s] to
which no response is required” and ten paragraphs because the documents
spoke for themselves with a qualified denial tacked on to nine of those
“to the extent that any response is required.”530 The practice of asserting
frivolous defenses is so widespread and so normalized that pro se
plaintiffs engage in this evasion of Rule 8!
In 2010, District Judge Marcia Cooke531 cited Judge Shadur’s
Appendix and Judge Stadtmueller’s order in Thompson v. Retirement
Plan. Judge Cooke deemed admitted the seven allegations that Ms.
Gomez had not answered because the United States had counterclaimed
with legal conclusions. Judge Cooke admitted these allegations because
Ms. Gomez had not otherwise denied these allegations. 532 By contrast,
524. See supra p. 982; see also Lane v. Page, 272 F.R.D. 581, 602 (D.N.M. 2011).
525. Thompson v. Ret. Plan for Employees of S.C. Johnson & Sons, Inc., Nos. 07-CV-1047,
08-CV-0245, 2008 WL 5377712, at *1–2 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 22, 2008).
526. See supra p. 964.
527. Lane, 272 F.R.D. at 602 (citing Thompson, 2008 WL 5377712, at *1–2).
528. Kassa v. Plans Admin. Comm. of Citigroup, Inc., 10-CV-0933, 2011 WL 13289818, at *4
(D.N.M. Apr. 27, 2011); N. New Mexicans Protecting Land Water & Rights v. United States, 15CV-0559, 2015 WL 8329509, at *10–11 (D.N.M. Dec. 4, 2015); Martinez v. Naranjo, 328 F.R.D.
581, 599–600 (D.N.M. 2018).
529. Martinez, 328 F.R.D. at 600.
530. Gomez v. United States, 09-CV-22148, 2010 WL 3834211, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 28,
2010).
531. Cooke, Marcia G., FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/cooke-marcia-g
[https://perma.cc/J6LS-BZAC] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
532. Gomez, 2010 WL 3834211, at *2.
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Ms. Gomez’s tacking of denials onto her refusals to respond to documents
that “speak for themselves” won her the chance to replead her answers to
those counterclaim allegations.533 Satisfying as it may be for me to see a
federal judge use Rule 8(b)(6) to deem admitted improperly refused
allegations, I am troubled to find the rule applied against a pro se plaintiff.
For the sake of balance, perhaps the judges of the United States District
Courts could apply some form of collateral estoppel against the lawyers
of the Justice Department going forward.534 Having enforced Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8 against Ms. Gomez, federal lawyers can now
all be expected to apply the rule correctly and without evasion when
answering for the United States. If they step outside the rule as Ms.
Gomez did, then wouldn’t a fair result be to deem their responses
admitted regardless of whether they tacked conditional language of
denial? I know that’s not going to happen.
In 2013, Magistrate Judge Thomas Smith535 of Florida’s Middle
District, also cited Shadur’s Appendix regarding the pleading of legal
conclusions. For Lion Gables Realty Limited Partnership, Jeremy
Springhart, Esq., filed florid, formal, somewhat antique responses to
some of the plaintiff’s allegations.536 For example, Mr. Springhart
answered that “[p]aragraph 10 of the Amended Complaint does not allege
a single statement of ultimate facts to which Lion Gables may either
admit or deny. Furthermore,” the lawyer continued, “the allegations
contained in Paragraph 10 are vague and ambiguous. In an abundance of
caution, denied.”537 In a similar vein, Mr. Springhart answered some
paragraphs with
Admitted to the extent that the terms and conditions contained in
Exhibit [x] speak for themselves. Lion Gables denies any allegation or
quotation that is inconsistent with the express language set forth in
Exhibit [x]. In all other respects, the allegations contained in Paragraph

533. Id.
534. See supra p. 974.
535. Thomas
Smith,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Thomas_Smith
[https://perma.cc/N2D6-LMWQ] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
536. Wright and Miller explain that:
The codes [that predated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] required the pleader to
set forth the facts underlying and demonstrating the existence of his cause of action. In
the parlance fashionable during that era, the facts that were to be pleaded were the
‘ultimate facts’; the inclusion of ‘evidence’ and ‘conclusions of law’ was improper. This
compartmentalization of pleading categories proved to be a chimera. As a result, much
litigant and judicial time and effort were expended in countless cases attempting to
distinguish ultimate facts from evidence and conclusions of law.
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 142, § 1218 (emphasis added).
537. Clarendon Am. Ins. Co. v. All Bros. Painting, Inc., 13-CV-934, 2013 WL 5921538, at *2
(M.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 2013).
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[y] are vague and ambiguous, and Lion Gables is unable to frame a
response. However, in an abundance of caution, denied.538

Citing Rule 8, the Shadur Appendix, a raft of cases from within the
Seventh Circuit, and Gomez, Judge Smith ordered Mr. Springhart to
replead his answer. Judge Smith noted that “[t]he fact that Lion Gables’
answers conclude with a general denial does not make its otherwise
improper responses proper.”539 He explained that “the manner in which
the concluding denial is made leaves the reader to guess whether Lion
Gables is denying the entire paragraph because it disputes all the
averments, or because it disagrees with some part of the paragraph.”540
Further, Judge Smith explained the harm to plaintiff Clarendon American
Insurance Company and, indeed, to every plaintiff who encounters
answers that depart from Rule 8. “Lion Gables’ objectionable answers
have prejudiced Plaintiff because,” the judge explained, “proper answers
would give Plaintiff notice of Lion Gables’ position on the facts alleged
in the amended complaint and potentially allow the parties to narrow the
issues and the scope of discovery.”541
C. Affirmative Defenses
Outside the Seventh Circuit, federal judges have not cited Judge
Shadur’s State Farm v. Riley Appendix with regard to the pleading of
affirmative defenses. Even within the Northern District, there were few
citations on this topic.542 There are three likely reasons for the paucity of
citations for this part of the Appendix. First, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals’ 1989 Heller decision covers the ground.543 Second, other
judges may simply disagree with Judge Shadur. Third, other judges may
feel that Judge Shadur’s technical emphasis on what constitutes an
affirmative defense is unimportant. And fourth, caught up in the issue of
whether shifts in pleading after the Iqbal and Twombly decisions, judges
have not landed on the side of requiring that defendants plead predicate
or foundational facts with their affirmative defenses.544
X. JUDGE SHADUR’S APPENDIX IN THE STATES
Judge Shadur’s Appendix has received little play in state court. I found
only three state court judges cited Judge Shadur’s Appendix. Why? One
538. Id.
539. Id. at *3.
540. Id.
541. Id.
542. In re Kmart Corp., 318 B.R. 409, 414 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004).
543. Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286 (7th Cir. 1989); see also supra
pp. 928–29 (discussing Heller).
544. See In re Kmart Corp., 318 B.R. at 414.
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obvious reason would be that Judge Shadur’s Appendix concerns the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Appendix has zero precedential
weight in interpreting state rules of civil procedure; indeed, in other
federal courts, the Appendix is merely persuasive authority. However,
states that have patterned their rules of civil procedure after the federal
rules typically agree that interpretations of the federal rules are at least
persuasive authority regarding construction of the state rules of civil
procedure.545
Another reason that Judge Shadur appears not be an influencer at the
state level is that within state courts, attorneys—for both plaintiffs and
defendants—are more tolerant of departures from Rule 8. Judges, too.
State court judges allow defense attorneys to plead the documents speak
for themselves, that legal conclusions need no reply, sometimes that strict
proof is needed, that fact-free affirmative defenses are fine; and that
reserving affirmative defenses until an attorney uncovers one through
research is appropriate.546 In their rules and commentary on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Professors Steven S. Gensler and Lumen N.
Mulligan comment that “it is unclear what exactly has led attorneys to
think these other responses are sufficient,” and they suggested that “most
think it is simply the result of lawyers accustomed to state-court practice
taking pleading techniques they learned—and that are tolerated—in state
court and assuming those techniques will also work in federal court.”547
Recall that Judge Shadur speculated in 1989 that defense attorneys were
all working from a formbook titled Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
How Not To Plead.548
Professors Gensler and Mulligan have absorbed Judge Shadur’s
concerns and style. They write:
It is (unfortunately) common for lawyers to use responses other than the
three options of admitting, denying, and stating lack of information. For
example, lawyers sometimes will respond to an allegation by saying
that “it is a legal conclusion that requires no response.” Also, when an
allegation concerns the content of a document, lawyers sometimes will
respond by saying that “the document speaks for itself.”549
545. Montgomery v. State, 967 So.2d 103, 106 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007); Smith v. Illinois Cent.
R.R. Co., 860 N.E.2d 332, 336 (Ill. 2006) (“[O]ur section 2-801 is patterned after Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and federal decision interpreting Rule 23 are persuasive authority
with regard to the question of class certification in Illinois.” (citation omitted)); Exec. Mgmt., Ltd.
v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 38 P.3d 872, 876 (Nev. 2002); Felix v. Galey Chevrolet, Inc., 49 N.E.3d
1224, 1230 (Ohio 2015); Yahnke v. Carson, 613 N.W.2d 102, 108 (Wis. 2000); Neylan v. Vorwald,
N.W. 2d 648, 656 (Wis. 1985).
546. See generally, Russell, supra note 7.
547. STEVEN S. GENSLER & LUMEN N. MULLIGAN, 1 FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
RULES AND COMMENTARY, Rule 8 n.177 (2021).
548. See Gilbert v. Johnston, 127 F.R.D. 145, 146 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
549. GENSLER & MULLIGAN, supra note 547, at Rule 8, Admitting or Denying the Allegations.
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The professors cite several Shadur orders, including the Appendix, in
support of their comments on the pleading behavior of state court
litigators.550 Professors Gensler and Mulligan do not speculate on why
state judges seem not to care about departures from the pleading rules.
A. State Courts
In 2001, Connecticut Judge Trial Referee Howard Zoarski551 cited
Judge Shadur’s Appendix in a footnote.552 The plaintiff moved to strike
six paragraphs from the defendant’s answer. The defendant’s lawyers had
responded, Judge Zoarski recounted, “by stating that ‘[t]he statements in
[the paragraphs] consist solely of legal conclusions for which no
responsive pleading is required. To the extent a responsive pleading is
required, [the defendant] neither admits nor denies the allegations
contained in [these paragraphs] as [the statutes] speaks for
[themselves].’”553 Judge Zoarski struck the responses after noting that
“only three types of responses are proper in the answer: admit, deny or
claim insufficient knowledge.”554 In his footnote citing the Appendix,
Judge Zoarski quoted Judge Shadur’s popular language about his years
listening, forlornly, for documents to speak.555 He granted the motion.556
Maryland is another state in which I found a state court citation of the
Shadur Appendix in a judicial opinion or order. In a 2009 opinion for a
three-judge panel of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland,557 Judge
Alexander Wright, Jr.,558 commented in a footnote that the appellants’
550. See GENSLER & MULLIGAN, supra note 547, at Rule 8 nn.178–79 (citing Kegerise v.
Susquehanna Twp. Sch. Dist., 321 F.R.D. 121, 122–23, (M.D. Pa. 2016)); Bruce v. Anthem Ins.
Cos., 2015 WL 1860002, *2 (N.D. Tex. 2015); Lane v. Page, 272 F.R.D. 581, 602–03 (D.N.M.
2011); United States v. Vehicle 2007 Mack 600 Dump Truck, 680 F. Supp. 2d 816, 828 (E.D. Mich.
2010); King Vision Pay Per View, Ltd. v. J.C. Dimitri’s Rest., Inc., 180 F.R.D. 332, 333 (N.D.
Ill. 1998); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley (State Farm v. Riley), 199 F.R.D. 276, 278
(N.D. Ill. 2001); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Marinemax of Ohio, Inc., 408 F. Supp. 2d 526, 530
(N.D. Ohio 2006); Westfield High School L.I.F.E. Club v. City of Westfield, 249 F. Supp. 2d 98,
102 n.4 (D. Mass. 2003)) (Shadur orders in bold).
551. Howard F. Zoarski, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Howard_F._Zoarski
[https://perma.cc/TL3Q-6AL4] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
552. Odell v. Wallingford Mun. Credit Union, No. CV-106012228S, 2011 WL 5842760, at *6
n.13 (Conn. Nov. 3, 2011).
553. Id. at *6 (alterations in original).
554. Id.
555. Id. at *6 n.13.
556. Id. at *6.
557. The Court of Special Appeals is an intermediate appellate court below the Court of
Appeals, which is Maryland’s highest court. See About the Maryland Court System, MD. CTS.
https://mdcourts.gov/courts/about [https://perma.cc/4JLZ-MJVR] (last visited Mar. 20, 2021).
558. Alexander
Wright,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Alexander_Wright
[https://perma.cc/9JWE-DDDD] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021); Hon. Alexander Wright, Jr. (Ret.) Joins
the
McCammon
Group,
MCCAMMON
GRP.
(June
24,
2020),
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answer, which had stated that “the terms of the contract speak for
themselves,” might be “problematic in attempting to specify which
allegations were, in fact, being denied.”559 Judge Wright quoted
“Maryland Rule 2–323(c), ‘[d]enials shall fairly meet the substance of
the averments denied’”560 and Judge Shadur’s Appendix including, of
course, Shadur’s language about the silence of documents to which he
listened, forlornly, for years. He also cited Wright and Miller’s comment
that “[i]t is also insufficient to . . . claim that ‘the documents speak for
themselves.’”561 Contra, Judge Wright cited District Judge David Allan
Katz’s562 order from the Northern District of Ohio holding “responses
that the documents ‘speak for themselves’ to be admissions that the
documents read as [the complainant] represents.”563 Finally, Judge Katz
also referred to a late-nineteenth-century Maryland case that appears to
have held that failure to deny a signature amounts to an admission,
although the applicability of that case is, at best, obscure in my view.564
Appropriately enough, the third state judge I found citing Judge
Shadur’s Appendix worked in the Richard J. Daley building not quite four
blocks north on Dearborn Street from Judge Shadur’s courtroom. In 2012,
Mathias Delort was Associate Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County,
where he served mostly in the Chancery Division.565 Writing during the
Great Recession that followed the economic crash of 2008, the judge
described the Chancery Division as “the country’s largest and busiest
foreclosure court . . . .”566 The 2012 order citing Judge Shadur’s
Appendix, which Judge Delort issued in response to a summary
judgement motion that Wells Fargo Bank’s attorney had filed seeking to
foreclose on a $750,000 mortgage,567 reads like something Judge Delort
might have written if he had just lunched with Judge Shadur.

https://www.mccammongroup.com/press-releases/hon-alexander-wright-jr-ret-joins-themccammon-group/ [https://perma.cc/8BGH-E52M].
559. Thomas v. Cap. Med. Mgmt. Assocs., LLC, 985 A.2d 51, 61 n.4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2009).
560. Id. (quoting Md. Rule 2-323(c)).
561. Thomas, 985 A.2d at 61 n.4 (citing 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1264 (3d ed. 2004)).
562. Katz, David, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/katz-david
[https://perma.cc/AF2U-KQES] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
563. Thomas, 985 A.2d at 61 n.4 (citing N.H. Ins. Co. v. Marinemax of Ohio, Inc., 408 F. Supp.
2d 526, 530 (N.D. Ohio 2006)).
564. Thomas, 985 A.2d at 61 n.4; Banks v. McCosker, 34 A. 539, 541 (Md. 1896).
565. Mathias W. Delort, ILL. CTS., http://www.illinoiscourts.gov/appellatecourt/
judges/bio_delort.asp [https://perma.cc/8HPS-W7RW] (last visited Apr. 19, 2021).
566. Green Tree Servicing v. Paz, No. 10-CH-13621, 2011 WL 5077861 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 18,
2011).
567. Wells Fargo Bank v. Brown, No. 09 CH 13581, 2012 WL 3058670 (Ill. Cir. Ct. May 4,
2012).
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The Cook County Chancery judge complained that “[z]ealous
foreclosure defense attorneys have taken up the notion that if they deny
substantive allegations in the complaint for specious reasons they can
‘force’ the lender to formally prove its allegations through time-wasting
and laborious formal proofs at a trial. However,” Judge Delort
commented that the Illinois’s procedural rules and foreclosure law
“render this strategy utterly worthless.”568
Judge Delort explained how defense attorneys should answer in
Illinois. He first noted that criminal defendants are entitled to plead not
guilty “even if they know they are guilty.”569 “In civil cases, however,”
the judge explained, “defendants must admit allegations they know to be
true.”570 Judge Shadur, to my knowledge, never used this simple, useful
contrast between civil and criminal cases.571 Judge Delort then turned to
the purpose of pleading: “A civil complaint and a proper truthful answer
delimit the factual disputes which the court must adjudicate.”572 Judge
Delort then chided that demanding “strict proof” and claiming that “the
document speaks for itself” were “improper,” citing, of course, Judge
Shadur’s Appendix.573 Continuing the lesson, he explained that in
Illinois, “[a] proper answer to a complaint must contain an explicit
admission, an explicit denial, or an explicit lack of knowledge assertion,
of each allegation in the complaint.”574
In the paragraph succeeding the pleading lesson, Judge Delort
explained that defense counsel may not claim insufficient knowledge
about an allegation and then deny the allegation.575 To support that
defense counsel may not deny what they do not know, Judge Delort cited
an order of Judge Shadur’s from January 2012, just a few months before
Judge Delort issued his order in the foreclosure case. Judge Shadur had
opened an order by writing: “This Court has completed the thankless task
of wading through the 86-page Answer by a dozen of the defendants to
the 200-paragraph First Amended Complaint (‘FAC’) in this
multiproperty mortgage foreclosure action brought by United Central
Bank (‘Bank’).”576 Sua Sponte Shadur reviewed the answer, found it
568. Id.
569. Id.
570. Id.
571. Judge Delort describes the criminal/civil pleading distinction again in Parkway Bank &
Trust Co. v. Korzen, 2 N.E.3d 1052, 1069 ¶¶ 35–36 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013), as supplemented (Dec. 16,
2013).
572. Wells Fargo Bank, 2012 WL 3058670.
573. Id.
574. Id. (citing 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-610(a)).
575. Id.
576. United Cent. Bank v. JJST Inc., 10-C-5550, 2012 WL 171659, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 20,
2012).
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lacking, struck it, ordered the defendants to replead, and, as then had been
customary for eleven years, ordered that “[n]o charge is to be made to
these defendants by their counsel for the added work and expense
incurred in correcting counsel's errors.” And, consistent with the
Appendix, ordered “Defendants’ counsel . . . to apprise their clients to
that effect by letter, with a copy to be transmitted to this Court's chambers
as an informational matter (not for filing).”577
Likewise, Judge Delort ordered the defendants to replead their
answer.578 However, by waiting until after the foreclosing bank had filed
a motion for summary judgment to scrutinize the answer, Judge Delort
gained none of the efficiencies that Judge Shadur’s Appendix and sua
sponte reviews created. Indeed, Judge Delort wrote that “while summary
judgment is probably warranted on this record, and most of the
defendants’ defenses are probably meritless, the better course of action is
to strike the defendants’ answer and require them to file an amended
answer before the court fully resolves any summary judgment
motion.”579 The delay in the grant of summary judgment was because the
defendant’s answer was “problematic” according the Judge Delort.580
Earlier resolution of the answer’s problems—sua sponte by Judge Delort
or through motions by Wells Fargo’s lawyers—might have concluded the
action sooner. There is, of course, no shame to be borne by the defense
attorneys, as delay is the second-best goal in foreclosure defense.
Later in 2012, Judge Delort won election to the First District Appellate
Court of Illinois581 where he has continued to instruct Illinois defense
attorneys to stop with their demands for “strict proof” and to otherwise
comply with the rules of civil procedure when answering. The following
year, in Parkway Bank & Trust Co. v. Korzen, Justice Delort repeated the
lessons about pleading that he had offered while a Cook County judge.582
Edward Margolis, Esq., a partner in the Chicago-based creditors’ rights
firm Teller Levit & Silvertrust, describes Parkway Bank as “an opinion
that should be mandatory reading for every practitioner . . . .”583 In 2018,
Justice Delort cited his 2013 order in support of a lower court that had
struck a defendant’s affirmative defenses with prejudice. In so doing,
577. Id. at *2.
578. Wells Fargo Bank, 2012 WL 3058670.
579. Id.
580. Id.
581. See Mathias W. Delort, supra note 565.
582. Parkway Bank & Tr. Co. v. Korzen, 2 N.E.3d 1052, 1069–70 ¶¶ 35–38 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013),
as supplemented (Dec. 16, 2013) (“A proper answer to a complaint must contain an explicit
admission or an explicit denial of each allegation in the complaint.” (citing 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/2-610(a))).
583. Edward S. Margolis, Pleading Lack of Knowledge: Not A Denial Under Illinois Law, ILL.
B.J., July 2016, at 44, 45.
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Justice Delort noted that “[t]he answer contained numerous procedural
deficiencies, including improperly demanding ‘strict proof’ of the
plaintiff’s allegations.”584 From Illinois’s First District Appellate Court,
Justice Delort appears to have launched a campaign to upgrade the
pleading in Illinois’s state courts, just as Judge Shadur had for federal
pleading from his courtroom in the Northern District of Illinois.585
B. The Vision Realized! Judge Shadur’s Appendix in Arizona
The common law’s method to resolve the meaning of Rule 8 is first to
await a controversy that turns into a case with an answer that offends the
plaintiff’s lawyers so much that the lawyers decide that risking the
possible wrath of the judge (and likely the defendant) is worthwhile when
balanced against the time- and money-cost of conferring with the other
side, drafting and filing a motion, awaiting a response, drafting and filing
a reply, and then, perhaps after a hearing, awaiting a decision from the
judge that, at best, allows the defendant a do-over, amended answer in
which the defendant, now months later, must actually admit or deny or
honestly confess insufficient knowledge to the complaint’s allegations,
or, at worst, the plaintiff’s lawyers will suffer the disapproval of the judge
for having delayed the case, but either way, neither the plaintiff nor the
defendant is likely at all to end up with an order that the circuit court of
appeals for the district, if in federal court, or the state court of appeals, if
in state court, will take up and issue an opinion that just might, perhaps,
conflict with the order of a different circuit court of appeals or, in state
court, perhaps conflict with another panel of the appellate court, so that
the Supreme Court of the United States or the state’s highest court might
become sufficiently interested that the high court justices might agree to
hear and decide the question of just what answers to complaints ought to
resolve.
Instead of awaiting the common law process the preceding paragraphlong sentence describes, the Arizona Supreme Court simply amended
Arizona’s Rule 8 in 2018.586 The Arizona Supreme Court made extensive
changes to its civil rules in order to enhance the efficiency of litigation
and made specific changes to Rule 8.587 The new rules took effect on July

584. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. Steward, 2018 IL App (1st) 172655-U, ¶ 4 (citing Parkway
Bank, 2 N.E.3d 1052, 1069, ¶ 36).
585. See also Judge Delort’s orders in Urban Partnership Bank v. 7725 S. Wolcott Bldg. Corp.,
No. 11-CH-2156, 2011 WL 3269287 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 16, 2011) (“The defendants’ answer is,
however, evasive and improperly pled.”); Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Johnson, No. 2007-CH17120, 2008 WL 3847315 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Feb. 20, 2008) (granting motion to strike answer and
ordering defendant to replead).
586. Application Provisions of Order No. R-17-0010, ARIZ. R. CIV. P.
587. See Prefatory Comment to the 2017 Amendments, ARIZ. R. CIV. P.
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1, 2018.588 Before then, Arizona’s Rule 8(b)(2) had been identical to
FRCP 8(b)(2). Both rules had been: “Denials—Responding to the
Substance. A denial must fairly respond to the substance of the
allegation.”589 But the Arizona Supreme Court changed and renumbered
Rule 8(c)(2) to read:
(2) Denials—Responding to the Substance. A denial must fairly respond
to the substance of the allegation. A denial does not fairly respond to
the substance of an allegation if it:
(A) answers an allegation by stating that “the document speaks for
itself”;
(B) answers an allegation by stating that the answering party “denies
any allegations inconsistent with the language of a document”; or
(C) answers a factual allegation, or an allegation applying law to fact,
by claiming that it states a legal conclusion.590

More efficiently even than the Shadur Appendix, the Arizona rule
change closes the mouths of documents that speak for themselves. The
rule change forecloses the option of defense lawyers pleading that they
deny only allegations inconsistent with the document but give no hint as
to what those allegations might be.591 Likewise, defense counsel may no
longer refuse to answer because the plaintiff’s allegation calls for a legal
conclusion.
The Arizona Supreme Court amended Rule 8 in other ways, too, as
part of sweeping changes that introduced limits on discovery based upon
a tiered system tied to the complexity of the cases. 592 Arizona has for
some time been simplifying discovery in civil litigation. For example, the
2018 changes swept car crash cases—the dominant category of personal
injury claims—along with other negligent and intentional torts cases plus
related tort cases into tier 1 and also lumped cases seeking $50,000 or
less into this tier.593 The rule changes allocated the smallest quantum of
discovery tools to this tier as well, with limits on the hours of fact-witness
depositions and the number of interrogatories, requests for production,
and requests for admission.594 Bigger cases get more discovery.595
The Arizona Supreme Court reduced discovery in smaller cases, which
could hurt plaintiffs who have complicated, lower-value disputes and also
could limit plaintiffs’ lawyers whose strategies depend on wearing down
588. Application Provisions of Order No. R-17-0010, ARIZ. R. CIV. P.
589. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(2) (2016) (amended in 2017 and renumbered as (c)(2)); FED. R. CIV.
P. 8(b)(2).
590. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(2).
591. Russell, supra note 7, at Section III.C.
592. Tiered Limits to Discovery Based on Attributes of Cases, ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.2.
593. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.2(b)(1) and (c)(3)(A).
594. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.2(f)(1).
595. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.2(f)(2) and (3).
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defendants and their lawyers (usually insurance lawyers) with waves of
pesky discovery requests. But what the court took away in discovery, the
court gave with answers. Disallowing the common dodges related to
speaking documents and legal conclusions gets plaintiffs actual answers
early in the litigation. An admitted fact is costless to the plaintiff. A fact
obtained through discovery never is free. The same is true for the court.
Having the defendant admit what’s true and deny what’s not is less costly
than involving the court in Rule 12 motions to determine the meaning of
the answer or discovery motions that as the plaintiff propounds
interrogatories and requests for admission seeking to get the defendant to
admit or deny the complaint’s allegations. The Arizona Supreme Court
has expedited litigation by amending Rule 8.
Is the Arizona change to Rule 8 the apotheosis of Judge Shadur’s
Appendix? Yes. Nowhere in the documents proposing the sweeping
changes to Arizona’s rules does Judge Shadur’s name appear, nor is there
a citation to his Appendix or any of his many rulings on these matters.
However, a protagonist in the efforts to reform Arizona’s rules told me
that, through his buddy who was a former Shadur clerk, he learned of
Judge Shadur’s positions and approach regarding answers during the
amendment process. Although the rule reform memos and documents do
not mention Shadur, the Arizona attorney involved in these changes
assures me that, as regards Judge Shadur and his Appendix, Arizona’s
new Rule 8 speaks for itself.

